Dr
Achim S t e i n e r
UNEP
Executive Director
United
Nations Environment Programme
Gigiri,
N
a i r o b i
K
E N Y A
--------------------------------------------------
Re:
Invisible threat to our planet biosphere – warning against infectious disease
globalization
Dear
Dr. Steiner,
first I would
like to appreciate the activities of your organization in protecting our planet
biosphere what was reflected also in the Nobel Peace Prize 2007 for your
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). This has given me a new
impulse to restart warnings against the threat
to our planet biosphere
by man-made animal infectious disease spreading and
globalization. The warning is based on my professional half a
century experience in this domain and on available relevant official data. The
basic information can be found in my letter sent to Mr. Ban
Ki-moon, Secretary-General, United Nations Organization (copy attached). I would like
to exploit this opportunity and provide you with more information showing the
urgency and complexity of this underestimated
very serious problem of the biosphere. The pathogenic microflora represents an integral component of the biosphere.
1. One of the important
dangers for our planet biosphere is
represented by mass spreading and globalization
of mostly invisible animal
infectious disease agents. The pathogenic microflora and parasites, integral
parts of the biosphere, still untouched domain of the global environmental
protection, merit adequate attention and necessary contra-measures. Infectious disease spreading belongs among the factors of man-made damaging our planet ecological and biological equilibrium as well as reducing its biodiversity.
2. Within the structure
of about one thousand of known animal
infectious disease species there are several thousands strains of different
types and subtypes complicating more their diagnosis, monitoring, surveillance,
prevention, control and eradication. Even within the same agent species there
can be strain types and subtypes differing mainly immunologically. Monohostal
infectious disease agents affect only one animal species while polyhostal infections
affect a wide range of hosts, i.e. they are transmissible to more than one
susceptible animal species. The infectious disease agents represent instable
dynamic very complex biological phenomena with the possibility of their
genotypic changes resulting e.g. from their mutation.
Examples:
Foot-and-mouth disease virus has 7 serotypes and more than 60 subtypes.
Numerous species and serotypes of Salmonella
are pathogenic for both animals and people.
3. Imported animal
infectious diseases have caused enormous number of human sufferings and
deaths and many times higher number of analogical consequences in animal
populations. Imported infectious diseases have
contributed to the extinction of many endangered animal species and even of
many human tribes and even nations. Animal species extinctions influenced by human
activities, including conscious infectious disease spreading through
international trade, have been more
numerous than their natural extinction.
4. The
complexity of these phenomena is represented also by different ways of transmission: direct through
contact with diseased animals or humans, through droplets spray, transplacental
and transovarial; indirect - vehicle-borne through contaminated inanimate
material such as water, products of animal origin (meat, milk, eggs, etc.),
feed and different objects; vector-borne mechanical and biological (to
succeeding generations – transovarian or transstadial transmission from one
stage of the life cycle to another) and aire-borne through droplet nuclei
and dust.
5. Animal
infectious diseases have different forms
such as clinically manifested acute
or chronic course or as subclinical
“carriers” spreading insidiously (for their discovery demanding special
etiological laboratory investigations or allergic tests are necessary).
6. Imported infectious diseases are extremely
difficult, usually impossible, to discover in time and to eradicate them. Every case is different. Territorial
eradication is extraordinary demanding, requiring a lot of resources and time.
Also in the infectious diseases against which the eradication methods are
available, their practical application is usually unreal due to serious
shortage of manpower, diagnostic laboratory capacities, funds,
legislation, public supports, etc. and due to requiring long periods without sure
and lasting success (risk of re-import or re-emergence). In the case of natural
nidality the effective and realistic methods are not yet available. Where the
government services are weak (private services have quite different priorities
and interests), mainly in poor developing countries, the eradication is without external assistance
unrealistic. The imported infections are continuously spreading without being
blocked by eradication programmes. In
the world no one animal infectious disease has been eradicated yet, in
spite of almost one hundred years of
international efforts.
7. Undesirable climatic changes, such as global warming, create
favourable conditions for: the reduction of population resistance against the
pathogens; the increase of pathogen virulence by the passages through newly
infected susceptible subpopulations; undesirable changes of biological
properties of the pathogens such as appearance of new strains - mutants, conversions of conditionally-pathogen
strains into full-pathogen ones, treatment resistant strains; undesirable
changes of global pathogen microflora in terms of quantity, quality and
structure influenced by continuously newly introduced pathogens from long
distance territories, etc. Shortly, actual changes in global climate create the
conditions for easier spreading of infectious diseases than up today. The undesirable climatic change
consequences are multiplied by the mentioned unwelcome changes in global
pathogen microflora and reverse. Simultaneous actions of the both factors strengthen mutually their negative impacts upon the biosphere and
health.
8. Thanks to World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Office of Epizootics (OIE) “new” very benevolent policy of
international trade in animals and their products, not requiring to guarantee the
infection-free status, the exporting countries, due to the lost of
economic motivation, stopped controlling
and eradicating animal infectious diseases, i.e. letting them to spread. Reimport
of infectious diseases has conducted to giving up specific disease
control/eradication also in importing countries = further free spreading. The
WTO/OIE policy have created a dangerous atmosphere
of “doing nothing” = letting the animal infections to spread (exception is
foot-and-mouth disease).
9. The problem is that the real occurrence of the infectious diseases is not known, even in
the human populations and even in the most developed countries. In animal populations and in
developing countries the
infectious disease
occurrence reporting is much more problematic. Therefore,
the reported data on the numbers of specific infectious disease
outbreaks and diseased animals and/or persons are collected ad hoc, i.e. usually very incomplete. Active
preventive screenings of infectious diseases have been minimized up to zero due
to lack of means and due to risk to discover “new” cases complicating trade and
export. The absence of full knowledge of infectious disease occurrence in
exporting countries (reporting on almost all internationally reportable
infections “No information available”)
represents serious risk for importing countries.
Example:
"It is assumed that, for every case of salmonellosis recorded in
humans in the
10. The ability to spread is different in different infectious
disease pathogens, different susceptible populations and environmental conditions. Imported
pathogen spread can be in a form of isolated exceptional local outbreak (blind
branch) or of sporadic outbreaks or of epizootic (epidemic) or of enzootic
(endemic) or of panzootic (pandemic)
affecting populations in very vast territories (maximal ramification of
imported agents). In some cases the spreading can reach in susceptible
populations even “exponential curve”. Any infectious disease occurrence threats
population in neighbouring localities. Some pathogens have been able to escape
even from the best isolated laboratories in the world.
Examples: Escapes of foot-and-mouth disease
(FMD) virus: from the
11.
Other characteristic is represented by the speed
of infectious disease agents’ postimport propagation. In some cases the
spread is slow and in other cases could be very rapid. An important indicator of the
infectious disease agents’ spread is represented by the ratio primary/secondary outbreaks,
depending usually on the period between the introduction and
discovery/isolation measures.
Example::"
12. The key postimport problems are late discovery and blockade of the
primary outbreaks due to weak or not
existing effective anti-epizootic surveillance at field level and due to
shortage of necessary number of well trained professionals.
Example: UK FMD 2001: “infection being
present but unreported for at least three weeks before the first case was
identified during an antemortem inspection in an abattoir“ “By the time 2001
outbreak was confirmed, it had spread to 57 locations across the United Kingdom”.
13. The control and eradication of imported
infectious diseases are extremely difficult even in the most developed
countries. The programmes require not
only suitable control/eradication
methods feasible under the given conditions but also a lot of resources
as well as very complex managerial arrangements. To import
an infectious disease is relatively easy but to eradicate it is
extremely difficult, particularly
when the disease penetrates among wildlife. Even the rich countries having
necessary means have not always the ability to eradicate the imported
infection.
Example: One of the most dangerous diseases of pigs is
African swine fever which was imported in 1978 in
14. The ecological, economic, public health and social consequences of
imported animal infectious diseases have different
grades from mild up to catastrophic impacts
depending mainly on the infection agent virulence, affected animal
species susceptibility, environmental conditions and control measures.
15. Classification of consequence
characteristics of animal infectious disease has many criteria such as
according to: animal species and categories,
causality, environmental impacts, disease forms (peracute, acute,
subacute, subchronic, chronic, subclinical carriers), quantitative/measurable
aspects (e.g. losses in milk yields, in meat production), qualitative aspects
(e.g. lower animal product quality, restrictions in distribution and
consumption), direct negative impact (e.g. lower natality and surviving rates),
indirect negative impact (e.g. lower body weight growing), losses in space (local, territorial, continental), losses in
time (instantaneous, prolonged, continuous, permanent), visibility (e.g.
visible or observed losses due to dead animals, non-visible losses due to
sanitary restriction of animal movement and trade), other criteria such as
total or partial losses, losses suffered
by inhabitants, by animal owners, by the
community, etc.
Example of catastrophic consequences caused by a very dangerous animal infection: United Kingdom FMD
disaster in 2001 as described by British authors Kitching, Thrusfield and Taylor in OIE Scientific and Technical Review. Volume 25 (1), April 2006: “The
official figure for the number of animals slaughtered was approximately
6.5 million, but when the total number of still-sucking lambs, calves and pigs
that were slaughtered is included, the total could be as high as ten million.
Approximately three million healthy animals were slaughtered to control the
epidemic! The financial cost of the FMD epidemic in the
16. The problems is that nobody
in the world, neither international organizations nor individual institutes monitor and analyse the global sanitary and
biospheric consequences of actual international trade policy in animals and
their products. On the contrary, the WTO and the OIE do not know the
truth thanks to deliberate elimination of the data on animal infectious
diseases export/import from
international animal health information system. Therefore, concrete
global data on the catastrophic
consequences are missing. The OIE even published documents
indicating that there is not any need for importing countries to know animal
infectious disease situation in exporting countries when we have “risk management tool” (!?). However, every literate
person knows that export of infectious diseases means their distant spreading damaging health and biosphere.
17. The difficulty is
represented also by very weak
professional animal health services after their dismantling during the 1990’s
through WB, IMF, OIE and FAO minimizing government role in controlling health/diseases
in animal populations. Private
sector have quite different priority than the protection of population health
and biosphere. Where the public supervising service is missing there is a space
for corruption and not respecting
rules and laws. International trade in animal commodities is carried out mostly
outside of government on-the-spot control and sometimes even without its knowledge.
18. According to
the OIE Code “The Head of Veterinary
Service of the exporting country is ultimately accountable for veterinary
certification used in international trade.” This theoretical principle is correct, however
in the majority of leading exporting countries is absolutely unreal - the Chief
Veterinary Officers are as the generals without any “army”. They are dependent
on almost uncontrollable private sector often not reliable and not objective
when testing and issuing “official” certificates on government behalf.
Relatively very weak public services are
unable to control effectively the trade and usually they are unable even to
see exporting commodities. Therefore, the supervision, if any, is mostly
superficial, formal (document control mainly) and benevolent without drawing
corresponding conclusions in cases of exporting infectious disease agents.
Other problem is represented by illegal
export of animal commodities due to missing necessary government control.
Example: “A large rendering company in
19. Trade
liberalization cannot mean liberalization of infectious disease spreading
damaging irreparably our planet biosphere !
Instead of health globalization, we are
witnesses of disease globalization!
20. The problem for
alarming world public can be the fact that the above described danger is not
detectable by our normal senses - hearing, sight, smell, taste or touch - in comparison, e.g. with visible alarming reduction
of the glaciers.
21. More detailed
information can be found in: http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz where following
texts could attract your attention:
“The International Office of Epizootics (OIE) – World Organization for
Animal Infection Globalization (not admitting
to require infection-free import)”,
”Globalization of communicable animal diseases and international
trade”,
“Particular sanitary problems of trade in animals and animal products”,
“Factors facilitating and
supporting animal infection long-distance spreading through international
trade”,
”Globalization of communicable diseases of animals – a crisis of
veterinary medicine”,
“WTO Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) – justification for
its abolition”,
”Critical analysis of OIE Animal Health Code for international trade
supporting infections/pathogens long-distance (incl. inter-continental)
spreading = the most dangerous document for global animal population health in
the history”,
”OIE abuse of disease import risk assessment method supporting
infections/pathogens’ long-distance
(incl. intercontinental) spreading”,
”OIE dominating officers: Importing countries do not need to know real
animal infection occurrence in exporting countries = facilitating export of
non-healthy animals and non-pathogen-free animal products”,
“Reported cases of disease/pathogen introduction in individual
countries – according to specific diseases (1,319 reports)”,
“Reported cases of newly
introduced or reemerged specific animal diseases in individual countries – according
to intervals (418 reports)”,
”Cases of specific animal diseases reported for the first time –
according to individual countries (485 reports)”, “History of diseases
spreading through international trade – lesson for the future”and
Warning letters against
man-made conscious (i.e. criminal) globalization of communicable diseases
through international trade.
22. In order to
maintain our planet in habitable conditions for the future generations, there
is necessary to minimize also the risk
of biosphere destruction by man-made
spreading of animal infectious diseases and to stop immediately WTO/OIE
anti-environmental policy.
Recommendations
for your consideration
a) I would like
to recommend the United Nations
Environment Programme to take
over the global biosphere protection in full scale, i.e. also as far as animal infectious disease pathogens as integral biosphere
components are concerned. This so
important global duty cannot be left to any irresponsible uncontrollable
organizations acting contra UNEP efforts and programmes.
b) To inform and alarm world public, also through influential
international mass media, to create necessary public opinion pressure on the
mentioned organizations and on unscrupulous exporters of the infectious disease
pathogens. In this conflict of interest the opinion of the world public, if
correctly informed and warned, will play one of the key roles.
Please, could you acknowledge
receipt of this letter ? Thanks.
Primum non nocere !
Yours sincerely,
Prof. MVDr
Václav K o u b a, DrSc.
Former Chief, Animal Health
Service,
Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations
Address: P.B. 516, 17000 Praha 7,
Copies for:
Mr. Ban Ki-moon,
UN Secretary-General
Dr Al Gore,
Former US Vice President
Attachment:
Copy of my letter sent to Mr. Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General