SEVERAL LESSONS FROM GLOBAL RINDERPEST ERADICATION (draft)
Contribution sent to Dr Juan Lubroth, Chief, Animal Health Service, AGAH, UN-FAO, Roma as proposals for his consideration when preparing following common document:
Juan Lubroth, Václav Kouba, Yoshihiro Ozawa, Joseph Domenech
«Lessons Learnt from the Eradication of Rinderpest: views of the Chiefs, Animal Health Service, FAO»
(Attached copies of particular self-explanatory e-mails sent to Dr Lubroth on 3.8.2011 and obtained from Dr Ozawa on 1.8.2011)
The rinderpest historically has been registered in 114 countries of all continents. After the World War II the rinderpest was reported still from 66 countries. FAO at its beginning in 1946 started the programme to assist in the harmonization of efforts to contain high impact livestock diseases. Rinderpest was at the top of the list and ever since then has continued to be one of central elements of the activities and programmes of the Organization. Initially the eradication efforts largely took place on an individual country basis. First major global impulse was given in 1985 (39 rinderpest countries) by identifying final deadline and in 1986 by starting g l o b a l rinderpest eradication programme merging three new regional ones. Second major impulse was given in 1994 (19 rinderpest countries) by AGAH/EMPRES. Numbers of countries reporting last case of rinderpest were as follows: during the 1940s – 5, during the 1950s – 5, during the 1960s – 7, during the 1970s – 3, during the 1980s – 26, during the 1990s – 18 and during the 2010s – 2 and thus finalizing successfully the global eradication process as the major achievement in veterinary history.
a) The eradication of rinderpest in all the world has confirmed for the first time in the history the practical feasibility of final g l o b a l eradication of selected animal infection.
b) The rinderpest global eradication to be understood as the start of a n e w e r a of veterinary medicine consisting in removing gradually the most dangerous killing animal diseases from our planet as the highest meta of the whole world veterinary medicine.
II. Lessons from anti-rinderpest planning
1) Eradication of rinderpest represented a very difficult problem to be solved being complicated by the fact that every case was different under different conditions requiring different practical application of established anti-rinderpest principles and target-oriented plans.
2) The extremely complex and demanding global rinderpest eradication programmes, had different work/resources/time consuming p h a s e s : rinderpest etiology and epizootiology research and its results’ testing; field investigations to identify all outbreaks and threatened territories; identification of control/eradication strategy, tactics and methodology (incl. diagnosis system based on laboratory investigations); feasibility studies and pilot testing; specific vaccine development, production and control; creation of necessary conditions (manpower, material, transport, funds incl. subsidies; logistics; public, legislation and political support; etc.); identification of specific objectives (incl. deadlines); attraction of donors; clearance procedures; starting phase; intensive attack phase combined with protective measures including vaccination; elimination phase, eradication phase and post-eradication phase under continuing surveillance verifying freedom from rinderpest and systematic evaluations. All these inter-connected phases were exigent but very important depending on the results of the previous ones. Complex system approach when applying action-oriented epizootiological principles was of extraordinary importance.
3) Before starting to write the proper p r o j e c t d o c u m e n t s, there was a need for programme context and convincing justification of expecting result, i.e. situation at the end of the project. When preparing anti-rinderpest projects it must be considered not only the disease occurrence, its territorial localization, stage of development (bases for programme measures) but also domestic and wild animal populations of susceptible species size, structure and distribution. Target-oriented investigative activities provided necessary information on rinderpest occurrence before starting, during and at the end of the programme as well as during follow-up period. It must be considered veterinary service organization and its ability of anti-rinderpest actions. It must be considered influencing factors such as ecological, economic, social, cultural and political conditions as well as public, government and donors’ supports. In some country political instability or even war complicated anti-rinderpest programme. The grade of the demandingness was multiplied by the fact that the time-bound programme required to reach the eradication prior to the deadline what was much more difficult than before 1985 without fixed global deadline.
4) United Nations general principles for project design proved to be useful also for anti-rinderpest planning. The core structure of the projects consisted of a hierarchy of basic project elements as follows: development objective, immediate objectives, outputs, activities and inputs.
5) Among the most difficult anti-rinderpest projects’ problems was to raise necessary funds for national as well as international programmes. The impact of reducing member-country government role and budgets as well as a crisis in financing United Nations agencies, including FAO, was very negative and required to mobilize external donors as never before. The situation was gradually improved when the global anti-rinderpest programme reached promising results and sponsoring agencies, banks and individual countries became more interested in supporting a programme being close to final historical achievement.
6) It is
obvious that financial support to cover all planned expenses during the
programme without interruption (as happened with the JP15 in
7) Which animal infection disease will be selected for following rinderpest global eradication? There are many criteria and every country has different needs and priority diseases. The criteria used for rinderpest indicate methods and conditions for global priority selection of relevant animal infection(s).
8) Identification of deadline for final g l o b a l rinderpest eradication
a) The identification of realistic final deadline for global rinderpest eradication was possible only when there were available all necessary information on rinderpest occurrence and trend in all affected countries and the achieved results indicated for the first time real feasibility to finish with this plague in the whole world. First of all it was necessary to consider the weakest “chain links” i.e. the countries “being behind”. In 1985 global rinderpest occurrence analysis carried out before formulating, clearing and starting in 1986 g l o b a l rinderpest eradication programme, composed from three new regional ones, facilitated to estimate its future trend and to indicate the global deadline which could be achieved during a quarter of a century, i.e. horizon 2010. It was necessary to consider also the need to have enough time reserve for finalizing stages of clinical forms’ elimination, virus elimination and of verifying the eradication in the countries with the most complicated situation. In spite of potential risks of not reaching desirable result, the established deadline has proved as realistic one.
b) The declaration of the feasibility of global rinderpest eradication and fixing final deadline were not possible before reaching favourable conditions for this worldwide action. Among the conditions facilitating the eradication process was the fact that rinderpest was understood as the number 1. dangerous animal infection disease – incurable killer, its etiology and epizootiology was already well known, affected animals were mostly domestic, grade of clinical manifestation was very high (important for rinderpest timely discovery), standard serological and virological diagnostic methods were already well developed, suitable anti-rinderpest vaccine was available, applied control, elimination and eradication methods proved to be effective and eradication programmes in the majority of affected countries were successful. Several decades’ surveillance and active screenings permitted to identify rinderpest occurrence in the world. Accumulated positive experience was offering well justified chance for final global eradication. In the meantime, there were developed and stabilized adequate organization conditions based on realization structure pyramid from the local, district, province, national, regional and global levels with the FAO Animal Health Service on top being responsible for the global programme and its results. This system facilitated uniform approach and global co-ordination.
c) After identification of the final deadline for rinderpest global eradication the planning system was improved and targeted to common final goal replacing previous relatively slow ad hoc programmes based on individual initiative of the AGAH, FAO Regional Offices, member country governments and donor agencies.
d) Global time bound campaign required a system based on logical, but not easy, interconnection of local programmes with national ones, national programmes with regional ones and these to link with the global one under the FAO-AGAH leadership, responsibility, central coordination combined with concrete assistance through AGAH field practical projects to rinderpest and rinderpest-threatened countries. Member country governments required deeds not words (Acta no verba).
a) United Nations general principles and methodologies for UN projects’ design and FAO clearance procedures proved to be useful also for extremely complex and demanding anti-rinderpest planning. Therefore, this should be considered when preparing similar international global eradication programmes. General principles of planning must always be adjusted to the concrete case, situation and needs. The infinitive variation of future selected infection characteristics and occurrence as well as influencing factors will require different contents and forms in every specific programme.
b) Among the most important components of anti-epizootic planning must be taken into account first of all the budget covering all planned activities during the whole programme avoiding any interruption. To get necessary support, first must be achieved a consensus on the need and feasibility of the programme among the professionals and then among the animal owners to demonstrate its importance and priority to the decision-makers and public. UN/FAO budgeting system exploiting all available forms (e.g. RP, TCP, TF, TCDC, UNDP) must be supplemented by outside-UN/FAO resources of interested donor agencies. For this purpose to be organized at the very beginning fund mobilizing conference of potential donors.
c) The identification of realistic national and international (incl. global) eradication programmes’ deadlines must be preceded by a very good knowledge of specific disease occurrence and trend based on active territorial investigations, continuing surveillance and acquired experience. The conditions for the decision on final global eradication of rinderpest in a given time (global deadline) can be applied also for some other very dangerous diseases with similar characteristics.
d) Having accumulated sufficient international experience with global eradication of the most important animal disease, time has come to continue without any interruption in this international policy representing a n e w e r a of veterinary medicine – era of global veterinary medicine gradually “cleaning” our planet from the most important killing animal infections. It can be continued with planning of global eradication, under UN-FAO-AGAH leadership, of one or two infections-killers meeting similar criteria as the rinderpest, e.g. of zoonotic glanders in a shorter term – 2025 (?) commonly with WHO and of foot and mouth disease in a longer term - 2050 (?). Final worldwide animal infections’ eradication to be declared as common goal for world veterinary medicine.
III. Lessons from anti-rinderpest organization
1) The most important rinderpest global eradication organizational acts of the AGAH were the identification of deadline and merging new anti-rinderpest regional programmes. In 1985 after rinderpest global situation analysis and its prognosis was set the d e a d l i n e – “horizon 2010”. Time bounding strategy gave a new very important impulse to global rinderpest eradication campaign at all levels conducing to the intensification of control/eradication (attack phases) measures aiming at the final objective, in close collaboration with global and regional partners such as: OIE, IAEA, IBAR etc. as well as with funding agencies such as UNDP, EU, etc., and with relevant reference laboratories.
2) Internationally organized FAO g l o b a l rinderpest eradication programme started in 1986 based on following regional anti-rinderpest projects: “The Pan African Rinderpest Campaign (PARC)” – (FAO Project GCP/RAF/218/JPN), “The South Asia Rinderpest Eradication Campaign (SAREC)“ - (FAO Project RAS/86/023) and “The West Asia Rinderpest Eradication Campaign Coordination (WARECC)” - (FAO Project RAB/86/024) including existing and new national programmes.
3) Anti-rinderpest programmes were much easier to implement in the countries with available adequate organization structure and management based mainly on sufficiently strong and competent p u b l i c animal health service. Chief Veterinary Officers reporting to the appropriate ministers directly or through established channels. played key managerial leading role in national rinderpest eradication programmes.
4) Anti-rinderpest programmes were much easier to implement in the countries where animal health service had centralized organization with vertical operation system offering better conditions for national programme and for the protection of country livestock populations. It also created conditions for more uniformity and better coordination of diagnostic methods and control measures and for mobilization of anti-rinderpest activities.
5) The global c o o r d i n a t i o n was very difficult due to the relatively high number of voluntarily and with initiative participating organizations, institutions, countries and donor agencies involved during different periods and in different components of the programme. FAO as UN agency being responsible for the final global result could only carry out the relevant actions itself, technically assist member-countries and issue non-obligatory not always respected recommendations. Many complications due to different opinions and interests of participating organizations not having the responsibility for the final global result must be overcome. In spite of this the AGAH managed to keep running the uninterrupted anti-rinderpest programme based on FAO General Conference resolutions. This was possible thanks to internationally recognized professional authority of the AGAH having although executing duties but no right to enforce the others. Therefore, it couldn’t be applied normal managerial system based on obligatory directives and strict control.
6) The anti-rinderpest campaign structure involved incalculable number of participating persons and institutions at all levels. Global anti-rinderpest campaign required to link local programmes with national ones, national programmes with regional ones and these to link with the global one under the FAO-AGAH leadership, responsibility and central coordination combined with concrete assistance (AGAH field practical projects) to rinderpest and rinderpest-threatened countries. Member country governments required “deeds not words”.
7) Anti-rinderpest programmes were much easier to implement in the countries where was established a national committee for animal disease emergency programmes composed of high-level decision-competent officers from such ministries as agriculture, health, home affairs, education, communications, justice, finance and transport.
8) At the end of the 1980s and early 1990s under the pressure of international monetary agencies the governments of developing countries reduced their budgets and started mass privatization. This policy affected also public veterinary services (somewhere even up to its dismantling) and thus anti-rinderpest actions became significantly weakened. This fact was reflected in slowing down the promising trend of the number of new countries reporting last case of rinderpest. During the period 1991-1993 only one country reported last case of rinderpest. Therefore the trend of rinderpest country eradication had two waves with the peaks in 1986 and in 1995.
9) Among the rinderpest eradication programme bottlenecks often belonged incomplete and not always reliable global action-oriented information system to provide necessary data for optimal decision-making. Special independent information system providing detailed data for global rinderpest eradication programme was missing.
10) Publications on practical successful rinderpest eradication programmes were useful not only for experience exchange but also as global programme supporting by convincing examples. Unfortunately, overwhelming majority of rinderpest papers were only theoretical isolated from practical solutions.
11) Veterinary Manpower
a) The transfer of the provisions of extremely complex and demanding programme and methods for rinderpest eradication into practical life depended firstly on veterinary manpower, where the key role had field working veterinarians having direct contact with the animals. Rinderpest outbreak early detection (firstly of decisive primary one) and its immediate initial isolation depended mainly on this staff. Rinderpest eradication solutions started and finished at the field level.
b) One of the weak link in the chain of anti-rinderpest programmes was lack of sufficient number of practically well trained veterinarians. During the anti-rinderpest campaign it was found that the veterinarians should be much better prepared mainly for extremely demanding field clinical and epizootiological investigations and diagnosis under anti-epizootic emergency conditions requiring immediate actions, considering that every case was different. Mass veterinary service privatization during early 1990s influenced veterinary faculties to dedicate maximum time to curative medicine at the expense of preventive population medicine, diagnosis, control and eradication of transmissible diseases, including the most important ones. Thanks to general use of the computers and reduced budgets the field practical anti-epizootic field exercises of the students at animal population level were minimized or zero.
a) Successful benefit/cost anti-epizootic programmes’ implementation requires adequate animal health service organization and management. Without well established and functioning organization supporting anti-epizootic measures the eradication of widely spread animal infection at national level is almost unrealistic. Isolated public veterinary services alone, in spite of all efforts and availability of technically feasible methodologies, are not able to implement demanding priority infections’ eradication programmes and therefore cannot be responsible for executing it.
b) Global anti-epizootic programme requires to create an organizational and managerial uniform system from the grass-root level up to highest possible level of decision-making and executing bodies from local, district, provincial and national government, international level – UN-FAO Regional and General Conferences supported by professional executing structure – National Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO Animal Health Service. Centralized public animal health service with vertical management is preferable.
c) At all managerial levels should be established anti-epizootic commissions composed of decision-competent representatives of the organizations and institutions involved to ensure necessary co-ordination and support of emergency diseases programmes.
d) For future global programmes similar to the rinderpest eradication should be, from the very beginning, established an international coordination committee, under the UN-FAO-AGAH leadership, composed from the highest decision-competent representatives of the most important participating organizations and institutions. Simultaneously to be introduced a special independent target and action-oriented global information system under the AGAH direct responsibility. At the same time within the AGAH a special unit (or at least a post of specialist having practical experience with eradicating selected disease) to be established being professionally in charge of the global eradication programme. Concurrently worldwide information, convincing and mobilizing campaign should be launched and particular manual and newsletter to be produced and distributed. In order to facilitate experience exchange the publications on successful local and national eradication programmes (with examples) to be supported (Exempla trahunt) .
e) The main criterion for any anti-epizootic project evaluation should be understood the final concrete documented practical results.
f) When considering that strengthening of animal health services is extremely important for any animal population health programme, there is an urgent need for veterinary faculties’ curricula revision and their adjustment to the actual and near future national and global anti-epizootic needs including specific infection global eradication programmes.
g) Veterinarians should have necessary knowledge and very practical skills to be able to correctly identify: animals and herds being diseased, suspect, threatened and specific-infection-free as well as the limits of outbreaks, perifocal and threatened areas. The results of these investigations represent the basis for any effective anti-epizootic measures and programmes. Differential diagnoses, also con respect to rinderpest, hypothetically already not existing, to discover its eventual residuum, should be trained as well. Specific disease(s) targeted practical field simulation exercises (learning by doing) at undergraduate as well as at postgraduate levels should be supported and international courses organized (start with CVOs, national specialists and relevant veterinary faculties’ teachers – teach teachers to teach - as trainees).
h) FAO Manual Guidelines for strengthening animal health services in developing countries, published in 1991 (translated in French and Spanish) should be used as supporting tool helping to improve organizational and managerial capability of public veterinary services.
IV. Lessons from anti-rinderpest legislation
1) Anti-rinderpest national programmes were much easier to implement where adequate legislation was available based on particular law dealing with animal health determining the rights and duties of inhabitants and institutions. First duty required any person being in the possession of an animal or carcass of which he suspects of being affected with a obligatory notifiable disease, to be bound by effectively enforced law to give notice of such fact to the official veterinary service.
2) The official veterinary services had easier position when having legal power to exercise inspection over: animals, domestic and wildlife, at least as far as they may carry diseases transmissible to domestic animals; animal products; any matter capable of transmitting animal disease; related premises, equipment, facilities and means of transportation.
3) The official veterinary services had easier position when having legal power to: perform epizootiological investigation of any area, clinical examination of any animal and inspect of any product subject to official veterinary control; apply official identifying marks to animals, products and means of transportation; issue or withdraw official certificates and licenses; prohibit, limit, restrict or regulate import, export and movement within the country, of animals, animal products and other products subject to veterinary inspection; order and implement the isolation, sequestration and official observation of animals; perform or order disinfection of premises, equipment, facilities and means of transportation; confiscate animals and products; destroy animals and products; etc.
4) The official veterinary services had more favourable conditions when the government had adopted a particular resolution declaring rinderpest eradication as national priority programme and obliged relevant ministers to secure specific tasks. In this way the veterinary services were fulfilling government tasks and not as before when being left almost alone in fighting against the rinderpest.
5) Biological and technical standards and definitions complying with OIE international norms and thus facilitating comparisons and communication between countries represented important component of anti-rinderpest legislation systems.
6) Available FAO documents on animal health legislation proved to be as an useful tool helping countries when developing own national legal system.
a) Successful benefit/cost anti-epizootic programmes’ implementation requires adequate legislation containing supporting duties of animal owners and of relevant institutions as well as the rights of public veterinary services – legal powers to exercise necessary inspection and to apply effective measures. Isolated public veterinary services alone are not able to implement demanding eradication programme in spite of their efforts and availability of technically feasible methodologies. Without national legislation supporting anti-epizootic measures the eradication of widely spread animal infection at national level is almost unrealistic.
b) The government particular resolution declaring the eradication of selected infection(s) as national priority programme(s), involving in it relevant ministers, creating government coordination commission and mobilizing necessary resources, belongs among key factors.
c) Very important for the new global anti-epizootic programmes are the resolutions of the FAO General Conferences at the level of member countries´ ministers and provision of the models of animal health legislation published by this Organization (e.g. Standard of veterinary services, 1974).
The author sent to Dr Lubroth (copy to Dr Yoshihiro Ozawa) an e-mail on
1. Comments on Global Rinderpest Eradication Programme
a) Internationally organized FAO global rinderpest eradication programme, based on creating and merging three regional FAO-AGAH programmes, started in 1986 and not in 1994 ! This can be documented by the regional projects prepared and initiated thanks to the initiative and under the leadership of Dr Y. Ozawa: “The Pan Áfrican Rinderpest Campaign (PARC)” – (FAO Project GCP/RAF/218/JPN), “The South Asia Rinderpest Eradication Campaign (SAREC)“ - (FAO Project RAS/86/023) and “The West Asia Rinderpest Eradication Campaign Coordination (WARECC)” - (FAO Project RAB/86/024) including existing and new national programmes *). That time the AGAH, after rinderpest global situation analysis and its prognosis, set the deadline – “horizont 2010”. Time bounding strategy gave a new important impulse to global rinderpest eradication campaign at all levels conducing to the intensification of control/eradication (attack phases) measures aiming at the final objective, in close collaboration with global and regional partners such as: OIE, IAEA, IBAR etc. as well as with funding agencies such as UNDP, EU, etc., and with relevant reference laboratories.
*) See attached map of global rinderpest eradication programme from 1986.
b) Forgetting in officially presented FAO documents that the global rinderpest eradication programme started in 1986, it could create the impression that for the period before 1994 it could be applied a Latin proverb “Hic sunt leones” (= “knowing nothing” or “AGAH global anti-rinderpest programme not existing”). It is difficult to understand why so important period of global anti-rinderpest actions managed by the AGAH was omitted. Was it a mistake or other reason, e.g. deliberately not recognizing pre-1994 AGAH anti-rinderpest activities and results)?
c) The importance of the pre-1994 period for the global rinderpest eradication can be documented e.g. by the data of the OIE WAHID 2009: During the period 1982-1993 the rinderpest was reported as eradicated by 24 countries ! **). Simultaneously, in remaining 18 rinderpest countries there were advanced these programmes towards final eradication during post-1993 period.
**) See attached graph on the number of countries reporting last case of rinderpest (= the most important moment of the eradication programme).
d) From 1994 the global rinderpest eradication programme was using pro forma the abbreviation “GREP” and began further intensifying of better funded ***) final phase in the remaining rinderpest countries, but the proper global programme started de facto in 1986. At the FAO HQs must be enough documents (maps, statistics, protocols, reports) from these periods for truly o b j e c t i v e evaluation of global rinderpest eradication programme instead of subjective approach !
***) Potential donors are usually much more generous when the programme promises very soon final success.
g) Therefore, it would be fair to correct and amend relevant FAO documents on rinderpest global eradication programme for official publication and for FAO archive.
Note: The extremely complex and demanding rinderpest global eradication programme, had different work/resources/time consuming phases: research and its results testing; field investigations to identify all outbreaks and threatened territories; identification of control and eradication strategy, tactics and methodology (incl. diagnosis system based on laboratory investigations); specific vaccine production and control; identification of programme priorities; creation of necessary conditions (manpower, material, financial, social/political and public support, etc.); attraction of donors; identification of specific objectives (incl. deadlines); clearance procedures (by FAO relevant units, member-country governments, supporting sponsors, etc.); starting phase; intensive attack phase combined with protective measures (incl. vaccination); elimination phase, eradication phase and post-eradication phase under continuing surveillance and evaluations. These phases were important, difficult, necessary and mutually interconnected (as a relay) depending on the results of previous ones.
Global campaign required to link local programmes with national ones, national programmes with regional ones and these to link with the global one under the FAO-AGAH leadership, responsibility, central coordination combined with concrete assistance, including AGAH field practical projects, to rinderpest and rinderpest-threatened countries. Member country governments required deeds not words (Acta no verba). The anti-rinderpest campaign structure involved incalculable number of participating persons and institutions at all levels creating a global organization pyramid led by the FAO-AGAH.
2. Veterinary Manpower
a) As I mentioned during 27 July 2011 discussion on “Animal Health at FAO”, the basic problem is how to transfer the provisions of extremely complex and demanding methods for emergency situation, into practical life. Their implementation depends firstly on veterinary manpower, where the key role have field working veterinarians having direct contact with the animals. Infection outbreak early detection (first of all the decisive primary one) and its immediate initial isolation depend mainly on this staff. The disease emergency and its solution starts and finishes at the field level, not in the offices.
b) Key factor for the implementation of any anti-epizootic programme is represented by the veterinary manpower, i.e. all the veterinarians and first of all veterinarians of public services. In case of emergency ones, the role of them is irreplaceable.
c) Almost one million veterinarians in the world should be much better prepared for emergency situations and veterinary faculties (more than 500) should significantly improve the education of new veterinarians for these kind of events. Our “grand veterinary family” should be much better prepared mainly for extremely demanding field clinical and epizootiological investigations and diagnosis under emergency conditions requiring immediate actions considering that every case is different.
d) New veterinarians and postgraduate trainees should have necessary knowledge and very practical skills to be able to correctly identify: animals and herds being diseased, suspect, threatened and specific-infection-free as well as the limits of outbreaks, perifocal and threatened areas. The results of these investigations represent the basis for any effective anti-epizootic measures and programmes. The mentioned skills can be learnt properly only during field practical simulation exercises applying the principle “learning by doing” (one example can be found on my website: “Practical field simulation exercise – basic training form of the preparedness against foot and mouth disease” http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/simulation.htm).
e) In short, the weakest link in the chain of anti-epizootic preparedness is critical lack of sufficient number of theoretically and practically well trained veterinarians. When considering that strengthening of public animal health services is extremely important for any animal population health programme, I would like to recommend to establish an international veterinary manpower development programme (similarly as it was in the past within AGA providing relevant analyses, recommendations, coordination and assistance to member country governments in order to strengthen significantly public veterinary services and thus national and international anti-epizootic preparedness. (More information in “Unprepared veterinary manpower – the weakest link in the chain of dangerous disease emergency preparedness” - http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/emergency.htm)
d) According to my information (latest at UNESCO HQs, Paris. 1 July 2011 – Dr L. Simionescu, Assistant Programme Specialist, Division of Higher Education) no any UN agency is dealing specifically with animal health manpower. In the past it was FAO and its AGAH influencing the veterinary education in the world. (More information in “History of global veterinary education policy of the United Nations” http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/UNveteducation.htm)
3. Next animal infection to be globally eradicated
El muermo madura para ser erradicado en todo el mundo como la primera zoonosis en la historia REDVET - Revista electrónica de Veterinaria,. 2011 Volumen 12 Nº 12, ISSN 1695-7504
The author received on 1. August 2011 an e-mail from Dr Yoshihira Ozawa, key international rinderpest virologist, former Chief, Animal Health Service, FAO who in 1980s initiated global rinderpest eradication programme. He explained me the background why the FAO official documents falsely informed that the global rinderpest programme started in 1994 suppressing the truth about decisive stage work and results during 1980s:
It was very nice that we could meet in Rome to during the FAO session
in Rome on the eradication of rinderpest. Although we could not have
enough time to talk about the history of rinderpest eradication, it was
obvious that the true history of rinderpest eradication campaigns was
not properly presented at the FAO Sessions.
I met Juan after the meeting(29 June) and expressed my disappointment
as to the way the FAO DG presented at the meeting emphasizing too
much on the activities in Africa and the GREP programme which started
in 1994. Juan Lubroth told me that Diouf was of the view that rinderpest
eradication was mainly achieved by the GREP Programme which started
by his own support. As he is leaving FAO in September, he wanted to
give impression that GREP was achieved by his own initiative.
To me the FAO ceremony was not at all reflecting the true history of RP
campaigns which we started in 1980s. I agree with you that we should
try to keep the true history of rinderpest campaigns.
When we met in Rome you showed me a chart showing the number of
RP cases in 1980s and 1990s. I hope you will publish the chart in a vet.
journal in the near future. If you could kindly send me the draft chart by
email, it will be very much appreciated.