Václav Kouba
SEVERAL LESSONS
FROM GLOBAL RINDERPEST
ERADICATION (draft)
Contribution sent to Dr Juan Lubroth, Chief, Animal Health
Service, AGAH, UN-FAO, Roma as proposals for his consideration when preparing
following common document:
Juan Lubroth, Václav Kouba, Yoshihiro Ozawa, Joseph
Domenech
«Lessons Learnt
from the Eradication of Rinderpest: views of the Chiefs, Animal Health Service,
FAO»
(Attached
copies of particular self-explanatory
e-mails sent to Dr Lubroth on 3.8.2011 and obtained from Dr Ozawa on 1.8.2011)
The
rinderpest historically has been registered in 114 countries of all continents.
After the World War II the rinderpest was reported still from 66 countries. FAO
at its beginning in 1946 started the programme to assist in the harmonization
of efforts to contain high impact livestock diseases. Rinderpest was at the top
of the list and ever since then has continued to be one of central elements of
the activities and programmes of the Organization. Initially the eradication
efforts largely took place on an individual country basis. First major global impulse
was given in 1985 (39 rinderpest countries) by identifying final deadline and in 1986 by starting
g l o b a l rinderpest eradication programme merging three
new regional ones. Second major impulse was given in 1994 (19
rinderpest countries) by AGAH/EMPRES. Numbers of
countries reporting last case of rinderpest were as follows: during the 1940s –
5, during the 1950s – 5, during the 1960s – 7, during the 1970s – 3, during the
1980s – 26, during the 1990s – 18 and during the 2010s – 2 and thus finalizing
successfully the global eradication process as the major achievement in
veterinary history.
Lessons:
a) The
eradication of rinderpest in all the world
has confirmed for the first time in the history the practical feasibility
of final
g l o b a l eradication of
selected animal infection.
b) The
rinderpest global eradication to be understood as the start of a n e w
e r a of veterinary medicine
consisting in removing gradually the most dangerous killing animal diseases
from our planet as the highest meta of the whole world veterinary medicine.
II.
Lessons from anti-rinderpest planning
1) Eradication of rinderpest represented a very difficult problem
to be solved being complicated by the fact that every case was different under
different conditions requiring different practical application of established
anti-rinderpest principles and target-oriented plans.
2) The
extremely complex and demanding global rinderpest eradication programmes, had
different work/resources/time consuming
p h a s e s : rinderpest etiology and epizootiology research and its
results’ testing; field investigations to identify all outbreaks and threatened
territories; identification of
control/eradication strategy, tactics and methodology (incl. diagnosis system
based on laboratory investigations);
feasibility studies and pilot testing; specific vaccine development,
production and control; creation of necessary conditions (manpower, material,
transport, funds incl. subsidies; logistics; public, legislation and political support;
etc.); identification of specific objectives (incl. deadlines); attraction of
donors; clearance procedures; starting phase; intensive attack phase combined
with protective measures including vaccination; elimination phase, eradication
phase and post-eradication phase under continuing surveillance verifying
freedom from rinderpest and systematic evaluations. All these inter-connected
phases were exigent but very important depending on the results of the previous
ones. Complex system approach
when applying action-oriented epizootiological principles was of extraordinary
importance.
3) Before
starting to write the proper p r o j e
c t d o c u m e n t s, there was a need
for programme context and convincing justification of expecting result, i.e. situation
at the end of the project. When preparing anti-rinderpest projects it must be
considered not only the disease occurrence, its territorial localization, stage
of development (bases for programme measures) but also domestic and wild animal
populations of susceptible species size, structure and distribution.
Target-oriented investigative activities provided necessary information on
rinderpest occurrence before starting, during and at the end of the programme
as well as during follow-up period. It must be considered veterinary service
organization and its ability of anti-rinderpest actions. It must be considered
influencing factors such as ecological, economic, social, cultural and political
conditions as well as public, government and donors’ supports. In some country
political instability or even war complicated anti-rinderpest programme. The
grade of the demandingness was multiplied by the fact that the time-bound
programme required to reach the eradication prior to the deadline what was much
more difficult than before 1985 without fixed global deadline.
4) United
Nations general principles for project design proved to be useful also for
anti-rinderpest planning. The core structure of the projects consisted of a
hierarchy of basic project elements as follows: development objective,
immediate objectives, outputs, activities and inputs.
5) Among the most difficult anti-rinderpest projects’
problems was to raise necessary funds for national as well as international
programmes. The impact of reducing member-country government role and budgets
as well as a crisis in financing United Nations agencies, including FAO, was
very negative and required to mobilize external donors as never before. The
situation was gradually improved when the global anti-rinderpest programme
reached promising results and sponsoring agencies, banks and individual
countries became more interested in supporting a programme being close to final
historical achievement.
6) It is
obvious that financial support to cover all planned expenses during the
programme without interruption (as happened with the JP15 in
7)
Which animal infection disease
will be selected for following rinderpest global eradication? There are many criteria and every country has
different needs and priority diseases. The criteria used for rinderpest
indicate methods and conditions for global priority selection of relevant
animal infection(s).
8) Identification
of deadline for final g l o b a l rinderpest eradication
a) The identification of realistic final
deadline for global rinderpest eradication was possible only when there were
available all necessary information on rinderpest occurrence and trend in all
affected countries and the achieved results indicated for the first time real
feasibility to finish with this plague in the whole world. First of all it was
necessary to consider the weakest “chain links” i.e. the countries “being
behind”. In 1985 global rinderpest
occurrence analysis carried out before formulating, clearing and starting in 1986 g l o b a l rinderpest eradication programme, composed
from three new regional ones, facilitated to estimate its future trend and to
indicate the global deadline which could be achieved during a quarter of a
century, i.e. horizon 2010. It was
necessary to consider also the need to have enough time reserve for finalizing
stages of clinical forms’ elimination, virus elimination and of verifying the
eradication in the countries with the most complicated situation. In spite of
potential risks of not reaching desirable result, the
established deadline has proved as realistic one.
b) The
declaration of the feasibility of global rinderpest eradication and fixing
final deadline were not possible before reaching favourable conditions for this
worldwide action. Among the conditions facilitating the eradication process was
the fact that rinderpest was understood as the number 1. dangerous animal
infection disease – incurable killer, its etiology and epizootiology was
already well known, affected animals were mostly domestic, grade of clinical
manifestation was very high (important for rinderpest timely discovery),
standard serological and virological diagnostic methods were already well
developed, suitable anti-rinderpest vaccine was available, applied control,
elimination and eradication methods proved to be effective and eradication
programmes in the majority of affected countries were successful. Several decades’ surveillance and active
screenings permitted to identify rinderpest occurrence in the world.
Accumulated positive experience was offering well justified chance for final
global eradication. In the meantime, there were developed and stabilized
adequate organization conditions based on realization structure pyramid from
the local, district, province, national, regional and global levels with the
FAO Animal Health Service on top being responsible for the global programme and
its results. This system facilitated uniform approach and global co-ordination.
c) After identification of the final deadline
for rinderpest global eradication the planning system was improved and targeted
to common final goal replacing previous relatively slow ad hoc programmes based on individual initiative of the
AGAH, FAO Regional Offices, member country governments and donor agencies.
d) Global time bound campaign required a system
based on logical, but not easy,
interconnection of local programmes with national ones, national programmes
with regional ones and these to link with the global one under the FAO-AGAH
leadership, responsibility, central coordination combined with concrete
assistance through AGAH field practical projects to rinderpest and
rinderpest-threatened countries. Member country governments required deeds not
words (Acta no verba).
Lessons:
a) United
Nations general principles and methodologies for UN projects’ design and FAO
clearance procedures proved to be useful also for extremely complex and
demanding anti-rinderpest planning. Therefore, this should be
considered when preparing similar international global eradication programmes. General
principles of planning must always be adjusted to the concrete case, situation
and needs. The infinitive variation of future selected infection characteristics
and occurrence as well as influencing factors will require different contents
and forms in every specific programme.
b) Among the
most important components of anti-epizootic planning must be taken into account
first of all the budget covering all planned activities during the whole programme avoiding any
interruption. To get necessary support, first must be achieved a consensus on
the need and feasibility of the programme among the professionals and then
among the animal owners to demonstrate its importance and priority to the
decision-makers and public. UN/FAO budgeting system exploiting all available
forms (e.g. RP, TCP, TF, TCDC, UNDP)
must be supplemented by outside-UN/FAO resources of interested donor agencies.
For this purpose to be organized at the very beginning fund mobilizing
conference of potential donors.
c) The
identification of realistic national and international (incl. global)
eradication programmes’ deadlines must be preceded by a very good knowledge of
specific disease occurrence and trend based on active territorial
investigations, continuing surveillance and acquired experience. The conditions
for the decision on final global eradication of rinderpest in a given time (global
deadline) can be applied also for some other very dangerous diseases with
similar characteristics.
d) Having accumulated sufficient international
experience with global eradication of the most important animal disease, time has come to continue without any interruption in this
international policy representing a n e w e r a of veterinary medicine – era of global veterinary medicine gradually
“cleaning” our planet from the most important killing animal infections. It can
be continued with planning of global eradication, under
UN-FAO-AGAH leadership, of one or two infections-killers meeting similar
criteria as the rinderpest, e.g. of zoonotic glanders in a shorter term – 2025 (?) commonly with WHO and of foot and mouth disease in a longer term -
2050 (?). Final worldwide animal infections’ eradication
to be declared as common goal for world veterinary medicine.
III. Lessons from anti-rinderpest organization
1) The
most important rinderpest global eradication organizational acts of the AGAH were the
identification of deadline and merging new anti-rinderpest regional programmes.
In 1985 after rinderpest global situation analysis and its prognosis was set
the d e a d l i n e – “horizon 2010”. Time bounding strategy gave
a new very important impulse to global rinderpest eradication campaign at all
levels conducing to the intensification of control/eradication (attack phases)
measures aiming at the final objective, in close collaboration with global and
regional partners such as: OIE, IAEA, IBAR etc. as well as with funding
agencies such as UNDP, EU, etc., and with relevant reference laboratories.
2) Internationally
organized FAO g l o b a l rinderpest
eradication programme started in 1986 based
on following regional anti-rinderpest projects: “The Pan African Rinderpest Campaign (PARC)” – (FAO Project GCP/RAF/218/JPN), “The South Asia Rinderpest
Eradication Campaign (SAREC)“ -
(FAO Project RAS/86/023) and “The West Asia Rinderpest Eradication Campaign
Coordination (WARECC)” -
(FAO Project RAB/86/024) including existing and new national programmes.
3)
Anti-rinderpest programmes were much easier to implement in the countries with
available adequate organization structure and management based mainly on
sufficiently strong and competent p u b
l i c animal health service.
Chief Veterinary Officers reporting
to the appropriate ministers directly or
through established channels. played key
managerial leading role in national rinderpest eradication programmes.
4)
Anti-rinderpest programmes were much easier to implement in the countries where
animal health service had centralized
organization with vertical operation system offering better conditions for
national programme and for the protection of country livestock populations. It
also created conditions for more uniformity and better coordination of
diagnostic methods and control measures and for mobilization of anti-rinderpest
activities.
5) The
global c o o r d i n a t i o n was very difficult due to the relatively high
number of voluntarily and with initiative participating organizations,
institutions, countries and donor agencies involved during different periods
and in different components of the programme. FAO as UN agency being
responsible for the final global result could only carry out the relevant
actions itself, technically assist member-countries and issue non-obligatory
not always respected recommendations. Many complications due to different
opinions and interests of participating organizations not having the
responsibility for the final global result must be overcome. In spite of this
the AGAH managed to keep running the uninterrupted anti-rinderpest programme
based on FAO General Conference resolutions. This was
possible thanks to internationally recognized professional authority of the
AGAH having although executing duties but no right to enforce the others. Therefore,
it couldn’t be applied normal managerial system based on obligatory directives
and strict control.
6) The
anti-rinderpest campaign structure involved incalculable number of
participating persons and institutions at all levels. Global anti-rinderpest campaign
required to link local programmes with national ones, national programmes with
regional ones and these to link with the global one under the FAO-AGAH
leadership, responsibility and central coordination combined with concrete
assistance (AGAH field practical projects)
to rinderpest and rinderpest-threatened countries. Member country governments
required “deeds not words”.
7)
Anti-rinderpest programmes were much easier to implement in the countries where
was established a national committee for animal disease emergency programmes
composed of high-level decision-competent officers from such ministries as
agriculture, health, home affairs, education, communications, justice, finance
and transport.
8) At the end of the 1980s and early 1990s under the pressure of
international monetary agencies the governments of developing countries reduced
their budgets and started mass privatization. This policy affected also public
veterinary services (somewhere even up to its dismantling) and thus
anti-rinderpest actions became significantly weakened. This fact was reflected
in slowing down the promising trend of the number of new countries reporting
last case of rinderpest. During the
period 1991-1993 only one country reported last case of rinderpest. Therefore the trend of rinderpest country eradication had two waves with
the peaks in 1986 and in 1995.
9) Among the
rinderpest eradication programme bottlenecks often belonged incomplete and not
always reliable global action-oriented information system to provide necessary
data for optimal decision-making. Special independent information system
providing detailed data for global rinderpest eradication programme was
missing.
10)
Publications on practical successful rinderpest eradication programmes were
useful not only for experience exchange but also as global programme supporting
by convincing examples. Unfortunately, overwhelming majority of rinderpest
papers were only theoretical isolated from practical
solutions.
11) Veterinary Manpower
a) The transfer of the provisions of extremely complex and demanding programme
and methods for rinderpest eradication into practical life depended firstly on
veterinary manpower, where the key role had field working veterinarians having
direct contact with the animals. Rinderpest outbreak early detection (firstly
of decisive primary one) and its immediate initial isolation depended mainly on
this staff. Rinderpest eradication solutions
started and finished at the field level.
b) One of the weak link in the chain of anti-rinderpest programmes was lack
of sufficient number of practically well trained veterinarians. During the
anti-rinderpest campaign it was found that the veterinarians should be much
better prepared mainly for extremely demanding field clinical and
epizootiological investigations and diagnosis under anti-epizootic emergency
conditions requiring immediate actions, considering that every case was
different. Mass veterinary service privatization during early 1990s influenced
veterinary faculties to dedicate maximum time to curative medicine at the
expense of preventive population medicine, diagnosis, control and eradication
of transmissible diseases, including the most important ones. Thanks to general
use of the computers and reduced
budgets the field practical
anti-epizootic field exercises of the students at animal population level were
minimized or zero.
Lessons:
a) Successful
benefit/cost anti-epizootic programmes’ implementation requires adequate animal
health service organization and management. Without well established and
functioning organization supporting anti-epizootic measures the eradication of
widely spread animal infection at national level is almost unrealistic. Isolated public veterinary services alone, in spite of all
efforts and availability of technically feasible methodologies, are not able to
implement demanding priority infections’ eradication programmes and therefore cannot be
responsible for executing it.
b) Global anti-epizootic programme requires to
create an organizational
and managerial uniform system from the grass-root level up to highest possible
level of decision-making and executing bodies from local, district, provincial
and national government, international level – UN-FAO Regional and General
Conferences supported by professional executing structure – National Chief Veterinary
Officers and FAO Animal Health Service. Centralized public animal health
service with vertical management is preferable.
c) At all managerial
levels should be established anti-epizootic commissions composed of
decision-competent representatives of the organizations and institutions
involved to ensure necessary co-ordination and support of emergency diseases
programmes.
d) For
future global programmes similar to the rinderpest eradication should be, from
the very beginning, established an international coordination committee, under
the UN-FAO-AGAH leadership, composed from the highest decision-competent
representatives of the most important participating organizations and
institutions. Simultaneously to be introduced a special independent target and
action-oriented global information system under the AGAH direct responsibility.
At the same time within the AGAH a special unit (or at least a post of
specialist having practical experience with eradicating selected disease) to be
established being professionally in charge of the global eradication programme.
Concurrently worldwide information, convincing and mobilizing campaign should
be launched and particular manual and newsletter to be produced and
distributed. In order to facilitate experience exchange the publications on
successful local and national eradication programmes (with
examples) to
be supported (Exempla trahunt) .
e) The main
criterion for any anti-epizootic project evaluation should be understood the
final concrete documented practical results.
f) When considering that strengthening of animal health services is
extremely important for any animal population health programme, there is an
urgent need for veterinary faculties’ curricula revision and their adjustment
to the actual and near future national and global anti-epizootic needs
including specific infection global eradication programmes.
g) Veterinarians
should have necessary knowledge and very practical skills to be able to
correctly identify: animals and herds being diseased, suspect, threatened and
specific-infection-free as well as the limits of outbreaks, perifocal and
threatened areas. The results of these investigations represent the basis for
any effective anti-epizootic measures and programmes. Differential diagnoses, also con respect to rinderpest, hypothetically
already not existing, to discover its eventual residuum, should be
trained as well. Specific disease(s) targeted practical field simulation
exercises (learning by doing) at
undergraduate as well as at postgraduate levels should be supported and
international courses organized (start with CVOs, national specialists and
relevant veterinary faculties’ teachers – teach
teachers to teach - as trainees).
h) FAO Manual Guidelines for strengthening animal health
services in developing countries, published in 1991 (translated in French
and Spanish) should be used as supporting tool helping to improve organizational
and managerial capability of public veterinary services.
IV. Lessons from anti-rinderpest legislation
1) Anti-rinderpest
national programmes were much easier to implement where adequate legislation
was available based on particular law dealing with animal health determining
the rights and duties of inhabitants and institutions. First duty required any person being in the
possession of an animal or carcass of which he suspects of being affected with
a obligatory notifiable disease, to be bound by effectively enforced law to
give notice of such fact to the official veterinary service.
2) The
official veterinary services had easier position when having legal power to
exercise inspection over: animals, domestic and wildlife, at least as far as
they may carry diseases transmissible to
domestic animals; animal products; any matter capable of transmitting animal
disease; related premises, equipment, facilities and means of transportation.
3) The
official veterinary services had easier position when having legal power to:
perform epizootiological investigation of any area, clinical examination of any
animal and inspect of any product subject to official veterinary control; apply
official identifying marks to animals, products and means of transportation;
issue or withdraw official certificates and licenses; prohibit, limit, restrict
or regulate import, export and movement within the country, of animals, animal
products and other products subject to veterinary inspection; order and
implement the isolation, sequestration and official observation of animals;
perform or order disinfection of premises, equipment, facilities and means of
transportation; confiscate animals and products; destroy animals and products;
etc.
4) The
official veterinary services had more favourable conditions when the government
had adopted a particular resolution declaring rinderpest eradication as
national priority programme and obliged relevant ministers to secure specific
tasks. In this way the veterinary services were fulfilling government tasks and
not as before when being left almost alone in fighting against the rinderpest.
5) Biological
and technical standards and definitions complying with OIE international norms and thus
facilitating comparisons and communication between countries represented
important component of anti-rinderpest legislation systems.
6) Available FAO documents on animal health
legislation proved to be as an useful tool helping countries when developing
own national legal system.
Lessons:
a) Successful benefit/cost
anti-epizootic programmes’ implementation requires adequate legislation
containing supporting duties of animal owners and of relevant institutions as
well as the rights of public veterinary services – legal powers to exercise
necessary inspection and to apply effective measures. Isolated public
veterinary services alone are not able to implement demanding eradication
programme in spite of their efforts and availability of technically feasible
methodologies. Without national
legislation supporting anti-epizootic measures the eradication of widely spread
animal infection at national level is almost unrealistic.
b) The
government particular resolution declaring the eradication of selected
infection(s)
as national priority programme(s), involving in it relevant ministers, creating
government coordination commission and mobilizing necessary resources, belongs among key factors.
c) Very important for the new global anti-epizootic
programmes are the resolutions of the FAO General Conferences at the level of
member countries´ ministers and provision of the models of animal health
legislation published by this Organization (e.g. Standard of veterinary services, 1974).
==================================================================
First Amendment
The author sent to Dr Lubroth (copy to Dr Yoshihiro Ozawa) an e-mail on
1. Comments on Global Rinderpest Eradication Programme
a) Internationally organized FAO global rinderpest eradication programme,
based on creating and merging three regional FAO-AGAH programmes, started in 1986 and not in 1994 ! This
can be documented by the regional projects prepared and initiated thanks to the
initiative and under the leadership of Dr Y. Ozawa: “The
Pan Áfrican Rinderpest Campaign (PARC)” – (FAO Project
GCP/RAF/218/JPN), “The South Asia Rinderpest Eradication Campaign (SAREC)“
- (FAO Project RAS/86/023) and “The West Asia Rinderpest
Eradication Campaign Coordination (WARECC)” - (FAO Project
RAB/86/024) including existing and new national programmes *). That time the AGAH, after
rinderpest global situation analysis and its prognosis, set the deadline – “horizont
2010”. Time bounding strategy gave a new important impulse to global rinderpest
eradication campaign at all levels conducing to the intensification of
control/eradication (attack phases) measures aiming at the final objective, in
close collaboration with global and regional partners such as: OIE, IAEA, IBAR
etc. as well as with funding agencies such as UNDP, EU, etc., and with relevant
reference laboratories.
*) See
attached map of global rinderpest
eradication programme from 1986.
b) Forgetting
in officially presented FAO documents that the global rinderpest eradication
programme started in 1986, it could create the impression that for the
period before 1994 it could be applied a Latin proverb “Hic sunt leones” (= “knowing
nothing” or “AGAH global anti-rinderpest programme not existing”). It is difficult to understand why so
important period of global anti-rinderpest actions managed by the AGAH was
omitted. Was it a mistake or other reason, e.g. deliberately not recognizing
pre-1994 AGAH anti-rinderpest activities and results)?
c) The importance of the pre-1994
period for the global rinderpest eradication can be documented e.g. by the data of the OIE
WAHID 2009: During the period 1982-1993
the rinderpest was reported as eradicated by 24 countries ! **). Simultaneously,
in remaining 18 rinderpest countries there were advanced these programmes
towards final eradication during
post-1993 period.
**) See
attached graph on the number of
countries reporting last case of rinderpest (= the most important moment of the
eradication programme).
d) From
1994 the global rinderpest eradication programme was using pro
forma the abbreviation “GREP” and began further intensifying
of better funded ***) final phase in the
remaining rinderpest countries, but the
proper global programme started de facto
in 1986. At the FAO HQs must be enough documents (maps, statistics,
protocols, reports) from these periods for
truly o b j e c t i v e evaluation of global rinderpest
eradication programme instead of subjective approach !
***) Potential
donors are usually much more generous when the programme promises very soon
final success.
g) Therefore, it would be fair to correct and
amend relevant FAO documents on rinderpest global eradication
programme for official publication and for FAO archive.
Note: The extremely complex and
demanding rinderpest global eradication programme, had different
work/resources/time consuming phases:
research and its results testing; field investigations to identify all
outbreaks and threatened territories;
identification of control and eradication strategy, tactics and
methodology (incl. diagnosis system based on laboratory investigations);
specific vaccine production and control; identification of programme
priorities; creation of necessary conditions (manpower, material, financial,
social/political and public support, etc.); attraction of donors;
identification of specific objectives (incl. deadlines); clearance procedures
(by FAO relevant units, member-country governments, supporting sponsors, etc.);
starting phase; intensive attack phase combined with protective measures (incl.
vaccination); elimination phase, eradication phase and post-eradication phase
under continuing surveillance and evaluations. These phases were important,
difficult, necessary and mutually interconnected (as a relay) depending on the results of previous ones.
Global
campaign required to link local programmes with national ones, national
programmes with regional ones and these to link with the global one under the FAO-AGAH leadership, responsibility,
central coordination combined with concrete assistance, including AGAH field
practical projects, to rinderpest and rinderpest-threatened countries. Member
country governments required deeds not words (Acta no verba). The
anti-rinderpest campaign structure involved incalculable number of
participating persons and institutions at all levels creating a global
organization pyramid led by the FAO-AGAH.
2. Veterinary Manpower
a) As I mentioned during 27 July 2011 discussion on “Animal Health at FAO”, the basic problem
is how to transfer the provisions of extremely complex and demanding methods
for emergency situation, into practical life. Their implementation depends firstly on veterinary manpower, where the
key role have field working veterinarians having direct contact with the
animals. Infection outbreak early detection (first of all the decisive primary
one) and its immediate initial isolation depend mainly on this staff. The disease emergency and its solution starts
and finishes at the field level, not in the offices.
b) Key factor for the implementation of
any anti-epizootic programme is represented by the veterinary manpower, i.e.
all the veterinarians and first of all veterinarians of public services. In case of emergency ones, the role of them
is irreplaceable.
c) Almost one million veterinarians in the world should
be much better prepared for emergency situations and veterinary faculties (more
than 500) should significantly improve the education of new veterinarians for
these kind of events. Our “grand veterinary family”
should be much better prepared mainly for extremely demanding field clinical
and epizootiological investigations and diagnosis under emergency conditions
requiring immediate actions considering that every case is different.
d)
New veterinarians and postgraduate trainees should have necessary knowledge and
very practical skills to be able to correctly identify: animals and herds being
diseased, suspect, threatened and specific-infection-free as well as the limits
of outbreaks, perifocal and threatened areas. The results of these
investigations represent the basis for any effective anti-epizootic measures
and programmes. The mentioned skills can be learnt properly only during field
practical simulation exercises applying the principle “learning by doing” (one example can be found on my website: “Practical field simulation exercise – basic
training form of the preparedness against foot and mouth disease” http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/simulation.htm).
e)
In short, the weakest
link in the chain of anti-epizootic preparedness is critical lack of sufficient
number of theoretically and practically well trained veterinarians. When
considering that strengthening of public animal health
services is extremely important for any animal population health programme, I would like to recommend to establish
an international veterinary manpower
development programme (similarly as it was in
the past within AGA providing relevant
analyses, recommendations,
coordination and assistance to member
country governments in order to strengthen significantly public veterinary
services and thus national and international anti-epizootic preparedness. (More
information in “Unprepared veterinary manpower – the weakest
link in the chain of dangerous disease emergency preparedness” - http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/emergency.htm)
d) According to my information (latest at
UNESCO HQs, Paris. 1 July 2011 – Dr L. Simionescu, Assistant Programme
Specialist, Division of Higher Education) no any UN agency is dealing
specifically with animal health manpower.
In the past it was FAO and its AGAH influencing the veterinary education
in the world. (More information in “History of global veterinary education
policy of the United Nations” http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/UNveteducation.htm)
3. Next animal
infection to be globally eradicated
Reference:
V. Kouba
El muermo madura para ser erradicado en todo el mundo
como la primera zoonosis en la historia REDVET - Revista electrónica de Veterinaria,. 2011 Volumen 12 Nº 12, ISSN 1695-7504
http://www.veterinaria.org/revistas/redvet/n121211/1211109.pdf
Second amendment:
The author received on 1. August
2011 an e-mail from Dr Yoshihira Ozawa, key international rinderpest virologist, former Chief, Animal
Health Service, FAO who in 1980s initiated global rinderpest eradication
programme. He explained me the background why the FAO official documents
falsely informed that the global rinderpest programme started in 1994 suppressing
the truth about decisive stage work and results during 1980s:
“Dear
Vaclav,
It
was very nice that we could meet in Rome to during the FAO session
in
Rome on the eradication of rinderpest. Although we could not have
enough
time to talk about the history of rinderpest eradication, it was
obvious
that the true history of rinderpest eradication campaigns was
not
properly presented at the FAO Sessions.
I
met Juan after the meeting(29 June) and expressed my disappointment
as
to the way the FAO DG presented at the meeting emphasizing too
much
on the activities in Africa and the GREP programme which started
in
1994. Juan Lubroth told me that Diouf
was of the view that rinderpest
eradication
was mainly achieved by the GREP Programme which started
by
his own support. As he is leaving FAO in September, he wanted to
give
impression that GREP was achieved by his own initiative.
To
me the FAO ceremony was not at all reflecting the true
history of RP
campaigns
which we started in 1980s. I agree with you that we should
try
to keep the true history of rinderpest campaigns.
When
we met in Rome you showed me a chart showing the number of
RP
cases in 1980s and 1990s. I hope you will publish the chart in a vet.
journal
in the near future. If you could kindly send me the draft chart by
email,
it will be very much appreciated.
Best
wishes.
Yoshihiro
Ozawa”
1