September
2007 Latest
amendment on
The International Office of Epizootics (OIE) -
World Organization for Animal Infection Globalization (not admitting to require
infection-free export/import, i.e. to require full sanitary guarantee !)
(Provisional text)
V. Kouba
Formerly: Animal Health Officer
(Research and Education), Animal Health Officer (Veterinary Intelligence),
Senior Officer (Veterinary Services) and Chief, Animal Health Service, Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO, Rome; Editor-in-Chief of
global FAO/WHO/OIE Animal Health Yearbook; Veterinary Public Health Expert, WHO;
Informatics Expert, OIE; Technical Vice-Director and Chief Epizootiologist,
Czechoslovak and Czech State Veterinary Service; Professor of Epizootiology,
University of Veterinary Sciences, Brno
Contents
1. Introduction
2. The OIE professional responsibility for the WTO/SPS
supporting consciously globalization of animal infections
3. List of principles of fair international trade not
respected by the OIE
4. The OIE “new policy” contrary to the principles of
fair international trade - supporting export of animal infections
5. List of principles of international animal
population health protection not respected by the OIE
6. The OIE “new policy” contrary to the principles of
international animal population health protection - supporting export of animal
infections
7. Undesirable consequences of the OIE policy
conducing to animal infection globalization
8. Discussion
9. Conclusion
10. References
11. Annex I on models in the management of animal
diseases
12. Annex II on veterinary service governance and
financing
1. Introduction
1.1 Increasing
size, distances and frequency of international trade in animals and in
animal products (hereafter “animal commodities”) represent the main factors
facilitating rapid globalization of communicable diseases of animals,
including those transmissible to man. Huge stream of animal commodities is
being transferred daily from exporting to importing countries. The exported
animal commodities represent potential or real carriers of animal infection
pathogens. All animal commodity export is today carried out, following the “new
policy” of relevant intergovernmental organizations, without any guarantee of sanitary innocuousness, i.e. of being free
of communicable disease pathogens = export of animal infections.
According to official FAO statistics e.g. on 2004
annual trade commodity import in quantity and monetary values: life animals –
10,632 million
1.2 Animal
infection import is very often followed by pathogen spreading extremely
difficult to discover and control/eradicate. The consequences are catastrophic.
Very limited number of successful communicable disease eradication programmes
together with all recoveries of individual diseased animals cannot compensate
at all rapidly increasing animal population morbidity due to
infections/pathogen export/import in the world. No one animal infection has
been globally eradicated yet. Infection import devaluates the results of
control and eradication programmes reached by previous generations. The animal infections are spreading as
never in the past when the trade used to be of much minor size and intensity,
at much shorter distances from much lesser number of commodity origin
localities to much lesser number of destination and distribution places to much
lesser number of end-users. The situation is getting worse every day
towards man-made global sanitary and ecological irreparable disaster. Infectious and parasitic diseases in animals continue to have every
day steadily increasing morbidity and
mortality in the world despite great
advances in sanitary sciences. Continuing worldwide mass long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading
of infections through trade, not being blocked by effective measures,
represents serious global crisis not
only of veterinary medicine which historical mission is to promote, protect and
recover animal health.
1.3 Terminology
used in this paper: “Infection” means the presence of communicable disease pathogenic
agent in the host (animal or man). “Infected
product” means the presence of communicable disease pathogenic agent in the
animal product. “Contaminated product”
means the presence of communicable disease pathogenic agent on the animal
product or on the inanimate object. “Pathogen”
means an agent that produces communicable disease – infection. Among the
pathogens – infection etiological agents - belong pathogenic virus, rickettsia,
bacteria, fungus and protozoa as well as
pathogenic helminths and arthropods, etc. causing
infectious and parasitic diseases.
Today the number
of known specific infections (not considering types and subtypes of many of
them) of vertebrate animal species only is close to one thousand. Almost two
hundred of them are transmissible to man (zoonoses). Number of internationally
notifiable infections in 2007 was as follows: multiplex species diseases – 16,
cattle diseases – 15, sheep and goat diseases -10, horse diseases -14, pig
diseases – 7, avian diseases – 13, etc.
In WHO publication “Foodborne disease: a focus for
health education”, Geneva, 2000 there are listed following foodborne
infections: Aeromonas enteritidis, Bacillus cereus
gastroenteritis, botulism, brucellosis, campylobacteriosis, cholera, Clostridium
perfringens enteritis, Escherichia
coli infections, listeriosis, salmonellosis, shigellosis (bacillary
dysentery), Staphylococcus aureus intoxication, typhoid and paratyphoid
fevers, Vibrio parahaemolyticus gastroenteritis, Vibrio vulnificus
infection, yersiniosis, viral gastroenteritis, viral hepatitis A,
poliomyelitis, amoebiasis (amoebic dysentery), cryptosporidiosis, giardiasis,
toxoplasmosis, anisakiasis, ascariasis, trichinellosis, taeniasis (Taenia
solium, Taenia saginata), clonorchiasis, fascioliasis, opisthorchiasis and
paragonimiasis. The list is not complete (e.g. bovine and aviar tuberculosis are
missing). (Dr Stuart C.
MacDiarmid in 1992 listed 52 infections
of livestock which may possibly be carried in carcasses, meat, offals or meat
products).
For the trade
the term “healthy animal” means an
animal free of communicable disease pathogens (not only without clinical
symptoms) and the term “sanitary
innocuous product of animal origin” means animal product to be free of
communicable disease pathogens (e.g. “foodborne-disease-pathogen-free
meat”). “Full sanitary quality”
means to be free of communicable disease pathogens. Unfortunately, these
logical terms are absolutely unknown to the International Office of Epizootics
- OIE (self-declared even as “World Organization for Animal Health” ?!)
supporting trade regardless of pathogen export. The “OIE Code” means OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code. The OIE instead
to adjust its policy to new international trade conditions, i.e. to make the
health protective measures more effective avoiding export of infections, simply
gave up its original anti-epizootic policy and became a “tool” of major exporting
countries supporting export of animal infections/pathogens.
.
1.4 Healthy animals and sanitary innocuous
products of animal origin have been and are acceptable by all importing
countries without any sanitary “obstacle” !
It is obvious,
that sterilized animal product is free of
infection pathogens and therefore, they cannot cause their spreading and
globalization.
1.5
Unfortunately, the major exporting
countries were and still have been not able or not willing to export only
healthy animals and their products, i.e. free of communicable disease
pathogens. These countries declared these natural and logical importing
country requirements for full sanitary quality as “non-tariff barriers”. These
so called “non-tariff barriers” de facto were and are represented by disease occurrence in exporting countries
! For these countries to produce and export healthy animals and sanitary
innocuous animal products meant to strengthen significantly public animal
health services and its inspection role, to implement demanding active disease
surveillance/monitoring systems, animal population health protecting
programmes, multi-infection control and eradication, strict sanitary control at
all levels of animal breeding and of the whole chain of food of animal origin.
Therefore, these countries tried to avoid investing in demanding disease
control and eradication programmes and instead they were “pressing” relevant
international organizations to admit export of animals and animal products
infected by communicable disease pathogens regardless of animal and human
health as well as of farmer/consumer needs/opinions in importing countries. The major exporting countries were
searching the easiest, the cheapest and the most profiting way for their export
regardless of sanitary consequences in importing countries, i.e. to reach
“international legalization” of pathogen export and thus to can do minimum or
nothing for animal commodity sanitary innocuousness .
1.6 Thanks to the OIE policy, among all exported goods only in the animal commodities the quality guarantee, in our case sanitary one, represents entirely unknown term: no sanitary guarantee = infection/pathogen free spreading.
1.7 The paper is
based on available documents of World Trade Organization (WTO) and International
Office of Epizootics (OIE), mainly on
OIE Codes for international trade,
testifying ”new policy” to safeguard international trade at the expense
of animal population health. The paper is based on official documents and data.
More information in:
http://vfu-www.vfu.cz/acta-vet/vol72/453-03.htm "Globalization of communicable
diseases of animal - a crisis of veterinary medicine”, Acta Veterinaria Brno,
2003, 72: 453-460.
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/globstatistics.htm "Statistics on animal disease
globalization through international trade”.
2. The OIE professional
responsibility for WTO/SPS supporting consciously globalization of animal infections
2.1 When
considering the factors supporting international long-distance (incl.
intercontinental) spread and globalization of animal infections, then among the
most important ones it must be included actual policy of global intergovernmental
organizations such as the WTO* and the OIE. The WTO was established to assist
member country governments in the application of fair trade principles in all internationally
traded commodities. On the other hand the OIE
was established to assist member country governments in the application of
principles for animal health protection against the spread of communicable
diseases, including transmissible to man. As the WTO is not scientific and
technical organization, it recognizes and relies on specialized organizations
such as the OIE in case of sanitary
aspects of the animal commodities’ trade.
*) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) was superseded as an international organization by the WTO. An updated
General Agreement became the WTO agreement governing trade in goods from
2.2 At the
beginning of the 1990s the major
exporting countries managed to dominate both mentioned organizations. These
countries abused the chance, when the GATT was being changed into WTO, and
managed (dictated) to introduce incredible
exceptions from all international fair trade principles to “facilitate” the export of non-healthy animals (non-free of
communicable disease pathogens) and non-pathogen-free animal products.
*) More information in
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/tradefactors.htm
(chapter 19).
2.3 The OIE, in spite of being responsible
to member country governments for animal health international protection policy,
gave up its original obligatory anti-epizootic duties
and betrayed the basic medical principles to
international business interest at the expense of importing country animal and
human health. The OIE took extraordinary “professional” initiative and
decisively participated in the preparation of the WTO “Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures” (SPS) consisting in avoiding to apply current
general fair trade principles “complicating (?)” animal export. The OIE used the trick abusing disease
introduction risk assessment and imposed it on importing countries, when
requiring full sanitary quality, i.e. healthy animals and/or innocuous animal
products or better sanitary quality, as the duty to justify “scientifically”
their logical sanitary demands. The OIE having main professional responsibility
for unfair WTO/SPS created “cleverly” and tactically in advance arranged artificial “alibi” (to can refer always to
WTO/SPS “agreed by member country
governments”) for its “new policy”
of false legalization of animal disease long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading
and globalization. The OIE has been using this alibi always when logical,
professional and scientific arguments have been missing. The OIE managed to smuggle its anti-sanitary disease globalization
policy trough the WTO/SPS document agreed thanks to false arguments (e.g.
deliberately holding back information on disease export risks) and trickery with the “risk assessment”.
The
top irony (= top hypocrisy) is that the OIE itself has deliberately never
presented to member country governments neither any risk assessment of its Code
and of other published provisions/methods nor any analysis of sanitary
consequences of the OIE Code conducing to the deterioration of global animal
population health ! The same is valid also for the WTO/SPS.
2.4 The author of this paper, after learning
about the “new” OIE policy conducing to globalization of animal diseases,
started to study the circumstances how
this disease globalization policy had been created. He tried to find out how the WTO/SPS had been prepared, justified and
presented to member country governments for its later approval at ministerial
meeting in
Note: The author studied also the preparatory
documents of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). The Czech
government session dealt with them presented by Vladimír Dlouhý, Minister of
Industry and Trade and by Josef Zelienec, Minister of Foreign Affaire on
2.5 The
governments were presented by a big package of documents (annexes included also “Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures - SPS”). In this annex justification there was no one word on
the risk of disease long-distance spreading through international trade in
animals and animal products, i.e. concealing the truth about risk of the
spreading and globalization consequences. On the other hand in the introductory
part there was further trickery in a form of very attractive sentence “desiring
to improve the
human health, animal, … health in all Members;” = big lie: in the whole document there is not
any provision or even one word dedicated to the health improvement.
2.6 The SPS, thanks to the OIE not respecting
basic medical principle "Primum non
nocere !", started officially
the globalization of infectious and parasitic diseases of animals, including
those transmissible to man. SPS is based upon risky trade at the expense of
animal and human health in importing countries. This policy cannot be
professionally justified and is indefensible in public, among consumers, farmers,
etc..
2.7 The OIE is de facto the author of the SPS and the main responsible for its consequences. The OIE brought the main trickery
principle into the SPS that „risk
assessment is preferable to zero risk approach“
(OIE Code 1997, Article 1.4.1.1) - giving the priority
to risky trade, i.e. to disease long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spread
and globalization and not to full sanitary quality (see paragraph 2.11). This
anti-sanitary policy has been applied after 1995 in all OIE documents, first of
all in the OIE Code for international trade. This dirty trick had been prepared well in advance in some
countries (MacDiarmid, 1992) and by the OIE, i.e. by many publications on “risk
assessment” (OIE, 1993), at the beginning using quantifiable methods to demonstrate
mathematically, i.e. theoretically, that the risk of disease importation
is minimal or zero. These subjective methods proved to be a big
nonsense when everybody can obtain different results depending on the
criteria used and on the export/import position: exporting country arguing with
minimal or zero risk and importing country arguing with the need to avoid
disease introduction at all.
The main effort of the OIE was to smuggle in the SPS
the risk assessment trick facilitating export/import of non-pathogen-free
animal commodities, combined with other
discriminating duties for paying importing countries only, without any sanitary
quality responsibility for the exporting countries. In the key OIE publication (2004)
on detailed risk assessment
methodology for paying importing country governments when requiring innocuous
animal commodities or better protection against
disease/pathogen introduction, it can be found incredible duties (musts), unknown in any non-animal commodity, such as:
“The risk analysis must be
well documented and supported by references to the scientific literature and
other sources, including expert opinion, where used. It must also provide
reasoned and logical discussion that supports the conclusions and
recommendations. There must be comprehensive documentation of all data,
information, assumptions, methods, results, and uncertainties.” The results’ presentation must: “explain the risk analysis model’s
structure clearly with the aid of appropriate diagrams, such as scenario tree;
document all the evidence, data and assumptions, including their references;
use clearly labelled, uncluttered graphs, etc.“
Special attention is dedicated to the titles, names and addresses, how to write the summary, how to
write the text (using
The history of international trade has never noted
such big nonsense ! For supporting
animal commodity trade facilitating infection/pathogen export the OIE has sacrificed its renomé and its “raison d’être” !
One of the main countries behind the WTO/SPS was
The OIE Code
risk assessment requires a long list of data to be available for the procedure
not respecting that the majority of them are not available even in the home
countries of the authors.
Example: “Risk estimation consists of intergrading the results from the release
assessment, exposure assessment and consequences assessment to produce overall
measures of risks.”. “For a quantitative
assessment, the final output may include: probability distribution,
confidence interval, and other means for expressing the uncertainties in the
estimates; portrayal of the variance of all model inputs, a sensitivity
analysis to rank the inputs as to their contribution to the variance of the
risk estimation output, analysis of the dependence and correlation between
model inputs.” (OIE Code 2001, article 1.3.2.4).
2.8 The text is demonstrating that this part of the Code was
elaborated by so called “eminent specialists on risk analysis”
(according to the letter of Dr Blancou, DG OIE sent to the author of this paper
on 30 October 1998) having no any idea about the need of importing country
governments. These “eminent (?)
specialists” didn’t respect at all the infinite diversity and dynamics of
animal disease/pathogen phenomena and their ability to reproduce and to spread
(horizontally and vertically - to following generations, sometime almost in exponential
curve form), mostly invisibly. These particularities are unknown in any other
trade commodity! The mentioned theoreticians didn’t’ consider any personal
responsibility for practical catastrophic consequences of their absurd
“armchair methodology”. This
is from the practical point of view a cardinal
nonsense having nothing to do in any international trade standard.
Every veterinarian, and first of all
Chief Veterinary Officers and their staff, know about the risk of communicable
diseases related with their pathogen sources and way of transmission described
in any textbook on specific infectious and parasitic diseases. The current
disease introduction risk analysis has been always normal national internal
procedure before the decision on the import based first of all on the knowledge
on the disease occurrence in the potential exporting countries and on the
reliability of their sanitary documents.
Even the countries being behind the
OIE Code risk assessment method didn’t respect it themselves which demonstrated
the falsehood of this trick.
Example of not respecting
the WTO/SPS and the OIE Code: In January 2001
More information in: http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/riskassessment.htm
"OIE abuse of disease import risk assessment method supporting
diseases/pathogens' export”.
2.9
The problem is not the non-quantifiable
(i.e. non-measurable) theoretical subjective risk analysis but how to
produce healthy animals and their
pathogen-free products to can practically guarantee the export of really
innocuous animal commodities, i.e. in full sanitary quality !
Particularly the discussion of the author of this paper
with one of the WTO/SPS philosophy/tactics’ authors - Dr MacDiarmid (New
Zealand) at the occasion of the World Veterinary Congress in Yokohama,
September 1995 and his letters confirmed the unfair background of the whole
“management” of the WTO/SPS and of the “new” OIE policy supporting export at
the expense of animal and human health in importing countries. In other words
to support business instead of animal health. Letter of Dr Stuart C.
MacDiarmid (actually - 2008 – still one of the OIE dominating veterinarians - Secretary
General, OIE Terrestrial Animal Health
Standards Commission) to the author of this paper dated of 15 January 1996: ”If, for a particular trade, we have
available risk reducing tools (tests, treatments, whatever) which will reduce
the risk by 10,000 or 100,000 times,
what does it matter what starting risk was ?”. In other
words, disease occurrence is not of importance for importing countries to know
it (!?). This is obviously the reason why Dr MacDiarmid belongs among those who
contributed to the abolition of international reporting of data on disease
import and to absurd reduction of disease occurrence grading data replacing them by one non interpretable cross
“+”. This deliberate blinding of importing countries and facilitating the
export of affected animals by communicable diseases and of non-pathogen-free
animal products created conditions for man-made globalization of animal
diseases as an irreparable ecological disaster.
2.10 Among the most influential “philosophy” supporting disease
globalization belongs the document published in 1994 by V. Caporale, Italy (today
– 2008 - still one of OIE dominating veterinarians – President, OIE Commission
for Scientific Disease Control) containing following sentence (influencing the
preparation of the WTO/SPS): "The need to remove technical obstacles
to the free circulation of animals and their products"; "It is
not longer possible to apply the old system under which animals and
animal products had to come from specific free zones, and were subjected to
isolation, quarantine, inspection and diagnostic testing before and after
export.".
This incredible statement, influencing the
preparation of the WTO/SPS, creates question if the preventive veterinary
medicine is necessary at all and the OIE as an international organization as
well to avoid “the old system” of animal population health protection !
Obviously, according to the mentioned author, the best would be to abolish
protective measures of importing countries and disease control measures in
exporting countries letting to trade not considering animal health and sanitary
quality of animal products. The sense of this anti-sanitary statement is
obviously that the best strategy = “doing
nothing” ! This would significantly reduce
or even erase public veterinary service to the delight of exporting country
producers, traders and government “economists”. The extremely benevolent OIE Code conduces to the lost of exporting
country motivation for animal infection eradication and control, when
the profiting and relatively easy export of non-pathogen-free commodities is
“internationally (?)” supported !
It could be that the mentioned “philosophy”
is behind three decades (from 1978) of African swine fever (ASF) occurrence in
The author of this paper has been interested in this
case from the beginning. In 1978 the ASF was reported in
The author himself visited Sardinia as a tourist in
May 2008 (30th anniversary of the ASF introduction !) and found that the policy of
“doing nothing”, not only in Nuoro province, is almost perfect: the people were not informed (even two
middle-age policemen in Orgosolo had never heard about this disease (!); no any
public notice in the villages and cities, no any information of tourists (i.e.
in 2007 about 5 million) at tourist offices, at international hotels or by
local tourist guides; not limited traditional grilling of piglets; free trade
in fresh pig meat and products with
labels without any word on veterinary investigations or ASF-free guarantee (the
author himself bought without any problem or warning “prosciutto crudo sardo” – Sardinian raw ham); no any border control to avoid export of these raw products
from the island and Italy; no any measures against pig free movements. No any
action to depopulate pig and wild boar (main virus carriers) populations or at least to significantly reduced
them – on the contrary they are protected prohibiting their hunting similarly as of all
other hunting animals (along the roads there were very frequent the warning
signs “Provincia … - Settore Ambiente - DIVIETO DI
CACCIA
- Oasi Permanente di Proteccione
Faunistica”, i.e.
hunting prohibited ! Considering the local conditions, the problem cannot been
solved applying only training courses and theory (publishing “scientific”
papers using nonsense mathematical modelling, absurd OIE Code risk assessment
method, etc.) and issuing “mountains” of administrative documents such as “European Union Commission Decision of 2 May
2005 concerning animal health protection measures against African swine fever
in Sardinia, Italy”, etc.. The problem requires field practice actions
based on a complex of professional and managerial activities supported by
public, animal owners and hunters, by uncompromising legislation and by very
strong government (eventually
international) control.
This case documents anti-sanitary policy of replacing
concrete practical field anti-epizootic actions by “doing nothing! (not
considering producing theoretical papers without practical impact and
organizing sterile meetings). The “responsible” international organizations, giving
“lessons” to all the countries, such as the OIE HQs chaired always by the
French DGs (France directly threatened by the ASF from neighbouring Sardinia –
at only 12 km distance of French Corsica being in contact through shipping),
OIE Commission for Europe chaired during decades by Dr Belev (Bulgaria),
European Union Animal Health Service, etc. obviously have not been interested
in practical blocking the propagation and in eradication not only of this very dangerous
disease.
2.11 The OIE is
professionally responsible for the WTO/SPS supporting it as the initiator and
the main author. This can be documented by many official declaration of the OIE, e.g. in
the OIE Code:
- "Import risk analysis is preferable to a
zero-risk approach"; (OIE Code 1997, Article 1.4.1.1); this is
a perverse statement in favour of exporting countries being unable to guarantee
health of exported animals or pathogen-free animal products in contrast with
the principles of fair trade to export full quality commodities, i.e. avoiding
risk for importing countries.
- "facilitate
international trade by unimpeded flow
of trade of animals and animal products"; (Code 2001, Art.
1.2.1.1); this statement documents the subordination of the OIE to major
exporting countries not respecting the need for consistent protection of animal
and human health in importing countries.
- “International
trade in animals
and animal products depends on a combination of factors which should be taken
into account to ensure unimpeded
trade, without incurring unacceptable risks to human and animal health”.
(CODE 2007, Article 1.2.1.1). The contents of the sentence is
contradictory; the unimpeded trade means without any obstacle ! What are
unacceptable risks ? Who decides the answer of this question ? Trade cannot be
based upon speculations !
2.12 The only purpose of the SPS and the OIE “new” policy is to
“facilitate” export of animal diseases/pathogens and converting importing
countries into sanitary defenceless position (international dictate !).
The SPS and the OIE are imposing duties only
on importing countries dictating them so called “measures”, i.e. what they have to do under the
“new” trade system, considering only the
export of non-pathogen-free animal commodities. The OIE is requiring the
“measures”, which are internal problems
of importing countries, instead of requiring from exporting countries the guarantee
of full sanitary quality of exporting animals and their products !
2.13 The OIE fully and slavishly supported the
policy of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) to minimize and degrade governmental veterinary services becoming
unable to control international trade and to guarantee export of sanitary
innocuous animal commodities.
More information in: http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/vetmanpower.htm
"Global crisis of public professional veterinary manpower - unable to
control effectively animal population health/diseases and animal trade !”
2.14
In order to “facilitate export” of infections/pathogens, the OIE in 1995 took
over (under very strange circumstances – “usurped ?”) the whole global animal disease information system from FAO and
WHO and immediately significantly
reduced the number of criteria on
disease occurrence (= much less
information than before) without any scientific, logical and practical
justifications and without any replacement to confuse importing country when
deciding on sanitary import conditions. The OIE deliberately minimized
information on the occurrence of all international reportable animal diseases. The OIE also abolished very useful regular
annual reporting on disease import cases and thus made impossible necessary
analyses of the WTO/SPS and OIE trade policy sanitary consequences. The OIE
even abolished, also without any
scientific, logical and practical justifications and without any replacement,
very useful numeric classification of
animal diseases (normal in medicine) and thus confused more importing
country decisions on import conditions.
2.15
It is obvious, when considering all official OIE documents and actions, that
the whole “new” system has been (almost in secrecy) well organized and managed from one place by the same authors (from
major exporting countries dominating the WTO and the OIE) having the only interest – to facilitate
profiting export regardless of animal and human health consequences in
importing countries.
2.16 All SPS
follow-up OIE documents, mainly its Codes
for international trade in animals and animal products, have been applying
and supporting the anti-sanitary policy
of the export of non-healthy animals and non-pathogen-free animal products.
The Code import conditions for
individual diseases have been minimized and also other provisions have been
made much more favourable for profiting exporting countries at the expense of
importing countries (overwhelming majority of the Code duties were addressed to
these countries) not to require full sanitary quality.
2.17 The
OIE, “professional” initiator and author of the WTO/SPS, instead of applying
animal health protecting duties, became voluntary the key intergovernmentall
organization for international long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading
and globalization of communicable diseases of animals, including those
transmissible from animals to human beings.
It must be very
influential and powerful lobby (group of countries, their “experts” and
exporters) as well as immense corruption when the WTO sacrificed all fair
trade principles for international trade and
accepted the OIE sanitary professional provisions consciously conducing,
without respecting the WTO fair trade principles, to animal infection
globalization. The animal export dominating countries managed fraudulently to
get through historically unknown procedures hostile to importing countries and
to global animal and human health.
2.18 The OIE is professionally
and morally fully responsible for global negative (catastrophic) sanitary
consequences not only of the OIE Code but also of the WTO/SPS
what without the OIE initiative, active
participation and agreement would never come into the world !
The WTO/SPS would
never be adopted
- if the OIE would insist on
consistent protection of animal and human health in importing countries as
required by the OIE original constitution (i.e. rejecting any corruption and
trade business lobby);
- if
the OIE as a global intergovernmental organization for animal population health
protection would reject the SPS authorship, i.e. not to agree, collaborate,
“justify” and support it, i.e. without OIE initiative, “professional” support
and pseudo-scientific justification;
- if
the governments would be correctly informed about the risk of consequences and
about the real hidden purpose = trade admitting disease pathogen export at the
expense of importing country animal and human health = disease pathogen
long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading and globalization;
- if
the governments would be openly and truthfully informed that the consequences
of the SPS meant not respecting all international fair trade principles;
- if the governments would know that it was a
big trickery;
- if
this problem would be dealt quite separately and not as “stuck” annex of the big GATT/WTO package;
- if
the SPS draft would be subjected to normal scientific opponent procedure (as it
is current event in the cases of university student theses).
2.19 The importing country governments
(exception of the corrupt ones) would never openly agree with the legalization
of infections/pathogens import and globalization through international
trade against the interest and opinion
of their farmers and consumers.
The
WTO/SPS and the “new” OIE policy was made possible only thanks to corrupt OIE bureaucratic
“pseudo-scientists” (still dominating the OIE), betraying their profession
and Hippocratic oath, being responsible
for catastrophic irreparable globalization of animal infections.
2.20 The OIE, as
a SPS follow-up action, has issued new OIE Codes applying (or even copying) the
text of the WTO/SPS. As a new component there was included the
main trick – non-quantifiable pseudo-scientific “risk assessment” method
avoiding importing countries to require healthy animals and pathogen-free
animal products. This provision represents the
key OIE Code component for infection long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading
and globalization trough international trade.
2.21 The OIE has
been abusing the WTO/SPS, as it had planned originally, as a “false” alibi for its “new
globalization policy”. In spite of the OIE repeatedly proclaiming itself that
it has been internationally upgraded by the WTO/SPS, de facto it has been degraded professionally almost to zero.
The OIE Code provisions are not officially cleared
by the member country governments. When deciding about animal and human
life and health, death and disease in the whole world, only the consensus of a
group of lower level officers – Chief Veterinary Officers - cannot be
acceptable. Therefore, they cannot have
international legal value. They serve only for facilitating easy profiting
export of commodities without sanitary innocuousness. The OIE is deliberately
calling its provisions as “international
standard” in spite of having nothing to do with real internationally binding
standard agreed by the governments. (“Standards” normally means the definitions
of the commodity quality).
Example: The OIE was advertising a new issue of the
OIE Code 2007: “The measures published in
the Terrestrial Code are the results of consensus
among the Veterinary Authorities of the OIE Member Countries; the standard it
contains are recognized within the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures as international standard for animal health and
zoonoses”
2.22 The WTO/SPS converted the OIE and its Codes for international trade into a subordinate
position to the WTO. This was obviously the OIE tactics to create a “higher level roof” for covering “new”
anti-sanitary policy and to provide
unfair alibi. The OIE was established in 1924 as fully independent intergovernmentall
organization not subordinated to any other international organization such as
World Trade Organization. The irresponsible and voluntary “takeover” of the
WTO/SPS anti-sanitary policy (de facto
prepared professionally by the OIE “experts”) represents a treachery of
original OIE mission to protect and promote animal populations health.
This was the reason why the author, feeling the moral duty as the former
Chief, Animal Health Service, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO), was asking several times Dr Jean Blancou and
More information in:
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/WTOTEXT3.htm" WTO "Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures"(SPS)- justification
for its abolition”
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/MOORE11.htm" WTO "Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures"(SPS) - answer to DG
WTO letter”
2.23 The OIE Code approving process is contrary
to all democratic principles. The actual consensus means simple public
voting (not secretly), if any, when individual importing countries have minimum
chance to get through with their opinion or proposals against the “wall” of the
major exporting countries dominating the
OIE and their blocks.
(See details in http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/OIEcode.htm, paragraph 17.29).
The OIE Code doesn’t known
(recognize) at all the trade in healthy animals and pathogen-free animal
products, i.e. of full sanitary quality ! It only recognizes the risky trade =
in non-healthy animals and in non-pathogen-free animal products !
The clearance of internationally
binding documents deciding on life/death and health/disease of animals and
inhabitants of our planet cannot be the subject of only a small group of
nominated Chief Veterinary Officers (not legally elected and not always
objective officials and relevant specialists) having not full responsibility
and competence for such extremely important and sensitive global decisions.
The OIE Code provisions must be
cleared by the governments themselves as responsible for the health of national
human and animal populations !!!
Unfortunately, the member country g o v e r n m e n t s are deliberately not informed at all about
the real OIE activities and consequences on animal and human health !
.
2.24 It seems
that the OIE has become a corrupt
organization (behaviour resembling an irresponsible club), paid by the
member country governments, serving only to the trade business at the expense
of global animal and human health. The OIE managed its dirty policy of animal
infection globalization and corresponding actions to “be in hiding” behind the WTO
believing that the responsibility for their consequences is common. However,
the professional responsibility is only and fully of the OIE.
2.25 The same major exporting countries
dominating the WTO and the OIE have been
dominating also FAO/WHO
2.26 Let the
reader himself to comment hypocritical and demagogic OIE documents’
formulations such as “Improving
animal health worldwide is a priority” (??),
title of the Editorial from
*) OIE web text: “By
adopting the OIE’s Fourth Strategic Plan in May 2005, our Member Countries
decided to update our historical mandate. The OIE was created in 1924 with the
aim of controlling the international spread of infectious animal diseases. Over
and above this historical mission, our new mandate is now “to improve animal
health worldwide.” There are
used new terms such as “Good
Governance” and “Global Public Good” in
spite of OIE real policy contrary to
these principles when organizing animal infection globalization.
The OIE is
repeatedly stating that “the veterinary
services of developing and transition countries are in urgent need of the
necessary resources and capacities that will enable their countries to benefit
more fully from the WTO/SPS”. How ? The DG has forgotten that it was the OIE as the key organization, together
with the World Bank, dismantling
functioning government veterinary services (including staff, funds,
facilities, laboratories, transport means, postgraduate training institutions,
animal health programmes, etc.) in these countries due to dictating and
supporting absurd exaggerated privatization of veterinary services.
Therefore, the
urgent need for health improvement has
been caused mainly by the OIE recent anti-government policy. The maximal need
for strengthening and internationally evaluating government veterinary services have the major exporting countries being
unable to export healthy animals and pathogen-free animal products – i.e. the
major contributors to animal infection long-distance (incl. intercontinental)
spreading and globalization (not mentioning the inability to control the
most dangerous infections, e.g. foot and
mouth disease in the
The question is why the OIE has done nothing to
eradicate e.g. three-decades-lasting African swine fever “below the OIE window”
– in
2.27 The OIE is
behind the animal infection globalization not only due to supporting and
organizing mass export of their pathogens into importing countries being unable
to detect them in time, control and eradicate. Spreading of animal infections continues also in exporting countries
after loosing economic motivation for animal infection
control and eradication to reach necessary sanitary quality of exporting
commodities, thanks to the OIE Code
supporting relatively easy and profiting export of only non-pathogen-free animals and
non-pathogen-free animal products. Actual mass spreading of animal
infections in importing as well as in exporting countries, i.e. in the whole
world, thanks also to OIE policy strongly supporting WB and IMF dismantling unscrupulously government veterinary services.
It is obvious, that weak public service cannot
execute effectively (or at all) neither infection control and eradication
programmes nor national and international trade inspection. The above
mentioned “policy” has conduced to minimizing
up to stopping active searching for discovering diseased animals and outbreaks
= the exporting countries do not know real animal infection occurrence (see OIE
World Animal Health yearbooks - WAH). The costly investigations are “risky” to
detect the reality, i.e. diseased animals – herds with necessary follow-up
demanding anti-epizootic measures (up to drastic depopulation) and serious
complication for animals and animal products local trading and export. Why to
investigate when the OIE Code has deliberately minimized up to avoided at all
the import conditions based on active testing of exporting commodities (the
latest deterrent examples are paratuberculosis and leptospirosis – both having
empty page !) ?
Examples of the abuse of OIE HQs position by the major
exporting countries dominating this organization: Italy having problems with
two List A diseases (the most important animal infections complicating the
export) – African swine fever and swine vesicular disease, “enforced” the
abolition of OIE Disease Lists’ classification and included them among other
not so dangerous infections (thanks to the Italian chairmanship of the OIE
Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases ?). The
2.28 There is
generally known that many animal species have disappeared due to pathogens of
dangerous infection diseases. In the history there were many nations which
vanished due to infection diseases. Globally spread pathogens of animal infections can
contribute to the disappearance of many other animal species and in the distant future even to vanishing of “homo sapiens”, i.e. to humankind
disappearance. The OIE animal infection globalization policy could be
theoretically understood as assisting in digging mass grave for the humanity
what will be never forgotten.
2.29
Before-WTO/SPS OIE Code was containing only very useful recommendations for
sanitary conditions letting the countries to find themselves the export/import
solution, considering also the OIE Code provisions, without any dictate from
outside, i.e. in full freedom and without any trick, such as professional
nonsense duty for importing countries to
elaborated the “risk assessment” for
exporting countries. Originally
recommended reasonable veterinary import conditions as minimum requirements
were replaced by a dictate of obligatory limits for significantly reduced
import conditions not respecting professional ethics and principle “Primum non nocere !”
2.30 All letters sent by the author of this paper to OIE HQs asking to stop the
anti-sanitary policy and to return to its basic and only duty as professional intergovernmentall
anti-epizootic organization were left without any positive reaction. The same
result had the author’s letters to the DG WTO. The OIE animal infection globalization is not any mistake,
it is a conscious policy !
-------------------------------------------------------
More information in:
- http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/OIEcode.htm
"Critical analysis of OIE Animal Health Code for international trade
supporting infections/pathogens' export
= the most dangerous document for global animal population health in the
history !”
- www.vfu.cz/acta-vet/vol74/74-161.pdf
"Book Review:
Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2004, OIE”
- http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/OIEcode2005.htm
"Book Review: Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2005, OIE”
-http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/warnings.htm
"Warning letters against man-made conscious (i.e. criminal)
globalization of communicable diseases through international trade”
3. List of principles of fair international
trade not respected by the OIE
3.1. Freedom of
exporting and importing countries to agree bilaterally on mutual trade conditions without any
external interference or dictate to importing country to accept offered goods
(= free trade without any outside discrimination).
3.2 Transparency
on exporting country information relevant for importing country decision on
import conditions, i.e. availability of relevant properly justified and
documented information (incl. eventually screening sampling methods and size,
investigation results, etc.) to can asses the risks of the given import.
3.3 Exporting
countries to provide necessary convincing quality advertisement on relevant
commodities to be exported.
3.4 Freedom of
paying importing country to select exporting country (encouraging trade free
competition).
3.5 Freedom of
paying importing country to refuse commodities, even without any justification
to be presented to the exporting country.
3.6 Freedom of
paying importing country to identify the conditions to be met by exporting
country.
3.7 Full true
information on the exporting commodity quality (what is guaranteed and what
not, possible side effects) to be available to importing country before its
decision on the given import.
3.8 Exporting
country to guarantee required quality of the commodity (including 100 % - full
quality).
3.9 Exporting
country to present to importing country commodity quality guarantee documents
(including guarantee period) well justified and convincingly documented.
3.10 The quality
guarantee documents to identify without any doubts the quality grades = full or
lower grades.
3.11 Export
of commodities not causing undesirable
problems in importing country.
3.12 Eliminate
from particular commodity export the country being unable to meet required
quality conditions.
3.13 Paying
importing country to have decisive final word about the import permission and
conditions.
3.14 Price of
full quality commodity to be the highest.
3.15 Price of
lower quality commodity to be lower than the highest one (price graded
according to the quality grade).
3.16 The quality
guarantee documents to be issued by persons or organization being materially
(financially) responsible for eventual commodity deficiency (facilitating
success of eventual reclaim procedure).
3.17 The trade
contract to include the procedure for the complain in the case when the
imported commodity doesn’t meet import conditions (incl. covering losses caused
by this commodity).
3.18 Import
decision making authority to respect the opinion of the imported commodity
paying end-users.
3.19 Declaring
(legibly labelling, marking) the true quality of the exported commodity in
order the importing country and the users to be fully informed on the commodity
quality and on eventual risks.
3.20 Steady
tendency of continuous improvement of
trade commodity quality to meet increasing requirements of importing countries
= motivation for steady improvement of commodity quality.
3.21 Stability
of international norms for exported commodities to can adjust in time necessary
quality preparations.
3.22. Exporters’
financial (material) responsibility for hidden flaws in exported commodities to
cover the losses caused by them.
3.23.
Post-import guarantee period for exported commodity.
3.24.
International standards according to commodity type.
3.25 Clear cut
definitions of used terms to avoid misunderstandings and speculation as far as
exported commodity quality is concerned.
3.26 Systematic
analysis of international trade multi-aspect consequences as basis for the
further improvement of exported
commodity quality.
3.27 Established
necessary government infrastructure to control effectively international trade
and supervise non-governmental services involved to can guarantee the fair
trade.
3.28 Effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for infringement of fair international commercial practices.
4. The OIE “new policy”
contrary to the principles of fair international trade = supporting export of
animal infections
4.1. The OIE
Code is not admitting freedom of
exporting and importing countries to agree bilaterally on mutual trade sanitary conditions without any
external interference dictating importing country to accept offered risky
or non-pathogen-free animal commodities, i.e. regardless of required sanitary
quality. The OIE Code is supporting unfair misleading commercial practices.
4.2 The OIE is avoiding information transparency on
exporting country sanitary situation relevant for importing country
decision on import conditions for animal commodity trade not admitting
availability of relevant properly justified and documented information (incl.
diagnostic methods and investigations’ size –
to can evaluate how far the samples were representative – reliability of
investigations’ results), i.e. to can asses the risks of this kind of import.
The OIE rejected reasonable recommendations, presented by the author of this
paper, to include in all diagnostic method standards (published in the OIE Manual of Standards of Diagnostic Tests
and Vaccines) the values of their specificity and sensibility to can assess
the reliability of the investigation results. This information is very
important for importing country to consider the risk of false negative investigation results in imported animals and/or
animal products.
If we
study carefully incredible anti-sanitary statements of the most influential OIE
“officers” about the “no need” for information on animal infection occurrence
then we can understand better the anti-sanitary
OIE policy minimizing up to avoiding informative value of the
OIE ”new information system” (probably better to call it “non-information
system”) for importing countries decision about sanitary conditions and to
confuse/blind them as much as possible.
Some
OIE statements document absolute underestimation
(or the most probably deliberate arrangement to trickily “facilitate trade”
following the OIE Code concept) of the importance of infection free status
and of
infection reporting for international trade ! In other words: “what does it matter what animal infection
occurrence in exporting country is” ? (see paragraph 2.9). The obvious reason is the
fact that the major exporting countries, dominating the OIE, do not know
internationally reportable animal infections’ occurrence at home themselves (as
it can be documented by the OIE World Animal Health yearbooks).
Example:
- “Historically, too
much emphasis has been placed on how a country or zone can reach ‘disease free’
status and then base the safety of its trade on such freedom”. “The OIE is taking
a new approach to setting standards and revising existing ones: the
categorization of a country/zone status is first based on the assessment of the
overall level of risk present in the country/zone or animal population, rather than on whether a disease has been reported or not.” (!?) (A. Thiermann, President, OIE Terrestrial Animal Health
Standards Commission, 2004).
More information in:
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/globsurveillance.htm "Global crisis of communicable animal
diseases' monitoring and surveillance: less information on their occurrence
than before computer era = facilitating infections/pathogens spreading through
international trade !”.
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/tradeinfo.htm "OIE dominating officers: Importing
countries do not need to know real animal infection occurrence in exporting
countries = facilitating export of non-healthy animals and non-pathogen-free animal
products”.
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/vetmanpower.htm
"Global crisis of public
professional veterinary manpower - unable to control effectively animal
population health-diseases and animal trade"
4.3 The OIE Code
is avoiding exporting country to provide
necessary sanitary quality advertisement on relevant animal commodities to
be exported. The OIE Code instead to require exporting country to provide
importing country full information on sanitary quality of the commodity to be
exported, on the contrary, it dictates
importing country to present scientifically justified and convincing “risk
assessment” analysis according to the nonsense OIE Code methodology. The OIE is requiring scientific justification from
importing countries when they wants to import healthy animals and animal
products to be free of particular pathogens.
More information in: http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/riskassessment.htm
"OIE abuse of disease import risk assessment method supporting infections/pathogens'
export”.
4.4 The OIE Code
is not admitting freedom of paying
animal commodity importing country to select exporting country (= not
admitting fair trade competition). Normally, importing country in case of
multi-country offer must select one the most suitable and reject the other
ones. According to the OIE Code “logic” (?) importing country must
scientifically and in convincing manner justify (according to the “risk
assessment” OIE methodology) the refuse
to all countries offering the same commodity, but not being selected.
4.5 The OIE Code
is not admitting freedom of paying
animal commodity importing country to refuse without any justification the
animal commodities due to not meeting required sanitary quality. According to
the OIE Code importing country cannot reject animal commodity not meeting the
requirements for healthy animals and/or pathogen-free animal products or for
better sanitary status than indicated in the Code. The OIE Code is requiring
the rejection to be justified providing scientific and convincing “risk
assessment” analysis to exporting country (using nonsense “risk assessment”
OIE non-quantifiable subjective
methodology). The OIE is declaring that the request for full sanitary quality
of the exporting animal commodities is irresponsible behaviour of importing
country and according to the WTO/SPS those countries must be punished (penalty).
- "It would be
irresponsible and contrary to the principles of encouraging international
trade to insist on guarantees as to the absence of commonly found
infections that are present in the importing country." (OIE Code 2001, page VI, C. 2). This
unbelievable nonsense means that the requirement for importing healthy animals
and innocuous animal products is irresponsible (?!). The real irresponsibility
is of the OIE Code authors and of exporting countries’ behaviour admitting and
supporting infection long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading through international
trade !
4.6 The OIE Code
is not admitting freedom of paying
animal commodity importing country to
identify sanitary conditions to be met by exporting country. The importing
country cannot freely define sanitary import conditions when not in the
agreement with very benevolent OIE Code admitting export of animal
infections/pathogens (exception for some infections such as foot-and-mouth
disease).
OIE Code 2007, article 1.2.1.2,
paragraph 2: “The international
veterinary certificate should not include
requirements for the exclusion of pathogens or animal diseases which are present within the territory of the importing country and are
not subject to any official programme. The requirements applying to pathogens
or diseases subject to official control programme in a country or zone should not provide a higher level of protection on imports than that provided for the same pathogens or diseases by the
measures applied within that country or zone.”
In the paper entitled “The obligations of member Countries of the OIE (World organization for animal health) in the organization of Veterinary
Services” (Rev. sci. tech. Off. Int. Epiz., 2003, vol. 22 (2), p. 549.,
B.Vallat (France), Director General, OIE and D.W.Wilson (Australia) referring
to the OIE Code asked “that an international veterinary certificate not include
requirements for the exclusion of
pathogens or animal diseases which are present within the importing country and are not
subject to any official control programme in that country.”
In other words, the importing country cannot require
healthy animals and innocuous animal products ! The
statement represents inter alia clear
instruction for long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading of animal infections
through international trade towards worsening
sanitary situation in importing countries. This is in absolute contrast
not only to the “new” OIE name (including the word “animal health” in illegal
self-declaration – as “World Organization for Animal Health”) and to hypocritical
unfailing callings for animal health improvement and food safety but also to
all global programmes requiring the health measures such as protection of animal and human populations, biosecurity, sustainable development, environment protection, poverty reduction, etc.. The tragedy is that
the only intergovernmentall independent organization in veterinary medicine
changed its original health protection policy into organizing animal infection
globalization causing irreparable consequences in importing countries, mainly
developing ones.
In comparison with the known situation “at home”, the higher level of
health protection requirements on import is absolutely necessary due to minimal
knowledge about animal infection situation in exporting country and about
imported risky commodity of unknown sanitary quality and even without any
sanitary guarantee.
4.7 a) The OIE is consciously avoiding (blocking) full true information on the exporting animal commodity sanitary quality to be available to importing country before its decision on the given import (what is guaranteed and what not). On one hand the OIE is minimizing up to avoiding information on exporting commodity sanitary quality and on the other hand it is requiring information on importing country sanitary situation and evaluation of its veterinary services. This is something incredible and absolutely unknown in all other trade commodities !
b) The OIE in
1996 “usurped” for itself the global animal health information system (formerly
it was common – FAO/WHO/OIE), reduced very useful and necessary animal infection
occurrence epizootiological criteria to minimum (“+”), reduced original very
useful HANDISTAT disease information software
(disappeared during three years
of “new version preparation”). The OIE in 2006 replaced it by an incredible
professional absurdity called WAHID minimizing even more the information value
for importing country decision-making on import conditions. The WAHID should
obviously replace the OIE World Animal Health yearbooks containing information
as they were sent by the member countries. Up to March 2008 the member country
governments had available only the latest issue from 2004 ! In March 2008 the
OIE finally were sent the WAH 2005 and WAH 2006 providing information with 2-3 year delays ! What kind of
information value could have the documents with old “historical” data, for
shelving only ? The OIE was advising in 2007 on “Important changes of this publication are foreseen.” These changes
instead to improve the information of the member country governments in animal
infection occurrence have significantly reduced the information value for
import decisions ! The worst is not only overcomplicated (for “statistical purposes
of irresponsible theoretical pseudo-scientists”?) the relatively simple data
(providing again significantly less information on infection occurrence than
before computer era) sent by the countries but the main reports, commenting in details voluntarily on
all internationally reportable animal infections’ situation and programmes, are
missing at all ! The most valuable
information sent by the countries were eliminated !!?? The OIE
dominating countries’ “mafia” can do what they want regardless to the need of
the other country governments’ animal health protection. Instead of publishing
in full all data on animal infection occurrence as received from the member
country governments, the OIE is publishing voluminous books without any
importance for these governments (e.g. 728 pages of “Annual Reports of OIE Reference Laboratories and Collaborating Centres”,
2007) ! The OIE is continuing using demagogy propaganda such as “With a wealth of clearly presented
information, World Animal Health is a key reference tool for the animal health
sector around the world”. In spite of this kind of false declarations, the
OIE to “facilitate trade” is doing exactly the contrary – minimizing, deforming or even holding back the obtained useful
information needed for decision-making of the country member governments!
In the WAHID development to key role had
c) The WAHID is full of incredible professional
nonsense such as calculating different disease (outbreaks) “indicators”
from ad hoc reported absolute data
(if reported at all) as the reality
that is x-times higher *),
introducing the ranking of these absolutely incomplete data, mixing data on
terrestrial with aquatic animals, not using numeric classification of diseases,
using English alphabetic order only, disease occurrence “grading” is minimal or
zero and even using colours (not legible in generally used black-white printers),
stressing clinical forms when for the trade are decisive the subclinical pathogens
carriers, etc. The “new” system is confusing
importing countries even more than before when deciding about the import
conditions (“to facilitate trade” ?). The OIE is continuing presenting
“statistically processed“ entirely incomplete data applying the principle “garbage
in = garbage out”.
*) In this context it can be
quoted a text demonstrating that even in the most developed country the infection occurrence is not fully known: "It is assumed that, for every case of
salmonellosis recorded in humans in the
4.8 The OIE Code
is supporting
exporting country not to guarantee required sanitary quality of the animal commodity (avoiding sanitary guarantee; 100 %
sanitary quality is not accepted and unknown in the all OIE official documents)
= guaranteeing nothing.
In all OIE documents there is no one
word requiring sanitary guarantee of exporting animal commodities. According to
the OIE Code the importing countries must accept animal commodities without
any guarantee of sanitary quality. The OIE in all its documents is admitting
only international trade in non-healthy animals and non-pathogen-free animal
products (not full sanitary quality = sanitary deficiency threatening
animal and human health).
4.9 The OIE Code
is supporting exporting country not to
present to importing country animal commodity sanitary quality guarantee documents
(including guarantee period) well justified and documented to convince
importing country. On the contrary, the OIE Code is tailored to avoid any
guarantee for sanitary status of exporting commodities and instead it is
insisting on so called “international veterinary certificate” representing only
not binding information on negative
results of some selected infection investigations’. The graduation of sanitary
quality, i.e. according to pathogen-free status, is for the OIE an unknown
phenomenon.
More information in the OIE Code 2007, Part 4, Model
International Veterinary Certificates.
4.10 The OIE
Code is supporting the absence of
sanitary quality guarantee documents necessary to identify without any doubts
the quality grades = full or lower grades. The OIE is supporting export of pathogens not
distinguishing different grades of
sanitary quality in order exporting countries to can require full price
as for sanitary innocuous commodities. The OIE is not admitting price
differentiation according to animal commodity sanitary quality grade: importing country must pay for non-healthy animals and/or
non-pathogen-free products as for the healthy animals and/or pathogen-free
products (= internationally organized robbery by the OIE). Infection/pathogen importing country must pay all
post-import economic consequences and costly specific control/eradication
measures itself !
How can be
justified that the importer must pay, thanks to the OIE policy, for non-healthy
animals and non-pathogen-free animal products the same price as for animal
commodity of full sanitary quality ? This false OIE principle conduces
exporting countries to do nothing for reaching full sanitary quality, i.e.
letting the infections to spread even in their home countries due to the absence of former (pre-SPS) economic motivation for animal
health protection and restoration !
The OIE is not admitting logical requirement exporting countries to put their “cards” on the table, i.e. to inform truly importing countries what infections’ free status is guaranteed and what infections’ free status is not guaranteed. This open play would facilitate decisions on import conditions and on the price corresponding with animal commodity sanitary quality.
4.11 The OIE
Code is supporting only export of non-sanitary-innocuous
animal commodities causing undesirable problems in importing countries. The
OIE doesn’t care at all about the
consequences of infections/pathogens’
import that are usually extremely difficult to detect in time and to
eradicate. In the majority of the countries infection timely detection and
eradication under actual circumstances of weak government services are
practically impossible (including in so called “most developed countries”).
4.12 The OIE is
not requiring to eliminate from particular animal commodity export the country
being unable to meet basic sanitary quality conditions. On the contrary, the
OIE is even threatening to eliminate from the trade the countries requiring to
import healthy animals and pathogen-free animal products ! This statement is a
top of perversity reflecting the “new” OIE
policy hostile to animal and human health in the world !
OIE Handbook on Import Risk Analysis for Animals and
Animal Products, 2004*), page 20 is even threatening importing
countries that “zero risk
importation policy would require the total exclusion of all imports” (!?).” In other words, the country requiring healthy
animals and pathogen-free animal products, to protect animal and human health,
should be punished and eliminated from all import of animals and their products
! The threat represents a top impudence of irresponsible
authors trying to defend for any
cost relatively easy exports at the
expense of health in importing countries.
*) Chief Author: Noel
However, biological aspects and protection of
animal and human health in importing
countries would require exactly the opposite, i.e. “zero risk importation
policy would require the total exclusion of all exports from those countries
that are not able to ensure pathogen-free animal commodities”.
The above quoted statement is unimaginable in any other
trade commodities where the basic
fair policy is to exclude from export those who are not able to guarantee
required quality of the goods !
4.13 The OIE is not admitting
paying animal commodity importing country to have decisive final word
about animal commodity import permission and sanitary conditions. The OIE Code,
dictating to accept risky good - carriers of infection pathogens, limits seriously the “space” for importing
country to decide about animal commodity import permission and sanitary
conditions.
4.14 The OIE Code is not admitting the price of full sanitary
quality commodity to be relatively the highest (higher than of the lower
sanitary quality) ! The OIE doesn’t know the terms “full sanitary quality” – “healthy
animals” and “disease-pathogen-free
animal products”. The OIE is supporting
only risky trade exporting pathogens. The OIE policy avoiding price
differentiation according to sanitary quality grades stopped
economic motivation of exporting
countries to control/eradication communicable diseases, i.e. to try to improve national animal population health.
According to the OIE perverse logic, the importing countries must pay full
(highest) price for animal commodity without sanitary quality guarantees.
Example: One of the traditional priority infection for
eradication programmes is bovine tuberculosis. However, many exporting
countries loosing economic motiation due to WTO/SPS and the OIE sanitary
benevolent “new export policy” stopped intensive control and eradication
programme against this disease letting it to be spread into wildlife
populations. “It was reported affecting
at least dozen different animal species, predominantly ruminants, but also
predators and carrion eaters, thus showing that M.bovis can gradually
contaminate an entire ecosystem.” OIE Final Report, 75th General
Session, Paris, 20-25 May 2007, page 48. As a deterrent example it can be
mentioned: New Zealand reported in previous WAH yearbook issues that
it had managed to reduce successfully bovine tuberculosis prevalence below 0.1
% already in 1979; however the disease
spread in wild animals: from 1985
reported in possums (Trichosurus vulpecula), from 1987 in
farm deer (Cervus elaphus) and from
1991 also in ferrets (Mustela furo). In 2004 tb was reported
(according to WAH 2004, page 251) also in wild pigs, wild cats, stoats,
hedgehogs and hares, i.e. the tb situation became worse than before, obviously
due to inadequate epizootiological control and quite ineffective anti-tb
programmes. The bovine tb instability was confirmed also in farmed cervidae: “At
The OIE Code, as a bad example,
is naturally strongly influencing import sanitary conditions for animal
commodity trade at bilateral as well as multilateral levels. Instead of
specifying the import quality conditions to be guaranteed and understandable to
all users, there are used “cleverly” general
formulations (often referring to currently not available documents) having
minimal information value for importing countries and their farmers/consumers.
How can importing countries assess the risk of infections/pathogens
introduction, as required by the OIE Code, having no any data on specific
infections in exporting countries? This type of camouflage represents other form facilitating easy and highly
profiting export regardless of sanitary quality, i.e. guaranteeing
nothing ! This type of very vague formulations is
only a non-documented information not representing at all any sanitary
guarantee. The farmers/consumers have not any chance to study the incredibly
overcomplicated international documents, being almost not available and under
permanent changes.
Example: New Zealand is exporting meat to
the European Union with “Animal and Public Health Certificate” (TZ-2006/12-PRO2 New Zealand) having following
text: “The animal products herein described, comply with the relevant New
Zealand animal health/public health standards and requirements which have been
recognized as equivalent to the European Community standards and requirements
as prescribed in Council Decision 97/132/EC, specifically, in accordance with
the Food Act 1981, Biosecurity Act 1993 and Animal Products Act 1999.” This is all !? No one word what is
guaranteed, i.e. no any sanitary guaranty ! How can the importing country and the users
understand if the commodity is free or not of infection pathogens, namely of
foodborne disease ones (e.g. is the commodity free of Salmonella or not ?) ? To what kind of etiological investigations the
commodity was subjected? What about their size (incl. the grade of representativeness) and results ? Is the
commodity free of all infections, or only of all internationally reportable
infections or only of some selected infections (which ones) ? In the above
mentioned “certificate” there is not any answer expected by the importers and
consumers. How can importing EU-member country government decides freely
about the import from opposite part of
the globe having not any information
for infection introduction risk assessment?
The “agreement” is “cleverly” formulated, in a form of deliberate camouflage, to avoid any doubt about
commodity sanitary status (no chance for the complaints) or the refusal due to
sanitary reasons or due to missing necessary infections occurrence information.
If we
look in the newest OIE global animal health information system (WAHID) for the
comparison of sanitary situation between any importing country and the New
Zealand as exporting one, then we can find for the year 2005: “There
is no report for New Zealand” (WAHID website dated 3 February
2007). The same system reported on animal health situation: “
4.15 The OIE Code is not admitting the price of lower sanitary quality commodity to be lower than of the higher quality commodity one due to avoiding sanitary quality grading, i.e. conducing to the equalization of prices and thus making impossible competitive motivation for sanitary quality improvement. Regardless of missing sanitary quality guarantee, many major rich exporting countries even strongly financially subsidise the export of non-healthy animals and non-pathogen-free animal products discriminating (seriously damaging) the producers of importing countries. This practice supports the pressure on importing country authorities to admit artificially cheaper products to be imported, i.e. infection/pathogens’ introduction. This dirty practice of the major exporting countries contributes also in this way to minimize national animal production of importing countries to maximize import without any sanitary guarantee, i.e. contributing to infections/pathogens long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading and globalization. This criminal practice is contrary to the principles of fair international trade. See also 6.4.
Example: European Union admits many West European
countries to support financially the export of animals and animal products
without sanitary innocuousness guarantee (maximizing profit). One of the main
export channels goes into Central European countries where the EU has dictated
criminal production quota to minimize national animal production, consciously
destroying previous full self-sufficiency in meat, milk, eggs and other animal
products and the previous well developed livestock industry as a whole. The
farmers of these countries are not able to compete with the subsidized prices
of imported animal commodities. Significant reduction of local production
(including liquidation of hundreds of thousands of animal farms and ranches), replaced
by the initially artificially cheap import, brought gradually much higher
prices than before. Similar situation in on American continent where strongly
subsidized
4.16 a) The OIE
Code is avoiding the veterinary certificate to be issued by the officers being
materially (financially) responsible for guaranteeing sanitary status and for
eventual sanitary deficiency = making impossible successful reclaim procedure.
According to the OIE Code the export document issuing “accredited” veterinarian is not responsible for real sanitary
status and has to sign only what he knows (no investigation – no
knowledge about existing infection = “health”?). He
can sign what he wants ! The OIE is not considering any objective inspection of
these “accredited” veterinarians by
government officers (who usually do not
see exported animals and animal products) not to complicate relatively easy and
profiting trade. According to OIE Code nobody is responsible for
sanitary guarantee of exported animal commodities !
OIE Code 2007, Article 1.2.2.1:” It is essential not to include in the
requirements additional specific matters which cannot be accurately and
honestly signed by a veterinarian. For example, these requirements should
not include certification of an area as being free from non-notifiable diseases
the occurrence of which the signing veterinarian is not necessary inform about.
Equally, to ask certification for events which will take place after the
document is signed is unacceptable when these events are not under direct
control and supervision of the signing veterinarian.”
OIE Code 2007, Article 1.2.2.2, paragraph 5: “They should not require a
veterinarian to certify matters that are outside his-her knowledge or which
he-she cannot ascertain and verify.”
OIE Code 2007, Chapter 1.2.2.3: “Certifying
veterinarians should only certify
matters that are within their own knowledge at the time of signing the
certificate, or that have been separately attested by another competent party; have no conflict
of interest in the commercial aspects of the animals
or animal products being certified and be independent from the commercial
parties.”
b) The above quoted OIE Code statements demonstrate once more that so
called “certificates” have nothing to do with sanitary guarantee and even cannot be in conflict of interest in the
commercial aspects !? Therefore, the OIE is preferring private
veterinarians and not government veterinarians to investigate animal
commodities and to issue export sanitary
documents themselves. It is logical that
export business and demanding sanitary aspects are normally in conflict of
interest what is for the OIE an unknown phenomenon.
The OIE, in spite of being intergovernmentall organization paid by member
country governments, has been degrading (even
“killing”) government veterinary services defending animal and human population
health while private veterinarians have opposite interest and motivation. The OIE Code reflects serious
weakness of major exporting country government veterinary services with very
limited staff able to work mainly in their offices and spending a lot of time
by administrative work.
OIE Code 2007, Chapter 1.1.1, term Veterinary Services : “Private sector organisations are
normally accredited or approved to deliver functions by the Veterinary
Authority” (“normally ?”).
OIE Code 2007, Article 1.2.1.3 describing the “responsibilities” of the exporting
country, instead of asking them for full sanitary quality guarantee of
exported animal commodities as of primary importance, is requiring only information and measures that are for importing
country only of secondary importance such as:
“ country ability to apply measures to control and prevent the relevant listed
(?) diseases, structure of veterinary service, procedure for authorization of
certifying veterinarians, monitoring their activities to verify their integrity
and impartiality, etc.” All these uncontrollable information cannot replace
at all the sanitary quality guarantee with full legal financial responsibility for eventual export
of pathogens.
c) Very interesting is the provision in the
paragraph 3. of the same Article: “The Head of the Veterinary Service of the
exporting country is ultimately accountable for veterinary certification
used in international trade.” How ? This
is only a poor theory when the certifications are carried out mostly or
exclusively by private veterinarians who, without necessary effective
supervision on the spot by the government service, can certify what they wish due to not having any legal
responsibility for the sanitary quality
guarantee as deliberately avoided by the OIE Code. The OIE Code is full of
other theoretical provisions giving tasks to the Heads of the Veterinary
Service not respecting the facts that weakened government services of exporting
countries are lacking necessary staff, facilities, material, funds, etc. needed
for adequate control of international export. Using private “accredited”
veterinarians is only imperfect
emergency substitute which cannot replace independent government service. They
usually avoid the conflict of interest with private exporters at the expense of
the health in importing countries = export of infections.
4.17 The OIE
Code is avoiding the trade contract to include the procedure for the complain
in case when the imported animal commodity doesn’t meet import sanitary
conditions or has introduced infections/pathogens (e.g. for covering losses
caused by this commodity). In practice, according to the OIE Code not admitting
sanitary guarantee and not requiring financial responsibility, the importing
country must pay these losses and cost of control/eradication measures itself !
4.18 The OIE
Code is avoiding decision making authority to respect the opinion of the
imported animal commodity users on
sanitary quality. The OIE doesn’t
respect at all the opinion of imported commodity users (farmers, consumers,
etc.) on sanitary quality !! In the OIE documents there are even
provisions about acceptability of some food-borne-disease-pathogens in imported
food ! Who has given the OIE the right to impose on the consumers the duty to
accept non innocuous food ?
In the OIE Handbook on Import Risk Analysis for Animals and Animal
Products it can be found on page 2 in the part entitled “
How far the WTO and OIE anti-sanitary concept has
reached is demonstrated by P.B. Jolly
who writes “It is imperative to put an
end to certain misconceptions, particularly the requirement of ‘zero
risk’ ” and mentions the idea of
“responsible consumers”
i.e. to accept not innocuous food !?
In: Veterinary Services: organization, quality assurance, evaluation. OIE
Scientific and Technical Review, Volume 22 (2), August 2003, p. 384. .” Again, who decides who is “responsible
consumer”, i.e. who accepts voluntarily pathogens in his food ?
This OIE document confirms
anti-sanitary policy also of the FAO/WHO
Example
see in 7.11.
The number of ad hoc (non systematic) investigated samples of food of animal
origin in exporting countries is absolutely
minimum being very far from the
lowest representativeness when considering the immense size of exporting commodities.
The OIE as well
as the FAO/WHO
4.19 The OIE
Code is not requesting to declare the true sanitary quality of the exported animal
commodities (e.g. legibly labelling, marking). Within the uncontrollable jungle
of international export and re-export of animal commodities their origin is
very often unknown, i.e. not traceable and their sanitary quality is almost always unknown to the users (farmers,
consumers, etc.) = free long-distance spreading of infections/pathogens. The
OIE Code makes consciously impossible to
inform the users on the true sanitary quality of the imported commodities
(animals, food of animal origin, etc.) avoiding deliberately, in the so called
“OIE international certificates”, any information on true sanitary status.
Thanks to this dirty policy, neither the farmers nor the consumers know the
sanitary quality if the imported commodity is free of infection pathogens or
not. Unfortunately, following this model, the same anti-sanitary policy is
transferred into local national trade. Thanks to the OIE policy the imported
animals and their products are the only
commodities where the exporter must not inform about their quality and can export what he will without
any quality guarantee! This is something incredible ! The OIE absolutely doesn’t care about the opinion
of the farmers and of the consumers who would never agree to import
non-healthy animals and non-pathogen-free animal products as it is dictated by
this extremely dangerous organization.
4.20 The OIE Code is supporting the tendency of
continuous deterioration of trade commodity sanitary quality instead of
meeting increasing sanitary quality requirements of importing countries. The
OIE is systematically making the OIE Code more benevolent (every year revisions
of many chapters) to even more “facilitate” trade exporting more easily
infections/pathogens. This consists, e.g. in minimizing or abolishing the sanitary
requirements on exporting animals investigations, on epizootiological
characteristics of other animals in the
herd and territory of their
origin. Other form of OIE organized long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading
of infections/pathogens is simply to eliminate the infection from the Code
provisions (e.g. paratuberculosis, leptospirosis). Other form of minimizing sanitary requirements and
confusing importing countries are several uncontrollable tricky “novelties”
such as the “zoning, compartmentalization,
regionalization, judgement of equivalence of sanitary measures, risk boundary,
etc.” based on theory, estimates and speculations only. The OIE Code
doesn’t require effective field control and protection of the specific
infection free zones, regions, etc. territory selected for the export. The
result is that the protection is formal on paper *), if any and the infections
continue spreading within and outside the country.
*) As a deterrent example can be mentioned the “paper
isolation” of
The OIE is in the hands of the most powerful countries
trying to minimize the already minimal OIE Code sanitary requirements for their
export. Instead of imposing on exporting countries to improve animal sanitary
status in their territories to can guarantee export of animals and their
products without pathogens (i.e. without exporting sanitary problems into
importing countries) they are systematically introducing in the OIE Code
theoretical “novelties” impossible for the importing country to control. They can use them “at home” as internal
problem of any country. Why not ? Many ideas can be reasonable and acceptable for local trade only (if ideal conditions
available and epizootiological situation well known) but not for international
trade practice. The exporting country under existing minimal or zero controls/inspections can
declare and “certify” what it wants. Because of regionalization and zoning have
been for exporting countries too demanding (requiring even eradication of
particular infections !?) and therefore “complicating” the export, the “scientists”
in service of international business (=
“professional prostitutes”) elaborated
different papers to support this new camouflages for importing countries. Similarly
as in many thousands of post-SPS OIE publications and documents as well as in all
publications of “business servicing scientists”, there in no one word that the
export must or should be without animal infection pathogens !
All these “novelties” only make easier the export of infections
= their spreading and globalization ! They are deepening the OIE-caused-lost of
economic motivation for animal infection effective control and eradication.
Example: “The
concept of compartmentalisation” was published in Rev. sci. tech. Off. Int.
Epiz., 2006, 25 (3), 873-879 by eleven (11 !) authors. The paper defends not proved “seven factors” theory (no
risk assessment, no examples of practical results) which is not applicable in
nation-wide practice even in the countries of the authors (e.g. lack of
necessary government service staff and no control, insufficient knowledge of
infection occurrence, not reliable accredited veterinarians usually depending
on local producers, not guaranteeing infection-free export, multi-etiological
problems, etc.). The majority of the authors are from the same countries which
for decades have dominated the OIE: six
from USA (3 from Centres for Epidemiology and Animal Health, Fort Collins,
Colorado) – the major exporter of animal commodities (including not
pathogen-free ones), two from Instituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Teramo,
Italy (not able to eradicate African swine fever during three decades and to
control effectively the sanitary situation; see also paragraph 2.10) and one
from European Union (applying the same trade policy as the OIE conducing to
pathogen spreading = animal infection Europeanization). In the Summary there is
a demagogical statement “assess and manage animal disease risk so
that the safety of trade can be ensure” when the practical impact is
exactly opposite (= infection spread).The principle of internal isolation is an
old one applied in large scale animal production units trying to separate
animals according to their categories and to isolate selected affected herds
from non-affected ones. The top isolation measures have been called
“black-and-white system”. However, in spite of the internal isolation, the
basic production unit (ranch, farm) represents for export purposes one basic
epizootiological unit.
The
importing countries are not interested in exporting country local
uncontrollable measures easily to be abused. They are interest only in healthy
animals and their sanitary innocuous products accompanied by official guarantee
of full sanitary quality !
4.21 The OIE Code is not assuring the stability of international sanitary provisions for exported animal commodities to can adjust in time sanitary quality preparation. The OIE Code is being issuing every year with many changes not marked in the extremely wordy book. The OIE is calling the Code as the “international standard”. However, any professional quality international standard cannot be changed every year ! This documents very low scientific and practical quality of the OIE Code.
The Code as an international “standard” is unique in the
world by its absolute instability - issuing every year (from 1998) a new version
without any indications of the changes in these thick books and thus seriously confusing the users. Every
new issue conduces to facilitate more and more the conditions for exporting
countries at the even major detriment of the importing country animal and human
health. In the other words, every new issue increasing infections/pathogens export risk facilitates more and
more the globalization of animal communicable diseases through international
trade. The instability due permanently replacing previous issues documents very
serious lack of the OIE responsibility, scientific standard, objectivity,
respect to international trade practice experience and logic as well as very
low professional quality of the Code. Permanent changing the Code gives
evidence that the OIE is not scientifically and even not logically justifying
(not able to implement it or simply it is not justifiable at all) not only any
Code “new” provisions (also “new” information systems) in spite of repeatedly
requiring importing countries to scientifically justify their demand for
healthy animals and pathogen-free animal products ! This can be understood as a
top of the OIE demagogy and hypocrisy !
Example: Only in the OIE Code 2007
there are 24 revised chapters and appendices on the following subjects: general
definition, zoning and compartmentalization, rabies, foot and mouth disease,
rinderpest, bluetongue, bovine tuberculosis, BSE, equine influenza, equine
infectious anaemia, equine piroplasmosis, equine rhinopneumonitis, glanders,
equine viral arteritis, avian influenza, surveillance for rinderpest,
surveillance for bluetongue, surveillance for avian influenza, etc. It means
that the previous Code 2006 can be thrown into basket as not more valid. The
same exercise has been repeated every year from 1997. One doesn’t know what is
still valid and what not.
4.22 The OIE
Code is making impossible financial (or
material) responsibility for hidden sanitary flaws of exported animal
commodity (e.g. for infection introduction, for false sanitary documents not
corresponding with import conditions). According to the OIE Code the certifying
officer guarantees nothing !
4.23 The OIE Code is not requiring any post-import sanitary guarantee period for imported animal commodities as it is normal in all other trade commodities. Therefore, the exporting country is without any risk of infection/pathogen export complaint = risk-free export !. The export of animal commodities is the only one where the negative consequences of non-full-quality export are without any “penalty”, not only due to difficult to detect invisible and non-measurable “phenomena” without particular laboratory investigations (their size is minimal or zero due to economic reasons) but mainly due to not guaranteeing exported commodity sanitary quality (veterinary certificate information is without legal value for the official complaint). All the negative post-import consequences, such as losses and cost of control/eradication measures, must be covered by the paying importing country what is something incredible in any other trade commodity! These are the criminal consequences of the OIE Code policy mainly due to not admitting infection-free trade, not requiring sanitary guarantee and due to requiring nonsense “risk assessment” based on speculation in favour of exporting countries! The exporting countries must be “grateful” to the OIE for so “clever” arrangement for easy and without-risk-export of non-infection-free commodities regardless of sanitary consequences in paying importing countries being internationally without any support (= defenceless).
b) The OIE anti-sanitary policy is
unfortunately “slavishly” copied by other international organizations
(influenced by the same major exporting countries) such as the the FAO/WHO
c) Animal infection Europeanization.
International trade within the European
Union is even easier due to not requiring at all any sanitary guarantee (only
information, if any). As far as the sanitary quality of the meat and other
products of animal origin are concerned, the “system” is only in the hands of
“self-controlling” (?) producers and exporters
without the “interference” of government
services (“out of play”). The only criterion for the importers is the price
and not any sanitary quality, e.g. international
movement and circulation of the meat is free conducing, thanks to the EU
organized absence of government sanitary inspections and infection controls, to
irreparable Europeanization of
foodborne-disease-pathogens such as
salmonelloses ! The conscious Europeanization is applied also on exported animals without sanitary guarantee crossing
uncontrolled the country borders not respecting entirely different animal
infection situation in different member countries. The EU HQs animal health
“armchair” staff dedicates mainly to the creation of ad absurdum enormous number of different legislation documents and
to the very formal (paper) control of their implementation. The staff doesn’t
dedicate its activities to practical solution of the main problems such as
effective protection of animal and human populations’ health and control,
elimination and eradication of major infections in the EU territory, i.e. to
the improvement of animal populations’ health. (As a deterrent example it can
be mentioned three decades of African swine fever in
Example of the Europeanization: The spread of
bluetongue in 2007 from the most southern part of the European Union (Spain and
Italy) for the first time in the history into the Nordic countries, following
the benevolent OIE Code “conditions” facilitating trade at the expense of the
importing country health.
d) The worse is
that the OIE Code extraordinary benevolence is very often “transferred” in
national animal commodities’ trade and thus supporting animal infection spreading inside of the country =
disastrous multiplying effect of the OIE policy being at the top of the
infection propagation “pyramid”!
4.24 The OIE
Code is trickily avoiding international
sanitary conditions according to animal commodity type. The OIE is
obviously afraid that formulating sanitary import conditions according to
different animal species and categories, according to different animal products
such as meat, eggs, milk, etc. would require to use the terms “healthy animals” and/or “pathogen-free animal products”. These
terms, unknown in the whole OIE Code, could create immense difficulty to
exporting countries when pathogen-free status would be required and they should
start with demanding mass investigations, infection control and eradication
programmes to achieve the required sanitary status of exported commodities.
4.25 The OIE
Code is lacking clear cut definitions of many used terms conducing to
misunderstanding and speculations as far as sanitary quality of exported animal
commodity is concerned. For example, the OIE is deliberately avoiding to identify sanitary import
conditions for animal products, first of all for meat (the most important
and the most frequent vehicle for infection/pathogen export, long-distance spread
and globalization). In about 600 pages of the OIE Code there is for meat
sanitary quality only one sentence of four words *): “Fit for human consumption.”
without any definition, explanation, conditions, requirements for
investigations, for origin from healthy animals, etc.. While in the long list
of the OIE Code “definitions” there are many definitions generally known to
everybody such as “death”, “killing”, “slaughter”, etc. For the most important animal commodity for animal
infection globalization there is no
space in the Code, obviously not to complicate profitable international
trade spreading freely infection disease pathogens. The main effort of the OIE
is to take attention away from the most important sanitary phenomena, such as “healthy animal” ,”pathogen-free animal product” , etc., what is reflected also in the
fact that these terms are missing at all in the whole thick OIE Code books. The
OIE is applying the same policy as FAO/WHO
*) In the OIE Code 2007 of about 57 thousand words
there are e.g. 878 words dedicated to General Obligations, 657 words to
Certification, 2,383 words to Risk Assessment and 8720 words to Veterinary
Services Evaluation.
**) Example see in the paragraph 7.11.
4.26 The OIE has
been avoiding any critical analysis of
international trade sanitary consequences to be presented to member country
governments for information and as the basis for the further development of its
policy. The OIE is the only intergovernmentall organization in the world history
not informing at all its paying members on the impact of its activities and
documents. Due to the fear to discover and admit catastrophic consequences of
its policy, the OIE immediately abolished the indicators of pre-WTO/SPS
information system for the evaluation of animal infection import cases. The OIE
is not interested at all in the true about the impact of its policy conducing
to communicable disease long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading and
globalisation.
More information in: http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/globsurveillance.htm
“Global crisis of communicable animal infections' monitoring and surveillance:
less information on their occurrence than before computer era = facilitating infections/pathogens spreading through
international trade !”
4.27 a) The OIE
was strongly supporting the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
policy in incredible destruction of
government veterinary services during the 1990’ and thus contributed to
significant reduction (somewhere almost till to zero) of public service ability
to control animal infections and trade. Very weak public veterinary services
are not able to control effectively international trade and supervise
non-governmental services involved in veterinary certification of exported
animal commodities. It is logical that weak public services can usually control
the trade and private service only formally and administratively, i.e. they can
control the papers. The OIE Code is not
requiring (on the contrary it is deliberately avoiding) any effective
government veterinary control of international trade letting almost all
this trade in the hands of private
veterinarians (!!) having completely contrary interest (profit). There is
generally known that where is not
effective control/inspection and where is missing the fear of sanctions there
is breeding ground for corruption and violation of relevant rules. In our
case when the OIE is avoiding sanitary guarantee then the signing “accredited” veterinarian can confirm what he wants !
Instead to require strengthening of government
veterinary services, Dr A. Thiermann
(USA), President, OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission is stressing (2004), without any proof, how the
implementation of this document is and will be „maximizing the benefit of globalization.“. This is the same trick
as the WTO/SPS promising preamble "Desiring to improve
the human health, animal health .. in all Members;" while in the whole
document there is no one word of the
health improvement measures. On the contrary, the WTO/SPS was written only
to facilitate the export of non-healthy
animals and non-pathogen-free animal products, i.e. to facilitate export of
infections/pathogens = animal infection globalization. Defending the WTO/SPS he is admitting long-distance spreading
of animal infections through „unrestricted trade“ (!?). The WTO/SPS
is maximizing the benefit only of the exporting countries at the expense of the
importing countries maximizing their losses.
b) The
OIE has been consistently and deliberately
mixing public and private veterinarians not
respecting at all quite different contradictory characteristics, positions,
duties and interests as well as quite different grades of responsibility for
sanitary quality of exported animal commodities. The OIE has been degrading government services and their
role in international trade. For the exporters the private
“accredited” veterinarians are more acceptable that the government ones. The
private veterinarians are usually not so strict in respecting local legislation
and export sanitary conditions (according to the OIE Code having no any
responsibility for sanitary status) in comparison with government
veterinarians. One of the reasons is the fact that the home countries of the OIE
dominating officers have very weak government services unable neither to
control on the spot all internationally notifiable animal infections nor the
animal commodities export. The OIE has
never presented to the member country governments any recommendation to
strengthen public animal health services and their sanitary control role in and
their responsibility for animal commodity trade to avoid spreading of communicable
diseases.
c) Today,
the Chief Veterinary Officers represent
more “the generals without army”. Due to lack of necessary number of
full-time public service veterinarians the countries are unable to organize
successful “battle” - animal infection surveillance, screening, control,
elimination and eradication. Private
veterinarians have naturally completely different interests and their ad hoc use as part-time professionals for
some public actions cannot replace full-time specialists of government
services. This fact belongs among the main reasons why the major exporting
countries unscrupulously pushed through the WTO/SPS and the OIE the possibility
of exporting animal commodities
regardless of animal infection pathogen presence, i.e. animal infection
long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading and globalization. In the
majority of exporting countries the international trade is in the hand of
practically uncontrollable private “accredited” veterinarians. In some
countries almost all private veterinarians are “accredited”, usually not
considering their special qualification, i.e. without necessary selection, if
any, based on necessary training and examinations.
Example of private service not helping even in the
most catastrophic panzootics: From more than 12 thousand
government and private veterinarians in
the United Kingdom there were only 2,000 veterinary surgeons at 2001 FMD
outbreak high working to control it. One would expect all-nation mobilization
of all veterinarians fit for work to participate in the anti-FMD campaign under
one command. To replace missing professional staff there were “imported”
veterinarians from different European countries and overseas (e.g. from
d)
This case demonstrates very important experience that the majority of private veterinarians are
usually not available for infection diseases control, eradication and
emergency actions. These veterinarians, including “accredited ones”, give naturally
the priority to current curative practice providing them necessary personal income
and defending their “territory” against the concurrence during their absence. The
OIE doesn’t respect the significant difference and instead of supporting, as
intergovernmentall organization, the government services, it supports private
services benevolent to the export of animal commodities.
e) The OIE is co-responsible for admitting
government veterinary services defending animal populations’ health to be too
weak and almost defenceless against strong and powerful private sector
defending its economic profit.
Examples of dismantling
government animal health services:
Rweyemamu, Astudillo: “Since the mid-1980s structural adjustment programmes in developing
countries have led to a demand for the privatization of veterinary services,
thus aiming at drastically diminishing
the role of the state in these activities. Surveillance, early warning,
laboratory diagnostic services, planning, regulation and management of disease
control programme, as well as ensuring the quality and safety of animal
products were secondary considerations. The chain of veterinary command that
required notification of disease outbreaks enabling a response to disease
emergency and which also ensured the management of national disease control
programme, was often dismantled.”
Ozawa et al.: “To cope with
ever-increasing demand on Veterinary Services, both countries have made continued
effort to expand the services, which currently only have a limited number of government personnel.”
“There are increasing demand for the prevention and control of diseases….
Furthermore, consumers are becoming more and more interested and demanding in
regard to the safety of livestock products. This means a heavier workload for
the Veterinary Services. However, current veterinary manpower is inadequate to
cope and the recruitment of additional workers is difficult in the light of the
continued
downsizing of the Government.”
f) The OIE has never recommended to member country governments to strengthen government animal health services and their competences. In order no to “complicate” the export, the OIE has never recommended to member country governments any criteria for the selection of veterinarians to be accredited for some work in the name of the government, any profile of these veterinarians as the conditions for obtaining the diploma of particular obligatory postgraduate training (undergraduate education usually is not preparing adequately the new veterinarians for this demanding and highly responsible work). In order no to “complicate” the export, the OIE has never recommended to member country governments: how to inspect – control the work of “accredited” veterinarians and “accredited” diagnostic laboratories, e.g. re-testing, placebo testing; revision of local investigations on the spot, field sampling and of laboratory testing; how to hedge against mistakes in sample collection, sending, results interpretation, against sample confusion (or substitution), mistakes and corruption in attest issuing, etc. The pre-export quarantine inspection should the must.
g) Without
strong, well trained, equipped, organized and managed public veterinary service,
supported by necessary funds and legislation, it cannot be implemented neither
any nation-wide successful animal infection control and eradication programmes
nor any effective sanitary inspection of animal commodity trade and export !
h) The OIE is organizing veterinary service evaluation missions to selected countries not including the most important ones for animal infection long-distance spreading and globalization – the major exporting countries (the evaluation and critics of the OIE dominating countries are not permissible !?).
Examples:
The major meat exporting countries in
thousand tonnes – average 2002-2004:
The
United Kingdom is not the subject of the OIE evaluation missions in spite of: being
unable to detect and eradicate in time the FMD 2001 (about 10 million animals
lost); exporting the FMD in France; having the major proportion of the BSE cases (1988-2000 :184,346 from global
total of 189,858 cases); exporting BSE in: Ireland – 5 in 1989, 1 in 1990, 2 in
1991 and 1992, 1 in 1994 and 1995; in France 1 in 1999, in Portugal 1 in 2000,
2002 and 2003; in Italy 1 in 2002. ( Eurostat: Dec. 2005). A large
rendering company in UK continued and expanded its export of meat and bone
meal, which may have been contaminated with BSE, for 8 years after EU ban in
1988, to 70 countries in the Middle and Far East.”(Hodges, J. 2001: Editorial. Livestock Production Science 69,
p. 59).
4.28 Summarizing the above facts it can be stated that the OIE is supporting unfair international commercial practices in animal commodities being in services of the major exporters. One of the key problems of international trade in animal commodities are unfair business-to-user commercial practices generating distortions of competition regarding sanitary quality.
The OIE is supporting misleading commercial practices such as: if the exporting country through the OIE “information system” is providing false information on animal infection occurrence (e.g. presenting ad hoc incomplete numeric data as real ones) and is therefore untruthful or in any way deceives or is like to deceive the importing country, and in either case causes or is likely to cause it to take a transactional decision that it would not have taken otherwise:
- nature of the commodity, its main sanitary characteristics such as its infection-free status, sanitary risks, fitness for purpose, results to be expected from its use, etc..
- attributes, rights and duties of the certificate issuing person, his qualification, status, approval, affiliation or connection of exporting agency, etc.
- compliance with the importing country requirements (the commitment capable of being verified), etc..
The OIE is supporting misleading omissions of important information that the importing country needs for transactional decisions (involving a right of withdrawal or cancellation) and thereby causes or is likely to cause it to take a transactional decision that it would not have taken otherwise: the OIE information system minimizing ad absurdum data on animal infection occurrence facilitates the exporting country to hide or provide in an unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely manner such information.
The OIE is not avoided aggressive commercial practices such as undue influence of the major exporting countries referring to the OIE Code.
The OIE is deliberately not requiring any penalty for unfair international trade practice conducing to animal infection export.
Example: The EU directives (2005/25/EC of
_________________________________
More information in:
- http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/vetmanpower.htm": Global crisis of public
professional veterinary manpower unable
to control effectively animal population health/diseases and animal trade !”
- http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/OIEcode.htm
"Critical analysis of OIE Animal Health Code for international trade
supporting infections/pathogens' export
= the most dangerous document for global animal population health in the
history !”
- http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/consumer.htm
"Conscious insufficient protection of consumer against foodborne disease
pathogens: international policy admitting them in food of animal origin = crime
against humanity ! “
5. List of principles of international protection of animal population
health not respected by the OIE
5.1 Primum non nocere (First, do not harm).
5.2 The priority
of international animal health policy is to protect healthy animals and their
herds/ populations against the introduction of infections/ pathogens from
abroad.
5.3 The
anti-epizootic measures must respect fully different biological character of
infection etiological agents and their interaction with animals and
environmental conditions.
5.4 To support
local (national) animal production to maximize the self-sufficiency and thus to
avoid or minimize the need for risky
import of animals and their products.
5.5 Not to
import risky animal commodities without the guarantee of full sanitary quality
(= without sanitary innocuousness –
avoiding all infectious diseases) or without acceptable sanitary guarantee.
5.6 Not to
import animal commodities from countries known as the exporters of
infections/pathogens.
5.7 Not to
import animal commodities from countries having very weak government animal
health service unable to control animal commodity export and to guarantee its
sanitary innocuousness or other acceptable level of sanitary quality.
5.8 To prefer
and support animal commodity import from the shortest possible distances to
shorten spread of eventually imported
infections/pathogens.
5.9 To prefer
and support animal commodity import from one or minimal possible places of
origin and thus reducing spread of
eventually imported infections/pathogens.
5.10 To prefer
and support one or minimal possible places of destination and distribution of introduced
animal commodity to reduce spread size of eventually imported
infections/pathogens.
5.11 To
stabilize the animal commodity trade channels between exporting and importing
organizations and thus to narrow the stream and dispersion of eventually
imported infections/pathogens.
5.12 To prefer import from specific infectious
disease free countries, territories and localities of epizootiologically
sufficient size to avoid or minimize the risk of introducing specific
infections/pathogens.
5.13 To require
pre-import investigations and quarantine of sufficient duration and necessary
multi-etiological investigations searching for pathogen carriers to avoid their
export.
5.14 To require
and support multi-infection surveillance, monitoring and screening covering
maximal possible population and territory to discover all existing infection
outbreaks in exporting countries, to isolate and eradicate them to can export sanitary innocuous animal commodities.
5.15 To require
for infections’ screening the best and the most complex diagnostic methods to
discover all specifically diseased animals and outbreaks in exporting
countries, to isolate and eradicate them to can export sanitary innocuous animal commodities.
5.16 Not to
accept animal commodity without official document on sanitary status guarantee
issued by independent officer,
preferably of government service.
5.17 To support
in case of doubt about sanitary quality of animal commodity to be exported,
before the decision on import permission,
to visit exporting country to analyse sanitary situation on the spot
assessing the reliability of public animal health service control and of
sanitary guarantee for the export purpose.
5.18 To require
for the export purpose sampling methods giving the most possible objective data
on sanitary status when investigating a representative part of the animal
commodity to be exported.
5.19 To respect
that every case of export/import of animal commodities is different in place
and time and therefore it must be solved flexibly respecting biological
character of multi-infection agents and
importing country need for sanitary innocuous goods.
5.20 To respect
that every exporting country has different situation in individual and
multi-etiological infection occurrence requiring different approach in
identifying sanitary import conditions.
5.21 Importing
countries to be informed truly and in full on animal infection occurrence in
exporting countries.
5.22 To support all suitable motivations for
effective animal population health protection, multi-infection investigations,
control and eradication in exporting countries to be able to export only animal
commodities of full sanitary quality.
5.23
International documents influencing the trade in animals and their products to
be concise and fully transparent, including the used terms, to facilitate their
uniform understanding.
5.24 Education, trainings, research and meetings in animal health to be dedicated primarily to the methods for animal population health protection against the infection/pathogen introduction through import and to the methods of animal population health recovery through effective control, elimination and eradication of specific infections, mainly in exporting countries.
5.25 To support
infectious diseases control and eradication activities in exporting countries
to avoid “delivery” of infectious disease pathogens in importing countries.
6. OIE “new policy” contrary to the principles
of international protection of animal
population health
6.1 Basic historical principle of the medicine “Primum non nocere” (“First, do not harm”) has become for the OIE almost
an unknown rule not applied at all in the “new modern (?)” OIE Code policy! The
OIE doesn’t prefer the protection of importing country animal population health
(with exception of one or very few selected infections of major exporting
countries’ interest) letting the overwhelming majority of animal infections to
be exported. Instead of consistent preventive medicine the OIE applies
fire-brigade approach, i.e. action only in case of infection outbreak or
emergency.
Even the old Greeks and Romans applied the
principle “Praevenire melius est quam
praeveniri.” (“It is better to precede than to be preceded.”)
As one of many “symptoms” confirming the OIE policy in
favour of exporting countries only it can be mentioned the OIE Code Glossary
definition of “Sanitary measure”: “means any measure applied to protect animal
or human health or life within the territory of the Member Country from risks arising from
the entry, establishment or spread of a hazard. [Note: A detailed definition of
sanitary measure may be found in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures of the World Trade Organization.]”
This
definition clearly speaks about the sanitary measures to be applied only in importing countries after
introducing infections/pathogens through international trade! The OIE Code
calculates only with pathogen-non-free trade ! No one word that
the main sanitary measures must be carried out in exporting countries to can
export sanitary innocuous animal commodities. It is very strange that detailed
definition of the most important term is to be found in the WTO/SPS and not in
the OIE Code, specialized international
organization for anti-epizootic policy. This confirms once again that the
WTO/SPS was the tricky “work” of the OIE and its corrupt “experts”. The
definition in the WTO/SPS represents a strange mixture of everything which has
nothing to do with the importing country health protection against infection
pathogen introduction.
6.2 a) The priority of today OIE is to safeguard international trade and not to protect animal and human health ! The OIE is repeatedly declaring that the requirements for exporting healthy animals and pathogen-free animal products are unjustified and contrary to safeguarding trade. The OIE documents state repeatedly (thousand times ?) and demagogically *) that “within its mandate under the WTO SPS Agreement, to safeguard world trade by publishing health standards for International trade in animals and animal products”. The only reference to the OIE Code in the WTO SPS (annex) doesn’t mean any new mandate contra the established one many years ago in the OIE basic text (constitution) by the founding member country governments and parliaments! No any government or parliament have approved explicitly the change of initial OIE anti-epizootic mandate of consistent protecting animal health in the world into an organization supporting animal infections/pathogens’ long-distance spreading and globalization through international trade! This self-made infection-spreading “mandate” legally doesn’t exist; it was “created” illegally by irresponsible OIE leadership in service of major exporting countries.
b) The
OIE has not any “mandate” for animal infection/pathogen spreading even when referring to the WTO/SPS where in the preamble it can be
read following text: “"Desiring
to improve the human health, animal health .. in all Members;", i.e. not desiring to make animal health worse! The above
mentioned OIE statement stresses that its mandate is “safeguarding world trade”
while deliberately omits “safeguarding
world animal and human health”! The former main
priority “concerning spread of epizootic diseases and the means
used to control them” disappeared
being replaced by the main concern of major exporting countries – to safeguard
international trade. No one word of
safeguarding world animal health or concern about the long-distance spread of
epizootic diseases. This change, not cleared officially by the Governments
(only by Chief Veterinary Officers’ consensus), explains the “new” role
favouring major exporting countries and supporting globalization of animals
infections. The OIE has become an organization of different objectives
than the original ones, that are still
the most important for global animal population health.
Note: The deviation
of the OIE objectives from the original ones is reflected also in OIE
publication “75 years 1924-1999” where on 152 pages was not space to quote the
OIE original main duty “avoiding spread
of epizootic diseases” what is today declared by the WTO and the OIE
as non-tariff barrier !?
c) The main concern is not to
avoid infections’ long-distance spread but to safeguard trade: “adoption and enforcement of sanitary
measures in order to minimize their negative effects on international trade”
. The Code is not accepting at all the
trade in healthy animals and their products: “in case where a government chooses to apply stricter measures, the
importing country m u s t be able to show
that its measure is based on a scientific assessment of the potential health
risks.” (OIE CODE 2001, DG OIE Foreword, pages III and IV.) What
is “scientific assessment of the potential health risks.” ?
-------------------------
*) The “new” objectives of the OIE published in 2004.
6.3 a) The OIE Code
doesn’t respect biological characteristics and complexity of individual
animal infections/pathogens. It doesn’t respect different types, subtypes of
etiological agent strains, their resistance, ability to reproduce and spread,
ability to increase their virulence through passages among susceptible animals
(without specific resistance in specific infection free population). It doesn’t
distinguish between virulent, avirulent and conditionally pathogen strains, it
doesn’t consider the risk of agents’ mutation, it doesn’t consider that the trade sanitary problems and measures are multi-etiological,
etc. It doesn’t consider that the majority of infections are very difficult to
discover due to prevailing subclinical course and sneaking spread. It doesn’t
respect that the imported infections usually are not detected in time and not
eradicated, particularly when penetrated into wildlife. It doesn’t respect that
not eradicated imported infections can
spread horizontally and vertically (to following generations), changing
gradually their characteristics (e.g. from acute manifest form to chronic and
subclinical ones) and many times becoming enzootic lasting many years or even
up to the end of the existence of the particular local susceptible
subpopulations (“for ever”?). It doesn’t respect that the interactions
agents-animals-environment represent a dynamic process of changes in place and
time and that every case is different (there are not two identical cases !). It
doesn’t respect that biological complex characteristics is impossible to
measure quantitatively, i.e. objectively. It doesn’t respect eventual failure of human factor. It doesn’t
respect that biological processes at population level cannot be modelled
mathematically, particularly when the
input data are not reliable. Therefore, the use of mathematical/statistical
models cannot replace practical field investigations and infection control
measures.
b) In spite of very bad experience with mathematical
modelling of infection control measures, the OIE, dominated by the theoreticians
– armchair bureaucrats, instead of organizing practical international
preventive and infection eradication programmes is giving particular attention
to “The Use of Epidemiological Models for
the Management of Animal Diseases” – Final Report of the 75th General Session,
Paris, 20-25 May 2007, pages 7-9. The OIE continues to present theoretical
abstract fantasies having nothing to do with practical measures of the member
country governments. Instead of supporting practical measures and training, the
OIE is confusing action-oriented epizootiology with theoretical biostatistics
and modelling (while sitting in offices) based on non real data and thus
deviating veterinary services from demanding field surveillance, control and
eradication activities.
Example: Kitching, Thrusfield and
Taylor (2006): “During
the 2001 epidemic of FMD in the
c)
International trade cannot be based upon OIE speculations and not verified
theory !
6.4 The OIE is not supporting at all local animal
production to avoid or minimize the need for sanitary risky import of
animals and their products. The self-sufficiency in animal production
represents the best preventive measures against the introduction of different
animal infections from abroad. For the OIE this concept is not acceptable
because it s Code is supporting only risky international trade in animal
commodities. The main “duty” of today OIE is the safeguard of international trade in non-pathogen-free
commodities, i.e. without any sanitary guarantee and not to protect
consistently animal and human health in importing countries. See also 4.15.
6.5 The OIE doesn’t
care at all about warning member country governments not to import risky animal
commodities without the guarantee of
full sanitary quality (= without
sanitary innocuousness – avoiding all infections) or without acceptable
sanitary guarantee (e.g. freedom of all internationally notifiable infections).
It cares only how to force importing countries to accept non-pathogen-free
animals and their products, i.e. supporting infection long-distance spread and
globalization. See also paragraph 4.18.
6.6 The OIE
doesn’t analyse the cases of exporting infections/pathogens and therefore it
has never informed and warned importing country governments about those countries
exporting systematically animal
infections/pathogens’. The OIE has not been interested in discovering the major
infection/pathogen countries-exporters not to complicate relatively easy and
profiting export without regard to worsening of infection occurrence in
importing countries due to infections/pathogens introduction.
6.7 The OIE
doesn’t analyse and identify the countries having very weak government animal
health service unable to control animal commodity export and to guarantee its
sanitary innocuousness or other acceptable level of sanitary quality.
Therefore, the OIE has never informed and warned importing country governments
about those countries having very weak public service unable to control
effectively animal commodity export, i.e. to guarantee full or required
sanitary quality and thus to avoid the
export of animal infections/pathogens.
6.8 The OIE new
policy has never preferred, supported or recommended to member country
governments animal commodity trade of the shortest possible distances and thus
to limit as much as possible eventual spread of imported infections/pathogens.
The OIE doesn’t care about the introduction of animal infections through
international trade, on the contrary it supports animal infection long-distance
(incl. intercontinental) spreading without regard to the distances between
localities of origin and of destination of traded commodity.
6.9 The OIE new
policy has never preferred, supported or recommended to member country
governments the principle to export of animal commodity from one or minimal
possible places of origin and to stabilize this trade between exporting and
importing organizations. The OIE doesn’t care about animal commodity
multi-origin contributing to multi-infection pathogen export. On the contrary,
the OIE supports animal infection long-distance spreading without regard to the
mentioned logical principle.
6.10 The OIE new
policy has never preferred, supported or recommended to member country
governments the principle of one or minimal possible places of destination and
distribution of imported animal commodity to minimize spreading of eventually
imported infections/pathogens. On the contrary, the OIE supports animal
infection long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading without regard to
the mentioned logical principle.
6.11 The OIE has
never preferred, supported or recommended to member country governments the
principle of stabilizing the animal commodity trade channels between exporting
and importing organizations and thus to narrow the stream and dispersion of
eventually imported infections/pathogens. Stabilized trade channels facilitate better
control of the commodity trade chain and etiological investigations to discover
in time eventual infections/pathogens.
6.12 a) The OIE
new policy has the tendency to minimize
the size of specific infection free territories and populations to be required
as import sanitary conditions. This is increasing the risk of introducing
specific infections/pathogens from surrounding not properly controlled
territories and populations. For this
purpose the OIE has been introducing
also some not objectively controllable “novelties” in form of not uniformly
understood terms such as “unit, epidemiological unit, subpopulation,
compartmentalisation, regionalization, zoning,
infected zone, surveillance zone, categorization of a country/zone,
equivalence of sanitary measures, low prevalence, hazard-based, risk-based etc.”confusing
importing countries (as it was already mentioned above).
Examples:
The region can be understood as a district, or country
and block of countries ? What about European Union region with African swine
fever in
OIE Code 2006, Chapter 2.2.8
b) The above mentioned example is reflecting general approach
of the Code to reduce the import requirements as much as possible, i.e. to
narrow them to individual animals = clinically affected to leave
at home and the rest (suspect and subclinical carriers) to export regardless of
being from affected herds and/or zones. The Code authors either have no any
idea on the epizootiology of the
diseases or are in service of export business lobby opening way for disease
spreading. Where is the “famous” OIE
scientific convincing risk assessment ? The above mentioned anti-sanitary
approach reminds the words of Dr MacDiarmid that for the export the local
disease situation is not important “when
having risk reducing tools (tests, treatment, whatever)” !? (See also
example in 2.9 paragraph). From the epizootiological point of view just the local (zone)
sanitary situation is the key factor in selecting animals or their products for
the export. The selection of
individual clinically healthy diseases from affected herds and zone is
extremely risky what the OIE Code doesn’t respect! The
most dangerous are the animal-carriers of etiological agents being without
disease clinical manifestation (i.e. originated from affected herds and zones !!).
c) It merits
attention the OIE abuse of sampling
methods for declaring a herd, flock, zone, territory or country as specific
infection free in spite of particular disease occurrence ! The infection exists
but according to the OIE Code “officially” doesn’t exist ! Where is the logic and professional approach
! For supporting export the OIE is even using the open lies !
Examples (OIE Code 2007):
Chapter 2.5.5 – equine influenza: “Equine influenza free country… requirements:
a serological survey has been carried out on a representative sample …
sufficient to provide at least a 99 % level of confidence of detecting the
disease if it is present at a prevalence rate exceeding 5 %.”
Chapter 2.3.1 – bovine brucellosis: “free country = the entire cattle population of a country or zone
is under official
veterinary control and it has been ascertained that the rate of
brucellosis infection does not exceed
0.2% of the cattle herds in the country or zone
under consideration”;
6.13 a) In the OIE Code import conditions for specific infections,
there is continuous tendency to minimize up to avoid pre-export etiological
investigations (searching for pathogen carriers), due to their cost and mainly
due to the risk to discover the reality - sanitary problem making the export
impossible. E.g. in the OIE Code 2000, Chapter 1.4.2.1 “Animal Health Measures
Applicable Before and At Departure” contains correct provisions regarding the pre-export quarantine, however, it is
contradictory to the whole concept of the OIE Code not admitting export of
neither healthy animals, i.e. free of infections/pathogens nor animals free of
internationally notifiable infections/pathogens:
Examples:
The OIE Code 2007, Chapter 2.2.6 Paratuberculosis – empty page = eliminating all import
conditions, including pre-export
investigations (obviously
"It is not longer
possible to apply the old system under which animals and animal products had to come from specific free
zones, and were subjected to isolation, quarantine,
inspection and diagnostic testing before and after export." (!?) -V. Caporale (
The OIE Code is asking not to
spend a lot of time investigating animals before the departure at the border
posts regardless of investigation time needs: “The time and place of the
examination shall be arranged taking into account customs and other formalities
and in such a way as not to impede or
delay departure.” (Article 1.4.1.6)
b) The
before-SPS OIE Code 1992, Chapter 1.5.2.1: “When
they have been found to be clinically healthy and free from List A diseases or any other infectious disease.” (This before-SPS OIE Code was still representing useful recommendations
without SPS “risk assessment” trickery.) Similar formulation can be found also
in all following OIE Codes, e.g. in 2007, 1.4.1: “When they have been found to be clinically healthy and free from
diseases listed by the OIE.” Only in these sentences the OIE recognizes the
importance of all internationally reportable infectious diseases. It seems that
this text of before-SPS OIE Code referring on all infectious diseases has been
obviously by mistake forgotten to be
eliminated. The OIE actual policy is supporting
only unimpeded animal trade and not to complicate it by avoiding infection
export.
6.14 The OIE has
never required, supported or recommended to member country governments multi-infection surveillance and monitoring
covering maximal possible population and territory to discover existing
infection outbreaks in exporting countries, to isolate and eradicate them and
to export sanitary innocuous animal
commodities. On the contrary, the OIE “facilitate trade” tendency has been to limit as much as
possible animal infections’ surveillance, monitoring and screening in exporting
countries to minimize the risk of infection/pathogen discovery, to save money
for demanding costly measures and thus to increase export profit at the expense
of the health in importing countries. The OIE refused the author’s suggestions
to include in regular reporting on animal health situation in individual
countries also on the numbers of specific etiological investigations to show
the size of the active surveys (screenings). Without this the ad hoc reported numbers of specific
infection affected herds and animals are very far from the real occurrence and
thus confusing importing countries when deciding on the sanitary conditions.
6.15 The OIE has
never required, supported or recommended to member country governments for infections’
screening to use the best and the most complex diagnostic methods to discover all specifically diseased animals
and outbreaks in exporting countries or zones, to isolate and eradicate them
and thus to can export sanitary
innocuous animal commodities. On the other hand, the OIE publishes a useful “Manual of Standards for Diagnostic Tests and
Vaccines”. Unfortunately, some countries do not use the most sensitive OIE
recommended diagnostic methods and therefore they are not able to discover
specific infection real occurrence in their territories what represents an
increased risk to export infection pathogens’ carriers.
Example: Among very few
countries reporting also the numbers of specific investigations belongs
6.16 The OIE has
never required, supported or recommended to member country governments the
principle not to accept animal commodity without
official document on sanitary status guarantee. On the contrary, the OIE
Code doesn’t respect at all that any exported commodity must have a quality
guarantee, in our case sanitary guarantee, i.e. to guarantee infection/pathogen
free status. To achieve sanitary innocuous status requires a lot of work and
resources. Therefore, the OIE is replacing this kind of document by non-binding
“international veterinary certificate” informing only on negative results of
clinical and eventually special etiological investigations. The exporting
countries, following the OIE Code provisions as far as sanitary status is
concerned, guarantee nothing.
There is not great difference when comparing it with illegal export of animal
commodities being also without any sanitary status guarantee and thus
contributing similarly to infection/pathogen international spreading and
globalization.
6.17 The OIE Code is recommending in case of any doubt about sanitary quality of exporting commodity, before the decision on import permission, to visit exporting country and analyse its veterinary service situation following a very long list of the criteria (for writing a book?). However, the most important aspect for importing country is deliberately missing, i.e. to investigate sanitary situation on the spot – at the origin of animal commodity to be exported, to assess the ability of public animal health service to control local sanitary situation and to meet required import conditions as well as to evaluate the reliability of sanitary guarantee/attests for avoiding the export of sanitary problems (infection/pathogen).
The OIE has been repeatedly calling for veterinary service evaluation in the member countries, in developing and transition ones, i.e. mainly importing ones (being as usually discriminated by this organization). The OIE has never considered to send veterinary service evaluation missions to the countries the most important for long-distance animal infection spreading and globalization, i.e. the major animal commodity exporting countries (according to the OIE Code without any guarantee for full sanitary innocuousness). This fact reflects the OIE domination by these countries not permitting any outside mission to look into their veterinary “kitchen” what could discover the sanitary reality and complicate the easy export.
Examples: The countries with major meat export in
2000:
6.18 a) The OIE
has never required for export purposes to use sampling methods giving the most objective data on sanitary status
when investigating only a representative part of the animal commodity quantity to
be exported and its surrounding sanitary threatening conditions. The OIE
requires only sampling methods being not able to discover the infection in
population or subpopulation for the export due to insufficient number of
representative samples. It permits infection/pathogen prevalence in some animal
commodities to be exported up to 5% value what represents open support of exporting “legally according to
OIE” animal-carriers or infected animal products ! The “armchair
epidemiologists” have managed to get into the OIE Code the sampling methods sufficient only for
rough orientation on infection occurrence and not for animal commodity export
where there is a need for much precise and demanding procedure. This
anti-sanitary professional nonsense has become normal OIE statistical procedure
regardless of obvious export of infections/pathogens.
Example: "”Total
number of samples … is based on the random statistic sample required to give a probability of 95 % to detect one positive sample given that
infection is present in the population at a level of 5 % or greater". (Code 2001, Art. 3.4.1.9
– “Hygiene
and disease security procedures in poultry breeding flocks and hatcheries”) referring to regularly monitoring of the
poultry establishments what is openly admitting
Salmonella (Salmonella enteritidis and
Salmonella
typhimurium) occurrence, i.e. even
their export !
b) In the OIE
Code there are missing import conditions against zoonotic Salmonella in poultry meat as well as in
mammal meat opening wide path for their free long-distance spread through
international trade !
One of the reasons why the OIE Code avoids
the import conditions for the salmonellae
letting them to be exported freely could be based on Acha, Szyfres (1985)
statement that “ it is impossible to obtain salmonella-free foods of
animal origin.”(!?). The
resistance to include mammal salmonelloses could be also linked with the
opinion of Dr Stuart C. MacDiarmid (1992), that time National Adviser (Animal
Health), MAF Policy and actual Secretary General, OIE Commission for the
Terrestrial Animal Health Code who wrote: “Salmonellae
are already widespread and common in New Zealand. … between 1 and 5 % of sheep and cattle are unapparent carriers.”
“The
most common vehicles for human infection are poultry, pork, beef, eggs, milk
and their products. In the
c) These statements help to understand the
fact that the OIE Code and FAO/WHO Code Alimentarius do not require the food of
animal origin to be free of zoonotic salmonellae and that these infections/pathogens
are not included in the OIE international information system and in any
international control programme ! Ergo, the policy against this zoonosis in
exporting countries is “doing nothing”. Where are widely declared OIE, WHO, FAO and EU
programmes to protect consumer health against foodborne infections when letting
them to be freely exported? Where is the “famous” risk assessment ?
d)
This is one of the reasons why the WTO/SPS and the OIE Code are not admitting
importing countries to require pathogen-free animal products !
e) If we consider the above mentioned
information and the consciously holey OIE Code, then it can be supposed that
every day is introduced, without any ante-export and post-import specific
controls and investigations, into importing countries enormous quantity of
zoonotic salmonellae (including exotic strains) spreading freely in extensive
territories infecting incalculable numbers of human beings ! This infection is
the first one reaching its globalization thanks to “doing nothing” at
international level.
f) The OIE instead of trying to avoid global
mass spreading of this extremely important foodborne disease pathogens has opened
the way for their free long-distance spreading through international trade when
applying the policy of “doing nothing” !
What are the thousands of papers and hundreds of
international meetings on animal salmonellosis as foodborne disease for, when
the situation in the world is rapidly deteriorating as never before thanks to
internationally organized “doing nothing” at the field level?
6.19 The OIE doesn’t respect at all that every case of export/import
of animal commodities is different in place and time and therefore it must be
solved flexibly respecting
biological character of multi-infection agents and importing country conditions and needs for sanitary innocuous goods. The OIE
Code provisions are very rigid not admitting any adjustment to actual sanitary
conditions in exporting countries as well as in importing ones. The whole Code
reflects administrative bureaucratic approach strongly influenced by the “paper
veterinary epidemiologist-theoreticians”.
6.20 Other theoretical non-sense provisions are represented by the “Code guidelines for reaching a judgement of
equivalence of sanitary measures” not respecting the absolute lack of
reliable data on true animal population health situation and on anti-epizootic
measures in the countries. The OIE Code doesn’t respect at all that there are not two countries with the same
animal health situation, with the same multi-infection structure,
occurrence, immunity and stage of development under the same
conditions, that there are not two infection
strains with the same characteristics, that the infections represent a
dynamic phenomenon in permanent change in time and place, etc. requiring different sanitary measures.
Every exporting country has different situation in individual and
multi-etiological infection occurrence requiring different approach in
identifying sanitary import conditions. These facts are not considered in the
OIE Code based on pure bureaucratic approach not respecting at all scientific principles,
biology, ecology and normal logic.
The sanitary measures are internal problems of
any country. The non-quantifiable comparison (“artificial exercise”) of
these measures is without any
importance for fair trade requiring full sanitary quality of exporting
commodities ! In no any other standard for international trade is
included similar non-sense of “measures equivalence” as it is in the OIE Code.
6.21 The
importing countries should be informed truly and in full on animal infection
occurrence in exporting countries. Unfortunately, the OIE “usurped” in 1996
global information system on animal infection
occurrence (till that year the system was common to FAO, WHO and OIE) and
immediately reduced significantly information for importing countries making
them unable to objectively assess epizootiological situation in exporting
countries and infection introduction risks. The OIE abolished regular reporting
on infection introduction through international trade making impossible to
analyse globally infections/pathogens’ long-distance spreading and
globalization. The OIE abolished regular reporting on infections’ occurrence
grading, on first reporting infection cases in the country, etc. The OIE
replaced all these information by a cross “+” not distinguishing infection in
one animal or million animals = absolute confusion of importing countries! Also
the new OIE information system WAHID is based on deliberate misleading omissions and on maximal ad absurdum theoretical (even non-sense)
combinations of reported very incomplete data on animal infection occurrence
(for “paper epidemiologist” publications ?), not respecting at all practical needs of member country governments
(what should be the objectives of the OIE information system).
More information in:
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/globsurveillance.htm “Global crisis of communicable animal infections'
monitoring and surveillance: less information on their occurrence than before
computer era = facilitating infections/pathogens spreading through
international trade !”
6.22 a) The OIE
has abolished, thanks to its Code extremely benevolent for the trade, all
suitable motivations for effective
animal population health protection, multi-infection investigations, control
and eradication in exporting countries. These countries, knowing that they
must not export healthy animals and pathogen-free animal products, stopped
after WTO/SPS and “new” OIE policy previous intensive and demanding
surveillance and monitoring based on active preventive investigations to
discover all specific infections’ affected herds and territories, control and
eradication programmes. Former motivation for highest possible sanitary quality
of animal commodities disappeared saving money and work at the expense of
importing country animal and human health. Stopping intensive anti-infection
programmes represents one of the consequences that almost all known animal infections
continues spreading and their occurrence become irreparable. Animal population
specific infections’ free status due to successful eradication programmes is
being converted into previous infection occurrence status (all work and
resources have been lost). Minimizing active investigations is conducing to the
lost of the knowledge of specific infection occurrence and eventual sanitary
“measures” are becoming semi-blind up to blind at all. Without the knowledge of
specific infection situation at the level of herds and territories, the export
document issuing veterinarian can “confirm” anything (no investigation = no
knowledge = health !?) when the OIE Code is prohibiting to sign anything what
is him unknown = not to issue any sanitary guarantee !
b) Even importing country governments stopped intensive preventive investigations, infection control and eradication programmes due to the OIE policy supporting infections/pathogens introduction through international trade in animal commodities. The continuation of animal infections’ control and eradication programmes, when combined with new introductions of specific pathogens, has lost practical sense.
It would remind the work of mythical Sisyphus who was condemned in
Hades eternally to push a rock to the top of a hill from which it rolled down
again.
c) The OIE
doesn’t care at all about the consequences of its policy of conscious
continuous mass long-distance spreading of infections in the world in spite of
its demagogical promising “global animal
health improvement” as a new (?) priority of this organization.
6.23 a) The OIE
doesn’t care that international documents influencing the trade to be concise
and fully transparent, including the used terms, to facilitate their uniform
understanding. The OIE Code for
international trade in animals and animal products is incredibly over-complicated
(not considering its extraordinary size), not transparent and full of terms
without clear cut definitions obviously to cloud the countries when making decision on the
import. The problem is not artificial of not quantifiable subjective risk
assessment but how to assure that the exporting animal commodity is sanitary
innocuous, i.e. free of pathogens of communicable diseases of animals, incl.
transmissible to man. About this, there is not one word in the whole OIE Code
provisions’ “jungle” neither in all other OIE official documents. The purpose
is to pulverize the problem and thus to confuse importing country to accept the
animal commodity under very benevolent (minimized) sanitary conditions, i.e.
including infection pathogens.
b) In the OIE
Code there are speculative theoretical terms
which can be understood differently such as: acceptable risk, unacceptable risk, appropriate level of protection,
compartment, establishment, biosecurity plan, biosecurity measures, infected
zone, unimpeded trade, containment zone, etc. Who decides in concrete cases what is acceptable, appropriate,
unacceptable, unimpeded trade, containment zone, etc. ? The OIE or exporting countries dictating
importing countries the “level” of their sanitary protection ?
c) Post-SPS OIE
Code tricky novelties to facilitate
export of animal infection pathogens: Risk analysis section: absurd guidelines
for import risk analysis, formal evaluation of veterinary services (only
questionnaire called it falsely by the
OIE as “international standard”), zoning, compartmentalisation,
regionalization, guidelines for reaching a judgement of equivalence of sanitary
measures, etc.. From practical point of view all of them represent only
nonsense unreal methods having nothing to do with importing country animal
health protection. The deliberate purpose is, unfortunately, exactly on the
contrary.
Examples: OIE Code 2007, Chapter 1.1.1 General
Definitions: “
Quantitative risk assessment - means an assessment where the outputs of the risk
assessment are expressed numerically.
Qualitative risk assessment - means an assessment where
the outputs on the likelihood of the outcome or the magnitude of the
consequences are expressed in qualitative terms such as ‘high’, ‘medium’, ‘low’
or ‘negligible’.
Who decides what is ‘high’, ‘medium’, ‘low’ or ‘negligible’
risk? Where is the “zero” what must be the baseline ? The OIE doesn’t know it at all ! Everybody knows that the infection
introduction risk evaluation is so complex that it cannot be assessed exactly
using numerical expressions = professional nonsense! All these theoretical speculations have nothing to do with fair transparent
trade and serve only to confuse member country government when deciding
about the sanitary conditions for importing animals and/or animal products.
d) In the same
OIE Code 2007 Article there are terms useful perhaps for research works but not
at all for practical international trade and for member country governments.
They serve for confusing importing country governments when evaluating infection
introduction risk, to can declare their arguments for import refusal or more
demanding sanitary conditions as not sufficiently “scientifically justified”.
Examples:
“ Transparency - means the comprehensive documentation of all
data, information, assumptions, methods, results, discussion and conclusions
used in the risk
analysis. Conclusions should be supported by an objective and
logical discussion and the document should be fully referenced.
Uncertainty - means the lack of precise knowledge of the input values which
is due to measurement error or to lack of knowledge of the steps required, and
the pathways from hazard
to risk,
when building the scenario being assessed. Variability - means a real-word complexity
in which the value of an input is not the same for each case due to natural
diversity in a given population.“
e) Some OIE Code
terms and statements are illogical and absolutely
contradictory, e.g. “unimpeded trade without incurring unacceptable risks
to human and animal health”. This means in
actual practice, according to the OIE trade policy, that the animal commodities being not free of
infections/pathogens cannot impede their export !
Example:
OIE Code 2007, Article 1.2.1.1. “International
trade in animals
and animal products depends on a combination of factors which should be taken
into account to ensure unimpeded trade,
without incurring unacceptable risks to human and animal health.””
6.24 The OIE,
often together with the WTO, during the last decade has organized incalculable
number of meetings, trainings and
produced innumerable number of different publications
and documents supporting infection long-distance
spreading through international trade, always referring to anti-sanitary
WTO/SPS. The topic is always the same. How to facilitate export at the expense
of importing country health, i.e. export of infections/pathogens. No one of these activities has been dedicated
to how to avoid the export of
infections/pathogens, i.e. how to improve animal health situation in
exporting countries. No one of these action has been dedicated primarily
neither to the methods for animal population health protection against the infection/pathogen
introduction through import nor to the methods of animal population health
recovery through effective control, elimination and eradication specific
infections, mainly in exporting countries. The same programmes have different
OIE commissions for international trade as well as WTO Committee on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Committee). This Committee has carried out
several “Reviews of the Operation of the SPS”, always how it is
beneficial to infection/pathogen exporting countries, i.e. how to make the
export of non-pathogen-free animal commodities
even more facile and not how to protect the animal and human health in
importing countries !
According the Final Report on 75th General
Session, 2007, paragraphs 86-89 “The Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Committee) held four regular meeting in 2006.” “The SPS Committee has been discussing
regionalization since 2003. During these discussions, the OIE representative
regularly described OIE work on zoning and compartmentalisation.”
The
OIE doesn’t admit any critics or doubts or anti-SPS suggestions to be presented
in its training courses, meetings,
documents and websites.
Example: WTO text “Understanding the WTO
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures”: Questions and answers: Problem: How do you ensure that your country’s
consumers are being supplied with food that is safe to eat – “safe” by the
standard you consider appropriate ? And at the same time, how can you ensure
that strict and safety regulations are not being used as an excuse for
protecting domestic producers?” Exactly the same text has been repeated in
many other WTO documents such as “Sanitary
and phytosanitary measures” or “Standard
and Safety – Food, animal and plant products - How safe is safe ?” These two sentences
demonstrate clearly the intention of the WTO/SPS the consumers not to ask for
sanitary fully safe food not to complicate trade in non-pathogen-free products. However, the
consumers are not interested in any WTO/SPS speculation regarding sanitary
innocuousness of imported food. It is obvious that the food originated from
local known conditions is for them preferable to the food from countries of
unknown animal health/disease situation and even without any sanitary guarantee
of the innocuousness. The same problem is with the international trade in
animals. The WTO and the
OIE have been organizing hundreds of courses to convince the trainees to accept
export of non-pathogen-free commodities (“safe is not safe”!?).
6.25 All OIE “apparat” (HQs staff, commissions,
editorial boards, etc.) is in the hand of the major exporting countries maximally
benefiting from the OIE trade policy at the expense of importing country health.
This is the same as “to set the fox to
keep the geese”. If the OIE was founded to protect animal health in the
world, mainly to avoid infection long-distance spreading through trade, then
for applying logical basic principle of “zero risk approach” decisive influence
should be in the hands of the most threatened countries, i.e. the major
importing ones and not on the contrary. The major exporting countries are
abusing the fact that weak government services of importing countries are
unable to detect in time or at all the introduced infections/pathogens and thus
the export is without any risk of penalty. The
major pathogen-exporting countries, through the WTO/SPS and the OIE Code,
dictate importing countries to accept animal commodities of non-full-sanitary
quality (innocuousness) and even
prohibit to refuse them. They dictate de
facto the level of health protection in importing countries. The OIE,
instead of logically requiring exporting countries to apply necessary control
and eradication measures to can export
the “health”, is organizing missions for veterinary service evaluation
in importing countries and requiring them to apply the measures against
imported diseases (= OIE is consciously expecting diseases/pathogens imports
organized by itself).
Example of the major exporters see in the paragraph 4.27 h.
6.26 The OIE has trampled all principles of
international animal and human
population health protection.
7. Undesirable consequences of the OIE policy condusing to animal infection
globalization
7.1 Good health of animals is the main prerequisite for their effective
production, reproduction and optimal use as well as for human health protection
against diseases transmissible from animals. These infections have opposite
impact conducing to animal suffering and
premature death. Similarly, good health of human beings is the main
prerequisite for any adequate human activity and for leading a contended long
life. Zoonoses have opposite impact conducing to human suffering and premature
deaths. Imported animal infections are
damaging livestock husbandry and
agriculture development and thus general economic and social development in the
world. The
number of affected animals and human beings by imported animal infections is
rapidly increasing reaching uncountable size. Due to missing global statistics
on this problem, it could be use only rough estimates. Therefore, this chapter
is dedicated to consequence forms only.
7.2 In the world during last
decade incalculable number (billions ?) of animals and persons (hundreds of millions ?) have been affected
by “legally” imported animal infections/pathogens, thanks mainly to the
benevolent OIE Code. The numbers of affected animals and humans in importing
countries are rapidly increasing (multiplying effect) due to missing both
effective international measures against the infection/pathogen export and
successful post-introduction actions to detect and eradicate them.
7.3 Everybody knows (with exception of the OIE ?), that any animal infection introduced from abroad
is contributing to the deterioration of animal health situation locally and
often to further spreading territorially, nationally and sometime up to
continentally and finally to globally affecting incalculable number of animals
and humans (in case of zoonoses). In one
or very few days any animal infection, thanks mainly to the OIE policy, can be
exported through infected animal commodity to any part of our planet. Everybody
knows that not eradicated imported infections can remain and spread for a long
time.
7.4 The deterioration of
animal infection situation consists in the introduction of new infection in
specific infection free country (historically or after successful eradication)
or increasing actual specific infection focality, morbidity and mortality
values. When the introduced infections are not eradicated, what is the usual
case, then they are getting chance for
further spread and eventually to enroot locally – territorially in form of
enzootics that could last sometimes almost “for ever” (mainly when penetrating
among wildlife) and become the source of further spreading. The OIE is
consciously supporting international long-distance spread and globalization of
animal infections due to doing nothing (or almost nothing) to avoid the export of
communicable diseases.
7.5 Thank to immense size of international trade in non-healthy
animals and non-pathogen-free animal products (the OIE doesn’t know and doesn’t
admit trade in healthy animals and pathogen- free animal products) the health situation of our planet human and
animal populations is becoming every day worse and worse without any action
to stop this irreparable disaster. The national and international control and
eradication programmes, not considering very few exceptions, are practically
the past (before dismantling government veterinary services and minimizing
public services role) and today almost unknown for the OIE and other relevant
international organizations.
7.6
Classification of consequence
characteristics of animal infections has many criteria such as according
to: animal species and categories,
causality, environmental impacts, disease forms (peracute, acute,
subacute, subchronic, chronic, unapparent carries), quantitative aspects (e.g.
losses in milk yields, meat production weight), qualitative aspects (e.g. lower
animal product quality - non-free of infections/pathogens, lower prices and
restrictions in distribution and consumption), direct/indirect impact (e.g.
direct negative impact of infections on natality, indirect negative impact on
body weight growing), space – losses (local, territorial, continental), time –
losses (instantaneous, prolonged, continuous, permanent), visibility (e.g.
visible or observed losses due to dead animals, non-visible losses due to
sanitary restriction of animal movement and trade), measurability - ability to be
quantified (e.g. measurable losses in litres of milk, un-quantifiable human
sufferings), other criteria such as evaluation of total or of a part of losses,
direct losses suffered by owners, losses suffered by the community, etc.
7.7 Worsening global animal infection situation, thanks mainly to
the OIE Code policy, has different sanitary
consequence forms of ecological, biological, economic, public health and social
characters, separately or in combination. The consequences have different
grades from mild up to catastrophic impacts. The problems is, that nobody in
the world is, neither individual professionals or institutes nor international
organizations analysing the global consequences of actual international trade
policy in animals and their products. The OIE policy is trying to hide the
incredible truth eliminating in the international animal health information
system the data on the export/import of animal infections through international
trade, following the OIE infection globalization policy. Therefore, the concrete
data on the catastrophic consequences as a whole are missing at all. However,
every literate person knows that export of infections means their distant, up
to global mass spreading damaging our planet life.
7.8 Ecological consequences. Imported
animal infections negatively influence fauna component of global biosphere in
different forms: cause a disequilibrium of animal populations’ territorial
distribution, of animal species structure and of category structure inside of
individual species, reduce the size of animal populations (in some localities
and in animal species up to zero), reduce to zero of some species being close
to their disappearance (be threatened with extinction), reduce animal
population territorial density, increase proportions of the etiological agents'
vectors and reservoirs increasing risk for susceptible animal species including
man. Other form of the consequences is represented by the reintroduction of
specific animal infections in territories
recovered in the past thank to effective eradication programmes (usually
very demanding, costly and time-consuming, even many years up decades). An important
indicator of imported infection spreading is the ratio primary/secondary
outbreaks documenting late discovery and blockade of the primary
outbreaks mainly due to weak or not
existing effective anti-epizootic surveillance at field level and due to lack
of necessary number of well trained
veterinary professionals.
Examples:
- Myxomatosis of rabbits introduced into
- Foot and mouth disease ratio primary/secondary outbreaks: Taiwan in 1977
= 1 : 6,147, UK in 1967/68 = 1 : 2,364 (430,000 lost animals); UK in 2001
= 1 : 2,030, Greece in 1994 = 1 : 94,
Netherlands in 2001 = 1 : 26; European
Union in 1977-1987 average = 1 : 54;
Europe in 1991-2000 average = 1 :
10,5. (OIE, FAO, Davies).
7.9 Biological consequences of imported
animal infections are multiform being reflected in changing characteristics and complexity of specific animal
infections/pathogens as the components of the biosphere. Being under new
foreign environmental conditions the introduced pathogen strains are often
changing their pathogenicity, resistance, ability to reproduce and spread
and increasing their virulence through
passages in susceptible population. Under the new conditions, the pathogens can
mutate and convert into new strains (complicating identification and effective
measures), avirulent and conditionally pathogen strains can become virulent,
the spectrum of vectors/reservoirs and/or of susceptible animal species can be
enlarged (particularly when pathogens affecting domestic animals penetrate into
multi-species wildlife). Under the new conditions, the pathogens can change the
infection course from subclinical one into manifest one, from subchronic or
chronic into acute or peracute one. Mixing imported with local herds having different internal
and external microflora, namely of conditionally pathogen strains, can cause
outburst of “sleeping” infection. A particular problem represents the import of
new emerging infections, i.e. unknown infections about which the world is not
yet informed and properly prepared due to missing research, suitable diagnostic
methods as well as preventive and control/eradication measures = free spreading
and globalization.
7.10 Economic consequences of imported animal
infections are multiform being reflected in: affected animals, their
herds/flocks and populations as the deterioration of all production and
reproduction parameters (in terms of reduced quantity and quality) seriously
complicating livestock husbandry due to
interrupted animal performances of
animals and of trade:
a) Reduced number of animals in total, per
surface unit, per space volume unit; undesirably deformed species and category
structure (proportions) due to increased mortality and premature culling and slaughter.
b) Reduced genetic value due to lower proportion of
genetically valuable animals and lower rate of high yielding animals.
c) Retarded development due to: reduced natality rate,
survival-to-weaning rate, survival rate;
retarded age at weaning, age for feedlot, age of sexual maturity, age at
first parturition, age for slaughter; reduced weight of new born, at weaning,
at feedlot beginning, at a given age, at
sexual maturity, at slaughter; reduce weight gain per time unit; reduced duration
of active/productive life; prolonged period for achieving a given weight, etc..
d) Deteriorated reproduction performance: reduced fertility,
increased number of services per conception, prolonged duration of service
period and reproduction interval, reduced number of new born animals per female
during one reproduction cycle and during the whole life, undesirable
replacement/restocking rate, etc.).
e) Deteriorated production
(e.g. milk, meat, eggs, wool, etc.) performance: reduced total production during
a given period, during a production cycle, per day, per year; reduced average
production per animal during a given period, during a production cycle, per
time unit, per day, per year, per the whole life; reduced production per space unit and per input unit such as feed
unit, monetary unit, manpower unit, etc.); increased feed per kg growth
(inefficiency of conversion of nutrients from feed).
f) Deteriorated quality
and price of animal products: reduced the yield of slaughter animals; carcasses
not fit for consumption; reduced grade of biological quality, grade of sanitary
innocuousness, grade of epizootiological innocuousness, grade of utility -
ability to be processed and used without restriction; reduced price, etc.).
g) Increased cost of sanitary measures: total, per year, per
production unit, per animal, proportion
from total cost of animal production, of animal health preventive and control
programmes, quarantine buildings, facilities
(laboratories), expendable (vaccines, drugs, disinfectants, etc.) and
non-expendable material, transport and logistic means, manpower, etc.;
compensation for sanitary slaughter, training programme, extension material;
animal health services cost, etc.
h) Negative impact of anti-infection restrictive measures on local,
national and international life, economy and trade.
i) Increased value of cost/benefit of reduced
animal production and of reduced food processing (increased
input to decrease output in monetary terms). Cost of resources that are wasted
on animals that die or being sanitary slaughtered. Excessive expenditure on
feed as a result of poor feed conversion efficiency. Cost/ineffective livestock husbandry development. Losses due to inefficient production reduced
price of animals and their products
j) Complications for animal production management, modern technology introduction, concentration/size and housing of animals on farms and ranches; requirement for more staff and resources than without imported infections.
k) Difficulties of
national and international trade in animals and their products.
Examples:
- Complete depopulation due to imported African
swine fever mortality and sanitary slaughter in
- According to FAO in 1980 following number
of animals died in the whole world: 64 millions of cattle (12,7 millions MT),
128 millions of pigs (9 millions MT), 100 millions of sheep (1.5 millions MT)
and 43 millions of goats (500 thousands MT).
-
Successful programme of eradication of
-
During last three decades in the 20th century Southern American
countries were prohibited to export beef to
-
FAO estimated in 1962 that average total
losses caused by animal diseases in developed countries were about 15 percent
and in developing about 35 percent.
- Kitching, Thrusfield and Taylor
(2006): “The official
figure for the number of animals slaughtered was approximately 6.5 million, but
when the total number of still-sucking lambs, calves and pigs that were slaughtered
is included, the total could be as high as ten million.
Approximately three million healthy animals were slaughtered to control
the epidemic.! The financial cost of the FMD epidemic in the
7.11 Public health consequences.
Imported animal infections transmissible to man cause sufferings, working incapacity, invalidity, and deaths in human populations, mainly in rural and sub-rural areas of cities. The incidence and
prevalence of these infections have grave negative impact on the health and
well-being of people. The consequences are reflected: in reducing human life
duration, grades of human health quality, grades of human welfare, productive
life duration and working ability; in increasing risks for human health, cost
of preventive and treatment drugs, vaccines,
sanitation, etc.. While the effect of imported zoonoses on human
productivity or output in terms of lost income and the cost of treatment can be
quantified, the value of premature mortality and human suffering are completely
different categories which cannot be evaluated in monetary terms. The negative consequences that can
be quantified in monetary value of: preventive investigations, diseased
persons' investigations, specific
vaccinations, preventive treatments, curative treatments, sanitation actions,
hospitalization, specific control measures, compensations and subsidies, public
health services, public health extension work, specific research and training;
losses due to epidemiological limitations and prohibitions and other costs
related to zoonotic infection measures.
Abusing
OIE risk assessment method, the relevant international organizations such as
the FAO/WHO
The
author of this paper, unable to find in available international documents and
websites any declaration on sanitary innocuousness of the food of animal
origin, several times sent e-mails to the Secretariat of the FAO/WHO
Examples:
- About fifty zoonoses can cause death in
humans. The zoonoses in
- In some “new” European Union countries the limits for
pathogens in food originally fixed at
zero value must be changed and accept food-borne-disease pathogens in food up to certain limit, admitted following the FAO/WHO
Example: CNEWS
7.12 Social consequences. Undesirable negative social consequences of
imported animal infections are multiform being reflected mainly in reducing
standard of living of affected people projected mainly in lower income and
reduced animal product consumption. Reduced animal production contributes to
the poverty of livestock output depended population. Reduced animal production
contributes to the hunger of human
population depending on livestock product consumption. Poverty and hunger
contributes to the interruption up to making impossible normal social,
cultural, sportif and political activities. Deterioration of psychological well-being
accompanying imported zoonotic infection. Similar consequences are related with
the measures against imported infections.
Kitching, Thrusfield and Taylor
(2006): “The
consequences .. were severe: economically, in terms of cost to the country;
socially, in terms of misery and even suicides among those involved in the
slaughter programme. The amount of slaughter that took place is not longer
likely to be tolerated by the public. The public memory of the
mounds of dead animals, funeral pyres and burial pits cannot be erased. “
7.13 The OIE has been continually avoiding to analyse catastrophic consequences of its policy and to inform member country governments about this horrifying reality. Instead, the OIE deals with annual changes in its overcomplicated Code and with frequent changes in global animal health information system loosing more and more its information value for import condition decisions. Other “tactics” to avoid dealing with rapidly worsening global animal health situation is represented by the incredible amount of topics to be dealt during the OIE general sessions having nothing to do with the protection of health in importing countries during international trade such as animal welfare (local problem), animal health modelling (speculations), etc. The problem of individual animal suffering is nationally important but the mass suffering of incalculable millions of animals affected by imported infections/pathogens due to OIE policy is not the subject for this anti-sanitary organization.
Note: The OIE has produced enormous number
of papers and organized enormous number of international meetings, seminars,
conferences, missions, agreements, etc. as never before while the global animal
infection situation has been worsening as never before, thanks mainly to
criminal support of animal infection export.
In 2006 there were 160 OIE Reference Laboratories and 20 OIE Collaborating Centres in 30 countries covering 101 diseases and
topics. In the particular OIE Annual Report of 728 pages, they reported on
enormous number of activities and publications but no one was dedicated to the main
problem - global analysis of critical situation, its causes and consequences as well as the suggestions for
the improvement in the given disease or topic. They do not feel any
responsibility for increasing morbidity
and mortality in the world and prefer to dedicate their activities to secondary
local problems following
the OIE instructions not including
global problem analyses avoiding the discovery of the truth which could
seriously “complicate” the export.
7.14 Animal infection
globalization and worldwide circulation of specific pathogens, invisible
enemies for all species of animal kingdom, including human, are not the OIE
problem ? The protection of global animal population health is not the OIE
responsibility ? Is the OIE an organization responsible for its policy,
activities and results to nobody ?
8.
Discussion
8.1 The “Discussion” usually compares already published data and texts dealing with the same or similar subjects. Unfortunately, the author has not been able to find for the comparison relevant publications on animal infections’ globalization through international trade. His publications on this subject are available on the website http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz. Many components of author’s publications are included in this paper. It is a pity that neither any relevant international organization nor any institution have produced scientific analysis of animal infections’ globalization through international trade. The OIE, as only global organization responsible for the collection and dissemination of data on animal infections, abolished deliberately this kind of reporting. The author has tried to collect and analyse official data available up to 1996 and then only ad hoc data on imported animal infections. See References.
8.2. Actual
increase of global warming, the
hunger of hundreds of millions of
inhabitants, mainly in developing countries, and excessive urbanization
(isolation from natural conditions) make international infection spreading much more serious due to
reduced natural resistance of the world populations. Even the World Health Organization (WHO) warns *) that
actual changes in global climate create conditions for much rapid spreading of
infections diseases than up today. This is fully valid also for the spreading
of infections/pathogens through the export/import of animals and animal
products.
*) Warnings of
Marget Chan, Director General, WHO, August 2007 about steadily
increasing number of newly discovered and re-emerged infections, about the
speed of communicable disease spreading and about the threat of by global
pandemics (“transmission in the whole world could last only few hours”).
Mr. Al Gore,
former
8.3 The OIE
absolutely doesn’t care that the most important human right is the right to
life (United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and
proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A III) of
8.4 Mass long-distance
spread of animal infections (including those transmissible to man) through
trade in the whole world, thanks mainly to the OIE policy, has already lost the chance for significant reduction and
eradication of almost all known animal infections (up today no one has been
eradicated globally). The man-made created very critical situation will be
getting worse due to further horizontal and vertical (to next generations) spread, mostly sneaky, of imported uncontrolled
diseases. Some of these “invisible enemies”, mainly those penetrated into
wildlife, could last up to the end of
terrestrial life on our planet contributing to its man-made destruction. We are
witnesses of real global bioterrorism organized by an organization financed even by the country
governments.
8.5 More than one decade “improving animal health worldwide” has not been the OIE priority (?). Thanks to the OIE policy the imported infections/pathogens have caused incalculable millions of deaths and sufferings of animals and human beings in the entire world, much higher than due to recent wars and terrorism acts.
There is a
difference – the war and local terrorist action consequences can be mended
during relatively a short period while the introduced infection spreading
consequences can last much longer, if not up to end of life on our planet. The OIE policy could be understood as historically
the first consciously organized global crime against our planet life damaging its biosphere due to dangerous disruption of
biological/ecological balance and increasing global occurrence of animal
infections conducing to animal populations’ reduction and to human populations’
hunger. Actual planet warming is creating
easier conditions for animal infection spreading, due to imposing stress
upon infected animals and humans, than before !
Notes:
- The OIE policy avoiding export of healthy animals and pathogen-free animal products is exactly opposite to its absolutely false and demagogic proclamation about animal welfare ! The OIE policy admitting zoonoses export is also entirely opposite to human welfare !
- The above mentioned documents have been not
produced anonymously – the names are known and the history of our planet life
will never forget them !
8.6 The OIE has trampled
all principles of international fair trade and of animal and human health
protection !
Perhaps, the OIE could be converted into a
self-financed discussion club (saving money of the governments), e.g. within
the World Veterinary Association, without having direct impact on the global
animal commodity trade not to cause more damages. It could continue to organize
meetings and to produce wordy theoretical papers of armchair
pseudo-epidemiologists for publication, discussions and conferences. Then the
trade could be again free and follow fair international trade principles.
8.7 The absurdity
of the OIE Code can be
demonstrated by the theoretical application
of its provisions on international trade in inanimate commodities (which do not contain dangerous components
able to reproduce and spread themselves as in the case of animate commodity
pathogens) “to facilitate trade” applying the dogma that “Import risk analysis is preferable to a zero
risk approach.”).
Importing
country
-
could not refuse offered commodity without providing exporting country written well documented convincing scientific
justification (i.e. not respecting the right to select freely the most suitable
country);
- could not require at all full
quality, e.g. fully usable/functioning product, without any post-import
troubles;
-
could not require better quality without written convincing scientifically
justified risk assessment;
- could not require quality
guarantee document;
- could not require the commodity to be free of defects;
-could
not refuse the commodity not free of defects;
- should pay imported commodity as
for 100 % quality regardless of real quality grade;
- should pay the commodity not
free of defects as for defect-free one, i.e. full price;
- should pay all repairs of
imported defected commodities and other post-import losses itself ;
- could not reclaim defected
commodity (due to non existence of legally binding quality guarantee
documents);
- should discard defected irreparable imported
commodities and pay for it itself;
- should accept exporting
country representatives to evaluate reasons for demanding import conditions;
- should accept exporting country statistical methods
admitting major proportion of defected goods;
- should be
totally excluded of all imports if requiring zero risk importation policy !?
According to the OIE Code
provisions the requirements for full quality commodities or to insist on
guarantees as the absence of defects would be irresponsible and contrary to the
principles of encouraging international trade !!!
These theoretical
examples reconfirm the OIE Code concept unscrupulously favoring exporting
countries at the expense of the importing ones. According to OIE concept the
exporting countries could not be responsible for the commodity quality !
8.8 The criminal
perversity of the WTO/SPS and the OIE Code illustrates the simple example:
the purchaser
cannot require full quality good; he must take any, even damaging ones (it
cannot be simply refused), as the seller decides (without any quality guarantee
thanks to the WTO and OIE export supporting dictate), but he must pay as for full quality and face
negative consequences himself ! The producer/seller/exporter decides, not the
paying end-user !
8.9 The OIE is doing
everything to suppress any information for world public and institutions on its
infection globalization policy causing disastrous consequences for
human and animal health.
8.10 The OIE
does not concentrate its activities on the main and only task for which it is
responsible, which was given at its own creation: to prevent the transmission
of animal diseases between states based on thorough analysis of their spread,
mainly due to international trade.
Instead, the
OIE without official approval of the member-country governments renamed itself
“World Organization for Animal Health” and has expanded its activities to
almost all problems of veterinary medicine (such as animal welfare,
zoo-hygiene, drugs, etc.) at the local (national) levels not conducing to
international spreading of animal infections. These problems do not require international
actions and therefore the OIE has not any responsibility for their solutions.
This organization, facilitating export of animal infections (as mentioned
above) has become a bureaucratic institution producing mountains of papers and
organizing a lot of meetings with relatively minimal positive impact (if any)
on practical solution of anti-epizootic problems to protect consistently
importing countries against the infection introduction from abroad. As an
example of an incredible paperwork, it can be mentioned enormous number of OIE
bilateral agreements – about 50 ! (“playing” on international importance ?)
consuming time and resources to the detriment of the principal obligation that
it does not comply. The OIE avoids responsibility for its main obligation and
deals with relatively easy agenda without being officially responsible.
Note: Cooperation Agreements between the OIE and
Intergovernmental Organizations and other Nongovernmental Organizations (2010):
FAO, WHO,
PAHO/WHO, WTO, WB, EC, IICA, GS-AC, OIRSA, SAARC, SPC, CABI, OAU-IBAR, SADC, CEBEVIRHA,
WVA, IFAH, FEI, IDF, IMS, ILRI, ABs, PVC,
SEAFDEC, SSAF, IFAP, AOAD, ECOWAS, WAVLD, ICMM, IEC, WSPA, ICLAS, ICES, IPC, ASEAN,
IDB, IATA, WCO, WAEMU, WMO, WIPO, WSAVA, ISO, CIC, UMA, GF-TADs, GLEWS, GFSI.
9. Conclusions
9.1 The OIE policy conducing to man-made globalization
of animal infections has catastrophic consequences for our planet life. The WTO/SPS through the OIE Code has caused incalculable numbers of newly affected animals and persons by
“legally” imported pathogens conducing to infection globalization = man-made
irreparable global ecological disaster.
The OIE policy is conducing to serious irreparable
changes of the planet microflora structure in favour of infection
disease pathogens. The OIE policy is conducing to gradual irreparable colonization of the planet by the damaging dangerous microbes
and parasites devastating our earth fauna due to postimport horizontal and
vertical spreading (multiplying impact) during the future.
9.2 The
OIE, thank its animal infection globalization policy, has become a very
dangerous organization for global animal kingdom health and surviving. Global spreading of pathogens (with
multiplying effect, sometimes even up to exponential curve tendency) through
international trade can contribute to
the disappearance of many animal species and in the far future even to vanishing of “homo sapiens”, i.e. to humankind
disappearance !
The
irresponsible OIE doesn’t care at all about the consequences of its policy for
the future development of our planet life and humankind fate ! The OIE
obviously follows the proverb “Why bother
about the future when we are dead and gone !”.
9.3 OIE Code “risk assessment” being required
from importing countries (however, not being used for the OIE Code itself
!!!) is a big criminal trickery not to guarantee
the infection-free-status of exported animals and their products but
guaranteeing for sure the long-distance spread and future globalization of
animal infections !
Perverse situation:
animal commodity importing countries are paying membership fees of an
organization damaging seriously their human and animal health, livestock
development and production, economics, people living standard, biosphere, etc.
! The importing countries are paying an
organization which has been converted from useful institution into their
“enemy”.
9.4 The tragedy is that the animal infections
spread as never and no any international organization carries out any effective
programme to block and reduced them, i.e. to improve global animal
population health applying the principle of globalization of animal health.
Simple passive monitoring of some selected infection diseases, without any
follow-up actions, is absolutely not any solution. Instead of practical
international control and eradication programmes, these organizations linked
with animal health, entirely isolated from the field realities and needs, are
producing only incredible amount of papers and theoretical meetings and
discussions, following the very bad
example of the OIE.
9.5 The OIE criminal policy organizing
animal infection globalization conducing, due to imported infections, to mass
sufferings and deaths of increasing incalculable number of animals and humans (x-times
higher than due to recent wars and international terrorism), has also
several other very negative consequences additionally to those mentioned above
in the chapter 7. The OIE not only contributed to the dismantlement of government services minimizing their staff and resources making
it unable to control effectively trade
and animal infections but also to minimizing
up to zero animal population health/disease: field activities (prevention,
surveillance, investigations, infection elimination/eradication, etc.),
research, science, undergraduate education and postgraduate training
avoiding practical problem solutions. Shortly, the OIE has caused a global destruction of previously well developing
animal population medicine theory and practice (epizootiology, veterinary
epidemiology, food hygiene, zoohygiene, etc.) giving the priority to the trade profit of the richest exporting countries and
not to the protection of health and life in importing countries. The OIE has
betrayed its mission and basic medical principle (Primum non nocere).
9.6 If we want to maintain our planet in habitable conditions also for future generations, we must minimize the risk of its biosphere destruction. Improving animal health worldwide cannot be implemented by the actual export business servile OIE which has lost its original anti-epizootic position and professional animal health authority and is guilty for historical record in worsening global animal health. It is not doubt that thanks to actual staff “constellation” at the OIE and its domination by the major exporting countries, the OIE will continue in its actual support of infection long-distance (incl. intercontinental) mass spreading through international trade. To start the programme of global animal health improving will not be possible without immediate abolishment of the WTO/SPS and of all actual OIE Code anti-sanitary provisions or of the OIE as an intergovernmental organization (supporting consciously animal infection globalization) and letting this task to United Nations Organization respecting normal principles of fair international trade also in animals and animal products and normal principles of international animal and human health protection.
9.7 Last warning letters, sent to the
most influential organizations and persons asking for actions to stop without
any delay the WTO and the OIE organizing animal infection globalization through
international trade, represent further arguments testifying dangerous risk for
the life on our planet:
a) Internationally organized spread of
infectious diseases damaging global health, biosphere and UN programmes
– document for United Nations Secretary-General sent on
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/UNSG.htm
b) Invisible threat to our planet biosphere – warning against infectious
disease globalization – document for Executive Director, United Nations
Environmental Programme sent on
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/UNEP.htm
c) Globalization
of infectious diseases – underestimated dangerous threat to our planet
biosphere – document for Dr Al Gore, Former US Vice-President sent on
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/ALGORE.htm
d) Information letters on
infection globalization through international trade were also sent to Barack
Obama, USA President-elect on 21 November 2008 and 18 January 2009.
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/jan2009.htm
10. References
Post-WTO/SPS OIE Animal Health Codes for International
Trade:
Special Issue 1997
Seventh Edition, 1998
Eighth Edition, 1999
Ninth Edition, 2000
Tenth Edition, 2001
Eleventh Edition, 2002
Twelfth Edition, 2003
Thirteenth Edition, 2004
Fourteenth Edition, 2005
Fifteenth Edition, 2006
Sixteenth Edition, 2007
Seventeenth Edition, 2008
- FAO/WHO/OIE (1980-1995): Animal Health Yearbook,
FAO,
- OIE (1993): Risk analysis, animal health
and trade. Rev. sci. tech. Off. Int. Epiz., 1993,12 (4)
- WTO (1995): The WTO Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).
- OIE (1996-2005): World Animal Health yearbooks, OIE,
Paris.
- OIE (2004) Handbook on Import Risk Analysis for
Animals and Animal Products. 183 pp., (
- Acha, P. and Syzfres, D.: Zoonoses and
Communicable Diseases Common to Man and Animals, PAHO,1987.
- Caporale V. (1994): Harmonization
of activities of the veterinary services in
- Davies G. (1993): Risk
assessment in practice: a foot and mouth disease control strategy for the
European Community. Rev. sci. tech. Off. int. Epiz, 12(4), 1109,1119.
- Kitching, Thrusfield and Taylor (2006): Use and
abuse of mathematical models: an illustration from the 2001 foot and mouth
disease epidemic in the
- Konigshoeffer H. Editor: The economic losses caused
by animal diseases, FAO/WHO/OIE Animal
Health Yearbook, 1962:284-313.
- Kouba V. (1996-2003): Warning letters.http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/warnings.htm
- Kouba V. (2002):
History of diseases spreading through international trade - lesson for
the future. World Veterinary Association Bulletin, Vol. 19, No. 1: 18-21. http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/WVAspread.htm
-Kouba V. (2003): Factors facilitating animal infection
long-distance spreading through international trade. http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/tradefactors.htm
- Kouba V. (2003): Comercio internacional y la
globalizacion de las enfermedades animales.
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/comercioglobal.htm
- Kouba V. (2004):
Abuse of disease import risk assessment method facilitating infection
export. http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/riskassessement.htm
- Kouba V. (2004):
Book Review - Handbook on Import Risk Analysis for Animals and Animal
Products, OIE. Acta Veterinaria Brno,
73: 549-551-
- Kouba V. (2005): Book Review - Terrestrial Animal
Health Code 2004. Acta Veterinaria Brno, 2005, 74 (1):161-1963. http://www.vfu.cz/acta-vet/vol74/74-161.pdf
- Kouba V. (2006): Critical analysis of OIE Animal
Health Code for international trade supporting infections/pathogens' export = the most dangerous document damaging
global animal population health in the history ! http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/OIEcode.htm
- Kouba V. (2006): Global tables of epizootiological
importance reflecting the deterioration of world animal population health:
Reported cases of specific infection/pathogen introduction in individual
countries according to specific infections (1,319 reports). http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/disintrod.htm.
- Kouba V.
(2007): Book Review - Terrestrial Animal
Health Code 2005. Acta Veterinaria Brno, 2006, 75: 481-483. http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/OIEcode2005.htm
- MacDiarmid S.C. (1992): The Importation into
- Murray N. et col. (2004): Handbook on Import Risk
Analysis for Animals and Animal products. OIE, Paris, 183 pp.
- Morley R.S. (Editor) (1993): Risk Analysis, animal
health and trade. OIE Revue scientific
and technique, vol. 12, No 4, 390 pp.
- Ozawa, Y., Chang, K,
Yoshida, K. and Michino, H. (2003): The present and future organization of
Veterinary Services in
- Rweyemamu M.M. and Astudillo V.M. (2002): Global
perspectives for foot and mouth disease control. Rev.sci.tech.Off.int.Epiz. 21(3)
- Thiermann A. (2004): Emerging diseases
and implications for global trade. Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. Int. Epiz., Vol. 23
(2).
- Thiermann A. (2004): Adapting veterinary infrastructure
to meet the challenges of globalization and the requirements of the World Trade
Organization Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (WTO/SPS). OIE Review scientific and technique, Vol. 23
(1).
- Zepeda C., Salman M., and Ruppaner R. (2001): International trade,
animal health and veterinary epidemiology: challenges and opportunities. Preventive
Veterinary Medicine, 48: 261-271.
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11. Annex
I
Book Review –
Agricultura Tropica et Subtropica, Universitas Agriculturae Praga, Vol. 45 (3) 2012: 80-81 :
Models in the management of animal diseases, OIE
Review scientific and technique, Vol. 30 (2), 2011
The Office International of
Epizootics (OIE) publication of 261 pages contains 22 papers edited by P.
Willeberg from the Center for Animal Disease Modelling and Surveillance,
P. Willeberg et al. describe a limited model applied
in practical solving surveillance of trichinellosis and BSE in
Another
three papers deal also with FMD management modelling. These “works” belong,
similarly as the majority of the papers, among unbelievable fantasies having
nothing to do with practical life and missing any proof of their feasibility,
efficiency and usefulness. Their authors have not good idea about practical
management of animal infections and belong among “armchair epidemiologist” playing with
computers and inventing absurd mathematical models. A deterrent example is
represented by so called “standard” of K. Owen et al. from
The OIE on one side is
publishing a paper of S.S. Nielsen et al. on a model simulating
paratuberculosis control while on the other side has eliminated specific protection measures from its Terrestrial Animal Health Code admitting global spread of this infection
through international trade.
In the publication
it cannot be found a single example where mathematical model has helped practically
to solve control and eradication of any animal infection. There is
no one model that has proven effective in animal disease management practice to
can serve as an useful example for the others. Mathematical modelling
represents today a “mania” propagated mainly by those having no any
responsibility for animal population health protection and communicable disease
management. Many
authors are undergraduate and postgraduate educators of “modern veterinary
epidemiologists” (including from developing countries) able to process
statistical data and elaborate disease management models but not to solve
practical problems in the field. It is much easier and more comfortable to
sit in office and work with a computer than to solve animal infections under
difficult field conditions and being responsible for the results.
The utility of
mathematical models as tactical decision support tools is very limited by the
innate unpredictability of disease spread. A model constitutes a theory, and a
predictive model is therefore only theoretical projection. No model will
produce the right output when fed by the wrong input. The UK experience
provides a very serious warning of how mathematical models can have unforeseeable catastrophic consequences.
I wonder why the OIE, responsible for animal population health protection,
is wasting its resources for almost useless “products“ instead of concentrating
the efforts on its original basic duty to assist in avoiding animal infection
spreading through international trade, what has become today’s reality. The countries, first of all the
developing ones, need guidance on effective measures based on practical
experience and not theoretical fantasies. Václav
Kouba
Note: From Wikipedia: Re UK 2001 FMD “The
extreme overkill of many disease-free animals (80 % of culled livestock were
clear) was a result of inappropriate poor mathematical modelling that did not
reflect the epidemiology of the epidemic.”
12. Annex II
Draft:
Book Review – Agricultura Tropica et Subtropica,
Universitas Agriculturae Praga, Vol. 46 (4), 2013:
136:
Good governance and financing of
efficient Veterinary Services. OIE Scientific and Technical Review 31 (2), 2012
This publication of the Office International of Epizootics (OIE)
of 321 pages containing 21 papers was edited by Dr Laurent Msellati, Senior
Manager of the Agriculture and Rural Development Team for the Latin America and
Caribbean Region, World Bank, Washington.
The contributions deal with different aspects of the
governance and financing of public veterinary services such as: good veterinary
governance definition, measurement and challenges, veterinary service missions,
animal health legislation, governance and management of veterinary
laboratories, coordination between veterinary services, good governance in “one
health” approaches, global public good concept, economic analysis of animal
health, strategic plans for improving the performance, veterinary services in
developing countries, financing public veterinary services, organization of
veterinary services, public-private partnerships; etc.. At the end there is an
interesting annex called “Good governance
and the financing of efficient Veterinary Services guidance note”
representing a form of a summary.
The majority of the papers deal with selected subjects only
theoretically without concrete examples proving practical application of the
authors’ ideas. There are very few practical examples useful for the paying
governments - members of the OIE as independent intergovernmental organization.
Almost all papers call for strengthening veterinary services and refer to so
called “OIE international standard”
which is de facto only a form of a
questionnaire. On the other hand among 352 literature references the most important
documents on governance of public veterinary services such as “Standard of Veterinary Services” FAO,
1974 and “Guidelines for strengthening
animal health services in developing countries“, FAO, 1991 are not
mentioned at all. The editor and the contributors underestimated the fact that
the main criterion of a good governance are practical results, i.e. how far the
services had contributed to the protection and betterment of animal population
health. It is a pity that not a single paper describes veterinary service
efficiency using cost/benefit analysis, comparison of centralized with
decentralized services governance, methods for identification of service
priorities and a governance analysis from a country with excellent nationwide
practical results..
As usually, also this OIE publication is
dominated by a small group of major exporting developed countries. From 46
authors (only one is Chief Veterinary Officer having experience with national
veterinary service governance), 17 indicate France as their country origin.
This country, leading the OIE from its very beginning in 1924 (including the
post of Director General) is “giving lessons” to all the countries and
therefore one would expect its governance system as a good model for the
others. Unfortunately, according to OIE documents, France has had problems with
the efficiency of its veterinary services. For example: more than a half of
present internationally reportable animal diseases are not officially
notifiable (i.e. their occurrence cannot be known); 2001 export of foot and
mouth disease into Netherlands (causing more than 200 000 dead
animals); inability to eradicate bovine
brucellosis, bovine tuberculosis and enzootic bovine leukosis (eradicated years
ago in many European countries) etc..
The OIE selected as the Editor, instead of an experienced
Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO), an officer from the World Bank. In the 1990s, this
organization, together with International Monetary Fund (both dominated by the
same countries as the OIE) forced the governments to minimize their role
through significantly reducing their budget. As the consequence public
veterinary services in the majority of the countries have been drastically
reduced and almost dismantled. CVOs
of these countries, due to critical shortage of money and staff, became
“generals without solders” not able to deal with national animal health
problems as before. Their public veterinary services have lost previous
capacity to control animal health situation, to eradicate infectious diseases,
to inspect trade in animal commodities, to protect inhabitants against disease
transmissible from animals, etc. Private
“accredited veterinarians”, depending existentially on local breeders and
producers, sometimes unreliable and easily to be corrupt, cannot replace at all
the role of independent public services. No one paper deals with this fact when
calling for strengthening public veterinary services. Due to actual critical
lack of resources, in spite of availability of effective methods, rich
experience and all the efforts of public veterinary services, animal health
situation in the world is getting worse as never before.
More information in: http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz.
Notes:
France is also dominating EU veterinary policy conducing to
mass spreading (Europeanization) of infectious diseases through international trade due to:
very benevolent OIE-EU sanitary conditions, abolished border controls,
unreliable certificates (without infection-free guarantee) and minimum (if any)
inspections on the spot by public veterinary service. For example: during
1990-1996 in 181 from 326 cattle shipments imported from Western Europe into
Czech Republic with “official veterinary certificates” there were discovered different
infectious diseases (tuberculosis in 3,
paratuberculosis in 24, IBR in 39, trichophytosis
in 86, leptospirosis in 11 and
hypodermosis in 18 shipments)! The EU, following the bad example of the OIE,
instead of consistent practical protection against infectious disease spread
through international trade, instead of practical Europe-wide control and
eradication programmes against all important transmissible diseases of animals,
is applying the easiest policy - “doing
nothing” (with the exception of paperwork. meetings, publications,
legislation not respecting the individual country situation, conditions,
priorities needs and resources). E.g.
The EU has been unable to eradicate African swine fever imported in 1978 in Sardinia,
Italy. To import an infection is the question of a moment, however eradicate it
is extremely difficult up to impossible. The animal population health in Europe
is rapidly deteriorating even in the countries self-declared as with “good
governance of veterinary services”.
One of the basic principles of good governance and
financing is to focus available resources on the main duties to achieve the key
objectives. The OIE, instead of consistently implementing its only duty as “international
office of epizootics for the control of infectious animal diseases”,
self-decided in May 2003, without any official clearances by all member country
governments, to expand its activities arguing that “the scope of the OIE’s missions has evolved beyond the prevention and
control of epizootic diseases to include all animal health issues”. The OIE
ignores that the “new issues” of infinitive numbers are the responsibility of
individual country governments while the OIE
is responsible for international control of epizootics. Distracting activities
from the epizootic control is irresponsible wasting resources of member country governments,
instead of concentrating them on its main duty under new world-wide emergency – rapidly
increasing infection spread through global trade. Enormous new bureaucracy
requiring additional paperwork (e.g. the OIE has signed more than 50
“Cooperation Agreements” with different organizations) and meetings are burdening also
member countries. The OIE, instead of alarming the world, doesn’t care at all
about the causes and consequences of animal diseases spreading through
international trade. Extremely benevolent “OIE Code” facilitates export of
animal commodities at the expense of health in importing countries. It supports
WTO (World Trade Organization) policy: first
business/profit and not sanitary innocuousness. The question arises as to
justify the existence of this organization not fulfilling its duty, ignoring
catastrophic consequences of its policy and contributing to irreparable
globalization of animal infections.
The OIE produces some useful documents such as manuals for
diagnostic standards. As far as the “OIE
Scientific and Technical Review” the member country governments expect
information helping them to solve their problems mainly through publishing good
examples from countries with concrete results in protection and recovery of
national animal populations health (e.g. infection eradications) and protection
of human health. Unfortunately, this OIE publication contains almost
exclusively papers dealing with topics which can be published in hundreds of other
publications issued by the universities and different veterinary institutions, associations
and societies. The member country governments need information on veterinary
services management conducing to successful national anti-epizootic programmes.
OIE dominating countries (richest in the world) are obviously not interested in
informing on more successful services in other countries. Some example can be
found in http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/cmea.htm). Author’s paper “A method of accelerated eradication of bovine brucellosis in the Czech
Republic” was published in the above mentioned OIE publication in 2003 after 3
years of the OIE trying not to accept it (obviously due to not believing that
the country-wide eradication was achieved during only 5 years). Many
contributors from Central European countries with successful anti-epizootic
programmes have a similar experience.