The International Office of Epizootics (OIE) - World Organization for Animal Infection Globalization (not admitting to require infection-free export/import, i.e. to require full sanitary guarantee !)
Formerly: Animal Health Officer (Research and Education), Animal Health Officer (Veterinary Intelligence), Senior Officer (Veterinary Services) and Chief, Animal Health Service, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO, Rome; Editor-in-Chief of global FAO/WHO/OIE Animal Health Yearbook; Veterinary Public Health Expert, WHO; Informatics Expert, OIE; Technical Vice-Director and Chief Epizootiologist, Czechoslovak and Czech State Veterinary Service; Professor of Epizootiology, University of Veterinary Sciences, Brno
2. The OIE professional responsibility for the WTO/SPS supporting consciously globalization of animal infections
3. List of principles of fair international trade not respected by the OIE
4. The OIE “new policy” contrary to the principles of fair international trade - supporting export of animal infections
5. List of principles of international animal population health protection not respected by the OIE
6. The OIE “new policy” contrary to the principles of international animal population health protection - supporting export of animal infections
7. Undesirable consequences of the OIE policy conducing to animal infection globalization
11. Annex I on models in the management of animal diseases
12. Annex II on veterinary service governance and financing
1.1 Increasing size, distances and frequency of international trade in animals and in animal products (hereafter “animal commodities”) represent the main factors facilitating rapid globalization of communicable diseases of animals, including those transmissible to man. Huge stream of animal commodities is being transferred daily from exporting to importing countries. The exported animal commodities represent potential or real carriers of animal infection pathogens. All animal commodity export is today carried out, following the “new policy” of relevant intergovernmental organizations, without any guarantee of sanitary innocuousness, i.e. of being free of communicable disease pathogens = export of animal infections.
According to official FAO statistics e.g. on 2004
annual trade commodity import in quantity and monetary values: life animals –
1.2 Animal infection import is very often followed by pathogen spreading extremely difficult to discover and control/eradicate. The consequences are catastrophic. Very limited number of successful communicable disease eradication programmes together with all recoveries of individual diseased animals cannot compensate at all rapidly increasing animal population morbidity due to infections/pathogen export/import in the world. No one animal infection has been globally eradicated yet. Infection import devaluates the results of control and eradication programmes reached by previous generations. The animal infections are spreading as never in the past when the trade used to be of much minor size and intensity, at much shorter distances from much lesser number of commodity origin localities to much lesser number of destination and distribution places to much lesser number of end-users. The situation is getting worse every day towards man-made global sanitary and ecological irreparable disaster. Infectious and parasitic diseases in animals continue to have every day steadily increasing morbidity and mortality in the world despite great advances in sanitary sciences. Continuing worldwide mass long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading of infections through trade, not being blocked by effective measures, represents serious global crisis not only of veterinary medicine which historical mission is to promote, protect and recover animal health.
1.3 Terminology used in this paper: “Infection” means the presence of communicable disease pathogenic agent in the host (animal or man). “Infected product” means the presence of communicable disease pathogenic agent in the animal product. “Contaminated product” means the presence of communicable disease pathogenic agent on the animal product or on the inanimate object. “Pathogen” means an agent that produces communicable disease – infection. Among the pathogens – infection etiological agents - belong pathogenic virus, rickettsia, bacteria, fungus and protozoa as well as pathogenic helminths and arthropods, etc. causing infectious and parasitic diseases.
Today the number of known specific infections (not considering types and subtypes of many of them) of vertebrate animal species only is close to one thousand. Almost two hundred of them are transmissible to man (zoonoses). Number of internationally notifiable infections in 2007 was as follows: multiplex species diseases – 16, cattle diseases – 15, sheep and goat diseases -10, horse diseases -14, pig diseases – 7, avian diseases – 13, etc.
In WHO publication “Foodborne disease: a focus for health education”, Geneva, 2000 there are listed following foodborne infections: Aeromonas enteritidis, Bacillus cereus gastroenteritis, botulism, brucellosis, campylobacteriosis, cholera, Clostridium perfringens enteritis, Escherichia coli infections, listeriosis, salmonellosis, shigellosis (bacillary dysentery), Staphylococcus aureus intoxication, typhoid and paratyphoid fevers, Vibrio parahaemolyticus gastroenteritis, Vibrio vulnificus infection, yersiniosis, viral gastroenteritis, viral hepatitis A, poliomyelitis, amoebiasis (amoebic dysentery), cryptosporidiosis, giardiasis, toxoplasmosis, anisakiasis, ascariasis, trichinellosis, taeniasis (Taenia solium, Taenia saginata), clonorchiasis, fascioliasis, opisthorchiasis and paragonimiasis. The list is not complete (e.g. bovine and aviar tuberculosis are missing). (Dr Stuart C. MacDiarmid in 1992 listed 52 infections of livestock which may possibly be carried in carcasses, meat, offals or meat products).
For the trade the term “healthy animal” means an animal free of communicable disease pathogens (not only without clinical symptoms) and the term “sanitary innocuous product of animal origin” means animal product to be free of communicable disease pathogens (e.g. “foodborne-disease-pathogen-free meat”). “Full sanitary quality” means to be free of communicable disease pathogens. Unfortunately, these logical terms are absolutely unknown to the International Office of Epizootics - OIE (self-declared even as “World Organization for Animal Health” ?!) supporting trade regardless of pathogen export. The “OIE Code” means OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code. The OIE instead to adjust its policy to new international trade conditions, i.e. to make the health protective measures more effective avoiding export of infections, simply gave up its original anti-epizootic policy and became a “tool” of major exporting countries supporting export of animal infections/pathogens.
1.4 Healthy animals and sanitary innocuous products of animal origin have been and are acceptable by all importing countries without any sanitary “obstacle” !
It is obvious, that sterilized animal product is free of infection pathogens and therefore, they cannot cause their spreading and globalization.
1.5 Unfortunately, the major exporting countries were and still have been not able or not willing to export only healthy animals and their products, i.e. free of communicable disease pathogens. These countries declared these natural and logical importing country requirements for full sanitary quality as “non-tariff barriers”. These so called “non-tariff barriers” de facto were and are represented by disease occurrence in exporting countries ! For these countries to produce and export healthy animals and sanitary innocuous animal products meant to strengthen significantly public animal health services and its inspection role, to implement demanding active disease surveillance/monitoring systems, animal population health protecting programmes, multi-infection control and eradication, strict sanitary control at all levels of animal breeding and of the whole chain of food of animal origin. Therefore, these countries tried to avoid investing in demanding disease control and eradication programmes and instead they were “pressing” relevant international organizations to admit export of animals and animal products infected by communicable disease pathogens regardless of animal and human health as well as of farmer/consumer needs/opinions in importing countries. The major exporting countries were searching the easiest, the cheapest and the most profiting way for their export regardless of sanitary consequences in importing countries, i.e. to reach “international legalization” of pathogen export and thus to can do minimum or nothing for animal commodity sanitary innocuousness .
1.6 Thanks to the OIE policy, among all exported goods only in the animal commodities the quality guarantee, in our case sanitary one, represents entirely unknown term: no sanitary guarantee = infection/pathogen free spreading.
1.7 The paper is based on available documents of World Trade Organization (WTO) and International Office of Epizootics (OIE), mainly on OIE Codes for international trade, testifying ”new policy” to safeguard international trade at the expense of animal population health. The paper is based on official documents and data.
More information in:
http://vfu-www.vfu.cz/acta-vet/vol72/453-03.htm "Globalization of communicable diseases of animal - a crisis of veterinary medicine”, Acta Veterinaria Brno, 2003, 72: 453-460.
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/globstatistics.htm "Statistics on animal disease globalization through international trade”.
2. The OIE professional responsibility for WTO/SPS supporting consciously globalization of animal infections
2.1 When considering the factors supporting international long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spread and globalization of animal infections, then among the most important ones it must be included actual policy of global intergovernmental organizations such as the WTO* and the OIE. The WTO was established to assist member country governments in the application of fair trade principles in all internationally traded commodities. On the other hand the OIE was established to assist member country governments in the application of principles for animal health protection against the spread of communicable diseases, including transmissible to man. As the WTO is not scientific and technical organization, it recognizes and relies on specialized organizations such as the OIE in case of sanitary aspects of the animal commodities’ trade.
*) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) was superseded as an international organization by the WTO. An updated
General Agreement became the WTO agreement governing trade in goods from
2.2 At the beginning of the 1990s the major exporting countries managed to dominate both mentioned organizations. These countries abused the chance, when the GATT was being changed into WTO, and managed (dictated) to introduce incredible exceptions from all international fair trade principles to “facilitate” the export of non-healthy animals (non-free of communicable disease pathogens) and non-pathogen-free animal products.
*) More information in http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/tradefactors.htm (chapter 19).
2.3 The OIE, in spite of being responsible to member country governments for animal health international protection policy, gave up its original obligatory anti-epizootic duties and betrayed the basic medical principles to international business interest at the expense of importing country animal and human health. The OIE took extraordinary “professional” initiative and decisively participated in the preparation of the WTO “Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” (SPS) consisting in avoiding to apply current general fair trade principles “complicating (?)” animal export. The OIE used the trick abusing disease introduction risk assessment and imposed it on importing countries, when requiring full sanitary quality, i.e. healthy animals and/or innocuous animal products or better sanitary quality, as the duty to justify “scientifically” their logical sanitary demands. The OIE having main professional responsibility for unfair WTO/SPS created “cleverly” and tactically in advance arranged artificial “alibi” (to can refer always to WTO/SPS “agreed by member country governments”) for its “new policy” of false legalization of animal disease long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading and globalization. The OIE has been using this alibi always when logical, professional and scientific arguments have been missing. The OIE managed to smuggle its anti-sanitary disease globalization policy trough the WTO/SPS document agreed thanks to false arguments (e.g. deliberately holding back information on disease export risks) and trickery with the “risk assessment”.
The top irony (= top hypocrisy) is that the OIE itself has deliberately never presented to member country governments neither any risk assessment of its Code and of other published provisions/methods nor any analysis of sanitary consequences of the OIE Code conducing to the deterioration of global animal population health ! The same is valid also for the WTO/SPS.
2.4 The author of this paper, after learning
about the “new” OIE policy conducing to globalization of animal diseases,
started to study the circumstances how
this disease globalization policy had been created. He tried to find out how the WTO/SPS had been prepared, justified and
presented to member country governments for its later approval at ministerial
Note: The author studied also the preparatory
documents of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). The Czech
government session dealt with them presented by Vladimír Dlouhý, Minister of
Industry and Trade and by Josef Zelienec, Minister of Foreign Affaire on
2.5 The governments were presented by a big package of documents (annexes included also “Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures - SPS”). In this annex justification there was no one word on the risk of disease long-distance spreading through international trade in animals and animal products, i.e. concealing the truth about risk of the spreading and globalization consequences. On the other hand in the introductory part there was further trickery in a form of very attractive sentence “desiring to improve the human health, animal, … health in all Members;” = big lie: in the whole document there is not any provision or even one word dedicated to the health improvement.
2.6 The SPS, thanks to the OIE not respecting basic medical principle "Primum non nocere !", started officially the globalization of infectious and parasitic diseases of animals, including those transmissible to man. SPS is based upon risky trade at the expense of animal and human health in importing countries. This policy cannot be professionally justified and is indefensible in public, among consumers, farmers, etc..
2.7 The OIE is de facto the author of the SPS and the main responsible for its consequences. The OIE brought the main trickery principle into the SPS that „risk assessment is preferable to zero risk approach“ (OIE Code 1997, Article 220.127.116.11) - giving the priority to risky trade, i.e. to disease long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spread and globalization and not to full sanitary quality (see paragraph 2.11). This anti-sanitary policy has been applied after 1995 in all OIE documents, first of all in the OIE Code for international trade. This dirty trick had been prepared well in advance in some countries (MacDiarmid, 1992) and by the OIE, i.e. by many publications on “risk assessment” (OIE, 1993), at the beginning using quantifiable methods to demonstrate mathematically, i.e. theoretically, that the risk of disease importation is minimal or zero. These subjective methods proved to be a big nonsense when everybody can obtain different results depending on the criteria used and on the export/import position: exporting country arguing with minimal or zero risk and importing country arguing with the need to avoid disease introduction at all.
The main effort of the OIE was to smuggle in the SPS the risk assessment trick facilitating export/import of non-pathogen-free animal commodities, combined with other discriminating duties for paying importing countries only, without any sanitary quality responsibility for the exporting countries. In the key OIE publication (2004) on detailed risk assessment methodology for paying importing country governments when requiring innocuous animal commodities or better protection against disease/pathogen introduction, it can be found incredible duties (musts), unknown in any non-animal commodity, such as:
“The risk analysis must be
well documented and supported by references to the scientific literature and
other sources, including expert opinion, where used. It must also provide
reasoned and logical discussion that supports the conclusions and
recommendations. There must be comprehensive documentation of all data,
information, assumptions, methods, results, and uncertainties.” The results’ presentation must: “explain the risk analysis model’s
structure clearly with the aid of appropriate diagrams, such as scenario tree;
document all the evidence, data and assumptions, including their references;
use clearly labelled, uncluttered graphs, etc.“
Special attention is dedicated to the titles, names and addresses, how to write the summary, how to
write the text (using
The history of international trade has never noted such big nonsense ! For supporting animal commodity trade facilitating infection/pathogen export the OIE has sacrificed its renomé and its “raison d’être” !
One of the main countries behind the WTO/SPS was
The OIE Code risk assessment requires a long list of data to be available for the procedure not respecting that the majority of them are not available even in the home countries of the authors.
Example: “Risk estimation consists of intergrading the results from the release assessment, exposure assessment and consequences assessment to produce overall measures of risks.”. “For a quantitative assessment, the final output may include: probability distribution, confidence interval, and other means for expressing the uncertainties in the estimates; portrayal of the variance of all model inputs, a sensitivity analysis to rank the inputs as to their contribution to the variance of the risk estimation output, analysis of the dependence and correlation between model inputs.” (OIE Code 2001, article 18.104.22.168).
2.8 The text is demonstrating that this part of the Code was elaborated by so called “eminent specialists on risk analysis” (according to the letter of Dr Blancou, DG OIE sent to the author of this paper on 30 October 1998) having no any idea about the need of importing country governments. These “eminent (?) specialists” didn’t respect at all the infinite diversity and dynamics of animal disease/pathogen phenomena and their ability to reproduce and to spread (horizontally and vertically - to following generations, sometime almost in exponential curve form), mostly invisibly. These particularities are unknown in any other trade commodity! The mentioned theoreticians didn’t’ consider any personal responsibility for practical catastrophic consequences of their absurd “armchair methodology”. This is from the practical point of view a cardinal nonsense having nothing to do in any international trade standard.
Every veterinarian, and first of all Chief Veterinary Officers and their staff, know about the risk of communicable diseases related with their pathogen sources and way of transmission described in any textbook on specific infectious and parasitic diseases. The current disease introduction risk analysis has been always normal national internal procedure before the decision on the import based first of all on the knowledge on the disease occurrence in the potential exporting countries and on the reliability of their sanitary documents.
Even the countries being behind the OIE Code risk assessment method didn’t respect it themselves which demonstrated the falsehood of this trick.
Example of not respecting
the WTO/SPS and the OIE Code: In January 2001
More information in: http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/riskassessment.htm "OIE abuse of disease import risk assessment method supporting diseases/pathogens' export”.
2.9 The problem is not the non-quantifiable (i.e. non-measurable) theoretical subjective risk analysis but how to produce healthy animals and their pathogen-free products to can practically guarantee the export of really innocuous animal commodities, i.e. in full sanitary quality !
Particularly the discussion of the author of this paper with one of the WTO/SPS philosophy/tactics’ authors - Dr MacDiarmid (New Zealand) at the occasion of the World Veterinary Congress in Yokohama, September 1995 and his letters confirmed the unfair background of the whole “management” of the WTO/SPS and of the “new” OIE policy supporting export at the expense of animal and human health in importing countries. In other words to support business instead of animal health. Letter of Dr Stuart C. MacDiarmid (actually - 2008 – still one of the OIE dominating veterinarians - Secretary General, OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission) to the author of this paper dated of 15 January 1996: ”If, for a particular trade, we have available risk reducing tools (tests, treatments, whatever) which will reduce the risk by 10,000 or 100,000 times, what does it matter what starting risk was ?”. In other words, disease occurrence is not of importance for importing countries to know it (!?). This is obviously the reason why Dr MacDiarmid belongs among those who contributed to the abolition of international reporting of data on disease import and to absurd reduction of disease occurrence grading data replacing them by one non interpretable cross “+”. This deliberate blinding of importing countries and facilitating the export of affected animals by communicable diseases and of non-pathogen-free animal products created conditions for man-made globalization of animal diseases as an irreparable ecological disaster.
2.10 Among the most influential “philosophy” supporting disease globalization belongs the document published in 1994 by V. Caporale, Italy (today – 2008 - still one of OIE dominating veterinarians – President, OIE Commission for Scientific Disease Control) containing following sentence (influencing the preparation of the WTO/SPS): "The need to remove technical obstacles to the free circulation of animals and their products"; "It is not longer possible to apply the old system under which animals and animal products had to come from specific free zones, and were subjected to isolation, quarantine, inspection and diagnostic testing before and after export.".
This incredible statement, influencing the preparation of the WTO/SPS, creates question if the preventive veterinary medicine is necessary at all and the OIE as an international organization as well to avoid “the old system” of animal population health protection ! Obviously, according to the mentioned author, the best would be to abolish protective measures of importing countries and disease control measures in exporting countries letting to trade not considering animal health and sanitary quality of animal products. The sense of this anti-sanitary statement is obviously that the best strategy = “doing nothing” ! This would significantly reduce or even erase public veterinary service to the delight of exporting country producers, traders and government “economists”. The extremely benevolent OIE Code conduces to the lost of exporting country motivation for animal infection eradication and control, when the profiting and relatively easy export of non-pathogen-free commodities is “internationally (?)” supported !
It could be that the mentioned “philosophy”
is behind three decades (from 1978) of African swine fever (ASF) occurrence in
The author of this paper has been interested in this
case from the beginning. In 1978 the ASF was reported in
The author himself visited Sardinia as a tourist in May 2008 (30th anniversary of the ASF introduction !) and found that the policy of “doing nothing”, not only in Nuoro province, is almost perfect: the people were not informed (even two middle-age policemen in Orgosolo had never heard about this disease (!); no any public notice in the villages and cities, no any information of tourists (i.e. in 2007 about 5 million) at tourist offices, at international hotels or by local tourist guides; not limited traditional grilling of piglets; free trade in fresh pig meat and products with labels without any word on veterinary investigations or ASF-free guarantee (the author himself bought without any problem or warning “prosciutto crudo sardo” – Sardinian raw ham); no any border control to avoid export of these raw products from the island and Italy; no any measures against pig free movements. No any action to depopulate pig and wild boar (main virus carriers) populations or at least to significantly reduced them – on the contrary they are protected prohibiting their hunting similarly as of all other hunting animals (along the roads there were very frequent the warning signs “Provincia … - Settore Ambiente - DIVIETO DI CACCIA - Oasi Permanente di Proteccione Faunistica”, i.e. hunting prohibited ! Considering the local conditions, the problem cannot been solved applying only training courses and theory (publishing “scientific” papers using nonsense mathematical modelling, absurd OIE Code risk assessment method, etc.) and issuing “mountains” of administrative documents such as “European Union Commission Decision of 2 May 2005 concerning animal health protection measures against African swine fever in Sardinia, Italy”, etc.. The problem requires field practice actions based on a complex of professional and managerial activities supported by public, animal owners and hunters, by uncompromising legislation and by very strong government (eventually international) control.
This case documents anti-sanitary policy of replacing concrete practical field anti-epizootic actions by “doing nothing! (not considering producing theoretical papers without practical impact and organizing sterile meetings). The “responsible” international organizations, giving “lessons” to all the countries, such as the OIE HQs chaired always by the French DGs (France directly threatened by the ASF from neighbouring Sardinia – at only 12 km distance of French Corsica being in contact through shipping), OIE Commission for Europe chaired during decades by Dr Belev (Bulgaria), European Union Animal Health Service, etc. obviously have not been interested in practical blocking the propagation and in eradication not only of this very dangerous disease.
2.11 The OIE is professionally responsible for the WTO/SPS supporting it as the initiator and the main author. This can be documented by many official declaration of the OIE, e.g. in the OIE Code:
- "Import risk analysis is preferable to a zero-risk approach"; (OIE Code 1997, Article 22.214.171.124); this is a perverse statement in favour of exporting countries being unable to guarantee health of exported animals or pathogen-free animal products in contrast with the principles of fair trade to export full quality commodities, i.e. avoiding risk for importing countries.
- "facilitate international trade by unimpeded flow of trade of animals and animal products"; (Code 2001, Art. 126.96.36.199); this statement documents the subordination of the OIE to major exporting countries not respecting the need for consistent protection of animal and human health in importing countries.
- “International trade in animals and animal products depends on a combination of factors which should be taken into account to ensure unimpeded trade, without incurring unacceptable risks to human and animal health”. (CODE 2007, Article 188.8.131.52). The contents of the sentence is contradictory; the unimpeded trade means without any obstacle ! What are unacceptable risks ? Who decides the answer of this question ? Trade cannot be based upon speculations !
2.12 The only purpose of the SPS and the OIE “new” policy is to “facilitate” export of animal diseases/pathogens and converting importing countries into sanitary defenceless position (international dictate !).
The SPS and the OIE are imposing duties only on importing countries dictating them so called “measures”, i.e. what they have to do under the “new” trade system, considering only the export of non-pathogen-free animal commodities. The OIE is requiring the “measures”, which are internal problems of importing countries, instead of requiring from exporting countries the guarantee of full sanitary quality of exporting animals and their products !
2.13 The OIE fully and slavishly supported the policy of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) to minimize and degrade governmental veterinary services becoming unable to control international trade and to guarantee export of sanitary innocuous animal commodities.
More information in: http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/vetmanpower.htm "Global crisis of public professional veterinary manpower - unable to control effectively animal population health/diseases and animal trade !”
2.14 In order to “facilitate export” of infections/pathogens, the OIE in 1995 took over (under very strange circumstances – “usurped ?”) the whole global animal disease information system from FAO and WHO and immediately significantly reduced the number of criteria on disease occurrence (= much less information than before) without any scientific, logical and practical justifications and without any replacement to confuse importing country when deciding on sanitary import conditions. The OIE deliberately minimized information on the occurrence of all international reportable animal diseases. The OIE also abolished very useful regular annual reporting on disease import cases and thus made impossible necessary analyses of the WTO/SPS and OIE trade policy sanitary consequences. The OIE even abolished, also without any scientific, logical and practical justifications and without any replacement, very useful numeric classification of animal diseases (normal in medicine) and thus confused more importing country decisions on import conditions.
2.15 It is obvious, when considering all official OIE documents and actions, that the whole “new” system has been (almost in secrecy) well organized and managed from one place by the same authors (from major exporting countries dominating the WTO and the OIE) having the only interest – to facilitate profiting export regardless of animal and human health consequences in importing countries.
2.16 All SPS follow-up OIE documents, mainly its Codes for international trade in animals and animal products, have been applying and supporting the anti-sanitary policy of the export of non-healthy animals and non-pathogen-free animal products. The Code import conditions for individual diseases have been minimized and also other provisions have been made much more favourable for profiting exporting countries at the expense of importing countries (overwhelming majority of the Code duties were addressed to these countries) not to require full sanitary quality.
2.17 The OIE, “professional” initiator and author of the WTO/SPS, instead of applying animal health protecting duties, became voluntary the key intergovernmentall organization for international long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading and globalization of communicable diseases of animals, including those transmissible from animals to human beings.
It must be very influential and powerful lobby (group of countries, their “experts” and exporters) as well as immense corruption when the WTO sacrificed all fair trade principles for international trade and accepted the OIE sanitary professional provisions consciously conducing, without respecting the WTO fair trade principles, to animal infection globalization. The animal export dominating countries managed fraudulently to get through historically unknown procedures hostile to importing countries and to global animal and human health.
2.18 The OIE is professionally and morally fully responsible for global negative (catastrophic) sanitary consequences not only of the OIE Code but also of the WTO/SPS what without the OIE initiative, active participation and agreement would never come into the world !
The WTO/SPS would never be adopted
- if the OIE would insist on consistent protection of animal and human health in importing countries as required by the OIE original constitution (i.e. rejecting any corruption and trade business lobby);
- if the OIE as a global intergovernmental organization for animal population health protection would reject the SPS authorship, i.e. not to agree, collaborate, “justify” and support it, i.e. without OIE initiative, “professional” support and pseudo-scientific justification;
- if the governments would be correctly informed about the risk of consequences and about the real hidden purpose = trade admitting disease pathogen export at the expense of importing country animal and human health = disease pathogen long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading and globalization;
- if the governments would be openly and truthfully informed that the consequences of the SPS meant not respecting all international fair trade principles;
- if the governments would know that it was a big trickery;
- if this problem would be dealt quite separately and not as “stuck” annex of the big GATT/WTO package;
- if the SPS draft would be subjected to normal scientific opponent procedure (as it is current event in the cases of university student theses).
2.19 The importing country governments (exception of the corrupt ones) would never openly agree with the legalization of infections/pathogens import and globalization through international trade against the interest and opinion of their farmers and consumers.
The WTO/SPS and the “new” OIE policy was made possible only thanks to corrupt OIE bureaucratic “pseudo-scientists” (still dominating the OIE), betraying their profession and Hippocratic oath, being responsible for catastrophic irreparable globalization of animal infections.
2.20 The OIE, as a SPS follow-up action, has issued new OIE Codes applying (or even copying) the text of the WTO/SPS. As a new component there was included the main trick – non-quantifiable pseudo-scientific “risk assessment” method avoiding importing countries to require healthy animals and pathogen-free animal products. This provision represents the key OIE Code component for infection long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading and globalization trough international trade.
2.21 The OIE has been abusing the WTO/SPS, as it had planned originally, as a “false” alibi for its “new globalization policy”. In spite of the OIE repeatedly proclaiming itself that it has been internationally upgraded by the WTO/SPS, de facto it has been degraded professionally almost to zero.
The OIE Code provisions are not officially cleared by the member country governments. When deciding about animal and human life and health, death and disease in the whole world, only the consensus of a group of lower level officers – Chief Veterinary Officers - cannot be acceptable. Therefore, they cannot have international legal value. They serve only for facilitating easy profiting export of commodities without sanitary innocuousness. The OIE is deliberately calling its provisions as “international standard” in spite of having nothing to do with real internationally binding standard agreed by the governments. (“Standards” normally means the definitions of the commodity quality).
Example: The OIE was advertising a new issue of the OIE Code 2007: “The measures published in the Terrestrial Code are the results of consensus among the Veterinary Authorities of the OIE Member Countries; the standard it contains are recognized within the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures as international standard for animal health and zoonoses”
2.22 The WTO/SPS converted the OIE and its Codes for international trade into a subordinate position to the WTO. This was obviously the OIE tactics to create a “higher level roof” for covering “new” anti-sanitary policy and to provide unfair alibi. The OIE was established in 1924 as fully independent intergovernmentall organization not subordinated to any other international organization such as World Trade Organization. The irresponsible and voluntary “takeover” of the WTO/SPS anti-sanitary policy (de facto prepared professionally by the OIE “experts”) represents a treachery of original OIE mission to protect and promote animal populations health.
This was the reason why the author, feeling the moral duty as the former
Chief, Animal Health Service, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO), was asking several times Dr Jean Blancou and
More information in:
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/WTOTEXT3.htm" WTO "Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures"(SPS)- justification for its abolition”
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/MOORE11.htm" WTO "Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures"(SPS) - answer to DG WTO letter”
2.23 The OIE Code approving process is contrary to all democratic principles. The actual consensus means simple public voting (not secretly), if any, when individual importing countries have minimum chance to get through with their opinion or proposals against the “wall” of the major exporting countries dominating the OIE and their blocks.
(See details in http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/OIEcode.htm, paragraph 17.29).
The OIE Code doesn’t known (recognize) at all the trade in healthy animals and pathogen-free animal products, i.e. of full sanitary quality ! It only recognizes the risky trade = in non-healthy animals and in non-pathogen-free animal products !
The clearance of internationally binding documents deciding on life/death and health/disease of animals and inhabitants of our planet cannot be the subject of only a small group of nominated Chief Veterinary Officers (not legally elected and not always objective officials and relevant specialists) having not full responsibility and competence for such extremely important and sensitive global decisions.
The OIE Code provisions must be cleared by the governments themselves as responsible for the health of national human and animal populations !!!
Unfortunately, the member country g o v e r n m e n t s are deliberately not informed at all about the real OIE activities and consequences on animal and human health !
2.24 It seems that the OIE has become a corrupt organization (behaviour resembling an irresponsible club), paid by the member country governments, serving only to the trade business at the expense of global animal and human health. The OIE managed its dirty policy of animal infection globalization and corresponding actions to “be in hiding” behind the WTO believing that the responsibility for their consequences is common. However, the professional responsibility is only and fully of the OIE.
2.25 The same major exporting countries
dominating the WTO and the OIE have been
dominating also FAO/WHO
2.26 Let the
reader himself to comment hypocritical and demagogic OIE documents’
formulations such as “Improving
animal health worldwide is a priority” (??),
title of the Editorial from
*) OIE web text: “By adopting the OIE’s Fourth Strategic Plan in May 2005, our Member Countries decided to update our historical mandate. The OIE was created in 1924 with the aim of controlling the international spread of infectious animal diseases. Over and above this historical mission, our new mandate is now “to improve animal health worldwide.” There are used new terms such as “Good Governance” and “Global Public Good” in spite of OIE real policy contrary to these principles when organizing animal infection globalization.
The OIE is repeatedly stating that “the veterinary services of developing and transition countries are in urgent need of the necessary resources and capacities that will enable their countries to benefit more fully from the WTO/SPS”. How ? The DG has forgotten that it was the OIE as the key organization, together with the World Bank, dismantling functioning government veterinary services (including staff, funds, facilities, laboratories, transport means, postgraduate training institutions, animal health programmes, etc.) in these countries due to dictating and supporting absurd exaggerated privatization of veterinary services.
urgent need for health improvement has
been caused mainly by the OIE recent anti-government policy. The maximal need
for strengthening and internationally evaluating government veterinary services have the major exporting countries being
unable to export healthy animals and pathogen-free animal products – i.e. the
major contributors to animal infection long-distance (incl. intercontinental)
spreading and globalization (not mentioning the inability to control the
most dangerous infections, e.g. foot and
mouth disease in the
The question is why the OIE has done nothing to
eradicate e.g. three-decades-lasting African swine fever “below the OIE window”
2.27 The OIE is behind the animal infection globalization not only due to supporting and organizing mass export of their pathogens into importing countries being unable to detect them in time, control and eradicate. Spreading of animal infections continues also in exporting countries after loosing economic motivation for animal infection control and eradication to reach necessary sanitary quality of exporting commodities, thanks to the OIE Code supporting relatively easy and profiting export of only non-pathogen-free animals and non-pathogen-free animal products. Actual mass spreading of animal infections in importing as well as in exporting countries, i.e. in the whole world, thanks also to OIE policy strongly supporting WB and IMF dismantling unscrupulously government veterinary services. It is obvious, that weak public service cannot execute effectively (or at all) neither infection control and eradication programmes nor national and international trade inspection. The above mentioned “policy” has conduced to minimizing up to stopping active searching for discovering diseased animals and outbreaks = the exporting countries do not know real animal infection occurrence (see OIE World Animal Health yearbooks - WAH). The costly investigations are “risky” to detect the reality, i.e. diseased animals – herds with necessary follow-up demanding anti-epizootic measures (up to drastic depopulation) and serious complication for animals and animal products local trading and export. Why to investigate when the OIE Code has deliberately minimized up to avoided at all the import conditions based on active testing of exporting commodities (the latest deterrent examples are paratuberculosis and leptospirosis – both having empty page !) ?
Examples of the abuse of OIE HQs position by the major
exporting countries dominating this organization: Italy having problems with
two List A diseases (the most important animal infections complicating the
export) – African swine fever and swine vesicular disease, “enforced” the
abolition of OIE Disease Lists’ classification and included them among other
not so dangerous infections (thanks to the Italian chairmanship of the OIE
Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases ?). The
2.28 There is generally known that many animal species have disappeared due to pathogens of dangerous infection diseases. In the history there were many nations which vanished due to infection diseases. Globally spread pathogens of animal infections can contribute to the disappearance of many other animal species and in the distant future even to vanishing of “homo sapiens”, i.e. to humankind disappearance. The OIE animal infection globalization policy could be theoretically understood as assisting in digging mass grave for the humanity what will be never forgotten.
2.29 Before-WTO/SPS OIE Code was containing only very useful recommendations for sanitary conditions letting the countries to find themselves the export/import solution, considering also the OIE Code provisions, without any dictate from outside, i.e. in full freedom and without any trick, such as professional nonsense duty for importing countries to elaborated the “risk assessment” for exporting countries. Originally recommended reasonable veterinary import conditions as minimum requirements were replaced by a dictate of obligatory limits for significantly reduced import conditions not respecting professional ethics and principle “Primum non nocere !”
2.30 All letters sent by the author of this paper to OIE HQs asking to stop the anti-sanitary policy and to return to its basic and only duty as professional intergovernmentall anti-epizootic organization were left without any positive reaction. The same result had the author’s letters to the DG WTO. The OIE animal infection globalization is not any mistake, it is a conscious policy !
More information in:
- http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/OIEcode.htm "Critical analysis of OIE Animal Health Code for international trade supporting infections/pathogens' export = the most dangerous document for global animal population health in the history !”
- www.vfu.cz/acta-vet/vol74/74-161.pdf "Book Review: Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2004, OIE”
- http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/OIEcode2005.htm "Book Review: Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2005, OIE”
-http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/warnings.htm "Warning letters against man-made conscious (i.e. criminal) globalization of communicable diseases through international trade”
3. List of principles of fair international trade not respected by the OIE
3.1. Freedom of exporting and importing countries to agree bilaterally on mutual trade conditions without any external interference or dictate to importing country to accept offered goods (= free trade without any outside discrimination).
3.2 Transparency on exporting country information relevant for importing country decision on import conditions, i.e. availability of relevant properly justified and documented information (incl. eventually screening sampling methods and size, investigation results, etc.) to can asses the risks of the given import.
3.3 Exporting countries to provide necessary convincing quality advertisement on relevant commodities to be exported.
3.4 Freedom of paying importing country to select exporting country (encouraging trade free competition).
3.5 Freedom of paying importing country to refuse commodities, even without any justification to be presented to the exporting country.
3.6 Freedom of paying importing country to identify the conditions to be met by exporting country.
3.7 Full true information on the exporting commodity quality (what is guaranteed and what not, possible side effects) to be available to importing country before its decision on the given import.
3.8 Exporting country to guarantee required quality of the commodity (including 100 % - full quality).
3.9 Exporting country to present to importing country commodity quality guarantee documents (including guarantee period) well justified and convincingly documented.
3.10 The quality guarantee documents to identify without any doubts the quality grades = full or lower grades.
3.11 Export of commodities not causing undesirable problems in importing country.
3.12 Eliminate from particular commodity export the country being unable to meet required quality conditions.
3.13 Paying importing country to have decisive final word about the import permission and conditions.
3.14 Price of full quality commodity to be the highest.
3.15 Price of lower quality commodity to be lower than the highest one (price graded according to the quality grade).
3.16 The quality guarantee documents to be issued by persons or organization being materially (financially) responsible for eventual commodity deficiency (facilitating success of eventual reclaim procedure).
3.17 The trade contract to include the procedure for the complain in the case when the imported commodity doesn’t meet import conditions (incl. covering losses caused by this commodity).
3.18 Import decision making authority to respect the opinion of the imported commodity paying end-users.
3.19 Declaring (legibly labelling, marking) the true quality of the exported commodity in order the importing country and the users to be fully informed on the commodity quality and on eventual risks.
3.20 Steady tendency of continuous improvement of trade commodity quality to meet increasing requirements of importing countries = motivation for steady improvement of commodity quality.
3.21 Stability of international norms for exported commodities to can adjust in time necessary quality preparations.
3.22. Exporters’ financial (material) responsibility for hidden flaws in exported commodities to cover the losses caused by them.
3.23. Post-import guarantee period for exported commodity.
3.24. International standards according to commodity type.
3.25 Clear cut definitions of used terms to avoid misunderstandings and speculation as far as exported commodity quality is concerned.
3.26 Systematic analysis of international trade multi-aspect consequences as basis for the further improvement of exported commodity quality.
3.27 Established necessary government infrastructure to control effectively international trade and supervise non-governmental services involved to can guarantee the fair trade.
3.28 Effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for infringement of fair international commercial practices.
4. The OIE “new policy” contrary to the principles of fair international trade = supporting export of animal infections
4.1. The OIE Code is not admitting freedom of exporting and importing countries to agree bilaterally on mutual trade sanitary conditions without any external interference dictating importing country to accept offered risky or non-pathogen-free animal commodities, i.e. regardless of required sanitary quality. The OIE Code is supporting unfair misleading commercial practices.
4.2 The OIE is avoiding information transparency on exporting country sanitary situation relevant for importing country decision on import conditions for animal commodity trade not admitting availability of relevant properly justified and documented information (incl. diagnostic methods and investigations’ size – to can evaluate how far the samples were representative – reliability of investigations’ results), i.e. to can asses the risks of this kind of import. The OIE rejected reasonable recommendations, presented by the author of this paper, to include in all diagnostic method standards (published in the OIE Manual of Standards of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines) the values of their specificity and sensibility to can assess the reliability of the investigation results. This information is very important for importing country to consider the risk of false negative investigation results in imported animals and/or animal products.
If we study carefully incredible anti-sanitary statements of the most influential OIE “officers” about the “no need” for information on animal infection occurrence then we can understand better the anti-sanitary OIE policy minimizing up to avoiding informative value of the OIE ”new information system” (probably better to call it “non-information system”) for importing countries decision about sanitary conditions and to confuse/blind them as much as possible.
Some OIE statements document absolute underestimation (or the most probably deliberate arrangement to trickily “facilitate trade” following the OIE Code concept) of the importance of infection free status and of infection reporting for international trade ! In other words: “what does it matter what animal infection occurrence in exporting country is” ? (see paragraph 2.9). The obvious reason is the fact that the major exporting countries, dominating the OIE, do not know internationally reportable animal infections’ occurrence at home themselves (as it can be documented by the OIE World Animal Health yearbooks).
- “Historically, too much emphasis has been placed on how a country or zone can reach ‘disease free’ status and then base the safety of its trade on such freedom”. “The OIE is taking a new approach to setting standards and revising existing ones: the categorization of a country/zone status is first based on the assessment of the overall level of risk present in the country/zone or animal population, rather than on whether a disease has been reported or not.” (!?) (A. Thiermann, President, OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission, 2004).
More information in:
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/globsurveillance.htm "Global crisis of communicable animal diseases' monitoring and surveillance: less information on their occurrence than before computer era = facilitating infections/pathogens spreading through international trade !”.
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/tradeinfo.htm "OIE dominating officers: Importing countries do not need to know real animal infection occurrence in exporting countries = facilitating export of non-healthy animals and non-pathogen-free animal products”.
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/vetmanpower.htm "Global crisis of public professional veterinary manpower - unable to control effectively animal population health-diseases and animal trade"
4.3 The OIE Code is avoiding exporting country to provide necessary sanitary quality advertisement on relevant animal commodities to be exported. The OIE Code instead to require exporting country to provide importing country full information on sanitary quality of the commodity to be exported, on the contrary, it dictates importing country to present scientifically justified and convincing “risk assessment” analysis according to the nonsense OIE Code methodology. The OIE is requiring scientific justification from importing countries when they wants to import healthy animals and animal products to be free of particular pathogens.
More information in: http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/riskassessment.htm "OIE abuse of disease import risk assessment method supporting infections/pathogens' export”.
4.4 The OIE Code is not admitting freedom of paying animal commodity importing country to select exporting country (= not admitting fair trade competition). Normally, importing country in case of multi-country offer must select one the most suitable and reject the other ones. According to the OIE Code “logic” (?) importing country must scientifically and in convincing manner justify (according to the “risk assessment” OIE methodology) the refuse to all countries offering the same commodity, but not being selected.
4.5 The OIE Code is not admitting freedom of paying animal commodity importing country to refuse without any justification the animal commodities due to not meeting required sanitary quality. According to the OIE Code importing country cannot reject animal commodity not meeting the requirements for healthy animals and/or pathogen-free animal products or for better sanitary status than indicated in the Code. The OIE Code is requiring the rejection to be justified providing scientific and convincing “risk assessment” analysis to exporting country (using nonsense “risk assessment” OIE non-quantifiable subjective methodology). The OIE is declaring that the request for full sanitary quality of the exporting animal commodities is irresponsible behaviour of importing country and according to the WTO/SPS those countries must be punished (penalty).
- "It would be irresponsible and contrary to the principles of encouraging international trade to insist on guarantees as to the absence of commonly found infections that are present in the importing country." (OIE Code 2001, page VI, C. 2). This unbelievable nonsense means that the requirement for importing healthy animals and innocuous animal products is irresponsible (?!). The real irresponsibility is of the OIE Code authors and of exporting countries’ behaviour admitting and supporting infection long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading through international trade !
4.6 The OIE Code is not admitting freedom of paying animal commodity importing country to identify sanitary conditions to be met by exporting country. The importing country cannot freely define sanitary import conditions when not in the agreement with very benevolent OIE Code admitting export of animal infections/pathogens (exception for some infections such as foot-and-mouth disease).
OIE Code 2007, article 184.108.40.206, paragraph 2: “The international veterinary certificate should not include requirements for the exclusion of pathogens or animal diseases which are present within the territory of the importing country and are not subject to any official programme. The requirements applying to pathogens or diseases subject to official control programme in a country or zone should not provide a higher level of protection on imports than that provided for the same pathogens or diseases by the measures applied within that country or zone.”
In the paper entitled “The obligations of member Countries of the OIE (World organization for animal health) in the organization of Veterinary Services” (Rev. sci. tech. Off. Int. Epiz., 2003, vol. 22 (2), p. 549., B.Vallat (France), Director General, OIE and D.W.Wilson (Australia) referring to the OIE Code asked “that an international veterinary certificate not include requirements for the exclusion of pathogens or animal diseases which are present within the importing country and are not subject to any official control programme in that country.”
In other words, the importing country cannot require healthy animals and innocuous animal products ! The statement represents inter alia clear instruction for long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading of animal infections through international trade towards worsening sanitary situation in importing countries. This is in absolute contrast not only to the “new” OIE name (including the word “animal health” in illegal self-declaration – as “World Organization for Animal Health”) and to hypocritical unfailing callings for animal health improvement and food safety but also to all global programmes requiring the health measures such as protection of animal and human populations, biosecurity, sustainable development, environment protection, poverty reduction, etc.. The tragedy is that the only intergovernmentall independent organization in veterinary medicine changed its original health protection policy into organizing animal infection globalization causing irreparable consequences in importing countries, mainly developing ones.
In comparison with the known situation “at home”, the higher level of health protection requirements on import is absolutely necessary due to minimal knowledge about animal infection situation in exporting country and about imported risky commodity of unknown sanitary quality and even without any sanitary guarantee.
4.7 a) The OIE is consciously avoiding (blocking) full true information on the exporting animal commodity sanitary quality to be available to importing country before its decision on the given import (what is guaranteed and what not). On one hand the OIE is minimizing up to avoiding information on exporting commodity sanitary quality and on the other hand it is requiring information on importing country sanitary situation and evaluation of its veterinary services. This is something incredible and absolutely unknown in all other trade commodities !
b) The OIE in 1996 “usurped” for itself the global animal health information system (formerly it was common – FAO/WHO/OIE), reduced very useful and necessary animal infection occurrence epizootiological criteria to minimum (“+”), reduced original very useful HANDISTAT disease information software (disappeared during three years of “new version preparation”). The OIE in 2006 replaced it by an incredible professional absurdity called WAHID minimizing even more the information value for importing country decision-making on import conditions. The WAHID should obviously replace the OIE World Animal Health yearbooks containing information as they were sent by the member countries. Up to March 2008 the member country governments had available only the latest issue from 2004 ! In March 2008 the OIE finally were sent the WAH 2005 and WAH 2006 providing information with 2-3 year delays ! What kind of information value could have the documents with old “historical” data, for shelving only ? The OIE was advising in 2007 on “Important changes of this publication are foreseen.” These changes instead to improve the information of the member country governments in animal infection occurrence have significantly reduced the information value for import decisions ! The worst is not only overcomplicated (for “statistical purposes of irresponsible theoretical pseudo-scientists”?) the relatively simple data (providing again significantly less information on infection occurrence than before computer era) sent by the countries but the main reports, commenting in details voluntarily on all internationally reportable animal infections’ situation and programmes, are missing at all ! The most valuable information sent by the countries were eliminated !!?? The OIE dominating countries’ “mafia” can do what they want regardless to the need of the other country governments’ animal health protection. Instead of publishing in full all data on animal infection occurrence as received from the member country governments, the OIE is publishing voluminous books without any importance for these governments (e.g. 728 pages of “Annual Reports of OIE Reference Laboratories and Collaborating Centres”, 2007) ! The OIE is continuing using demagogy propaganda such as “With a wealth of clearly presented information, World Animal Health is a key reference tool for the animal health sector around the world”. In spite of this kind of false declarations, the OIE to “facilitate trade” is doing exactly the contrary – minimizing, deforming or even holding back the obtained useful information needed for decision-making of the country member governments!
In the WAHID development to key role had
c) The WAHID is full of incredible professional nonsense such as calculating different disease (outbreaks) “indicators” from ad hoc reported absolute data (if reported at all) as the reality that is x-times higher *), introducing the ranking of these absolutely incomplete data, mixing data on terrestrial with aquatic animals, not using numeric classification of diseases, using English alphabetic order only, disease occurrence “grading” is minimal or zero and even using colours (not legible in generally used black-white printers), stressing clinical forms when for the trade are decisive the subclinical pathogens carriers, etc. The “new” system is confusing importing countries even more than before when deciding about the import conditions (“to facilitate trade” ?). The OIE is continuing presenting “statistically processed“ entirely incomplete data applying the principle “garbage in = garbage out”.
*) In this context it can be
quoted a text demonstrating that even in the most developed country the infection occurrence is not fully known: "It is assumed that, for every case of
salmonellosis recorded in humans in the
4.8 The OIE Code is supporting exporting country not to guarantee required sanitary quality of the animal commodity (avoiding sanitary guarantee; 100 % sanitary quality is not accepted and unknown in the all OIE official documents) = guaranteeing nothing. In all OIE documents there is no one word requiring sanitary guarantee of exporting animal commodities. According to the OIE Code the importing countries must accept animal commodities without any guarantee of sanitary quality. The OIE in all its documents is admitting only international trade in non-healthy animals and non-pathogen-free animal products (not full sanitary quality = sanitary deficiency threatening animal and human health).
4.9 The OIE Code is supporting exporting country not to present to importing country animal commodity sanitary quality guarantee documents (including guarantee period) well justified and documented to convince importing country. On the contrary, the OIE Code is tailored to avoid any guarantee for sanitary status of exporting commodities and instead it is insisting on so called “international veterinary certificate” representing only not binding information on negative results of some selected infection investigations’. The graduation of sanitary quality, i.e. according to pathogen-free status, is for the OIE an unknown phenomenon.
More information in the OIE Code 2007, Part 4, Model International Veterinary Certificates.
4.10 The OIE Code is supporting the absence of sanitary quality guarantee documents necessary to identify without any doubts the quality grades = full or lower grades. The OIE is supporting export of pathogens not distinguishing different grades of sanitary quality in order exporting countries to can require full price as for sanitary innocuous commodities. The OIE is not admitting price differentiation according to animal commodity sanitary quality grade: importing country must pay for non-healthy animals and/or non-pathogen-free products as for the healthy animals and/or pathogen-free products (= internationally organized robbery by the OIE). Infection/pathogen importing country must pay all post-import economic consequences and costly specific control/eradication measures itself !
How can be justified that the importer must pay, thanks to the OIE policy, for non-healthy animals and non-pathogen-free animal products the same price as for animal commodity of full sanitary quality ? This false OIE principle conduces exporting countries to do nothing for reaching full sanitary quality, i.e. letting the infections to spread even in their home countries due to the absence of former (pre-SPS) economic motivation for animal health protection and restoration !
The OIE is not admitting logical requirement exporting countries to put their “cards” on the table, i.e. to inform truly importing countries what infections’ free status is guaranteed and what infections’ free status is not guaranteed. This open play would facilitate decisions on import conditions and on the price corresponding with animal commodity sanitary quality.
4.11 The OIE Code is supporting only export of non-sanitary-innocuous animal commodities causing undesirable problems in importing countries. The OIE doesn’t care at all about the consequences of infections/pathogens’ import that are usually extremely difficult to detect in time and to eradicate. In the majority of the countries infection timely detection and eradication under actual circumstances of weak government services are practically impossible (including in so called “most developed countries”).
4.12 The OIE is not requiring to eliminate from particular animal commodity export the country being unable to meet basic sanitary quality conditions. On the contrary, the OIE is even threatening to eliminate from the trade the countries requiring to import healthy animals and pathogen-free animal products ! This statement is a top of perversity reflecting the “new” OIE policy hostile to animal and human health in the world !
OIE Handbook on Import Risk Analysis for Animals and Animal Products, 2004*), page 20 is even threatening importing countries that “zero risk importation policy would require the total exclusion of all imports” (!?).” In other words, the country requiring healthy animals and pathogen-free animal products, to protect animal and human health, should be punished and eliminated from all import of animals and their products ! The threat represents a top impudence of irresponsible authors trying to defend for any cost relatively easy exports at the expense of health in importing countries.
*) Chief Author: Noel
However, biological aspects and protection of animal and human health in importing countries would require exactly the opposite, i.e. “zero risk importation policy would require the total exclusion of all exports from those countries that are not able to ensure pathogen-free animal commodities”.
The above quoted statement is unimaginable in any other trade commodities where the basic fair policy is to exclude from export those who are not able to guarantee required quality of the goods !
4.13 The OIE is not admitting paying animal commodity importing country to have decisive final word about animal commodity import permission and sanitary conditions. The OIE Code, dictating to accept risky good - carriers of infection pathogens, limits seriously the “space” for importing country to decide about animal commodity import permission and sanitary conditions.
4.14 The OIE Code is not admitting the price of full sanitary quality commodity to be relatively the highest (higher than of the lower sanitary quality) ! The OIE doesn’t know the terms “full sanitary quality” – “healthy animals” and “disease-pathogen-free animal products”. The OIE is supporting only risky trade exporting pathogens. The OIE policy avoiding price differentiation according to sanitary quality grades stopped economic motivation of exporting countries to control/eradication communicable diseases, i.e. to try to improve national animal population health. According to the OIE perverse logic, the importing countries must pay full (highest) price for animal commodity without sanitary quality guarantees.
Example: One of the traditional priority infection for
eradication programmes is bovine tuberculosis. However, many exporting
countries loosing economic motiation due to WTO/SPS and the OIE sanitary
benevolent “new export policy” stopped intensive control and eradication
programme against this disease letting it to be spread into wildlife
populations. “It was reported affecting
at least dozen different animal species, predominantly ruminants, but also
predators and carrion eaters, thus showing that M.bovis can gradually
contaminate an entire ecosystem.” OIE Final Report, 75th General
Session, Paris, 20-25 May 2007, page 48. As a deterrent example it can be
mentioned: New Zealand reported in previous WAH yearbook issues that
it had managed to reduce successfully bovine tuberculosis prevalence below 0.1
% already in 1979; however the disease
spread in wild animals: from 1985
reported in possums (Trichosurus vulpecula), from 1987 in
farm deer (Cervus elaphus) and from
1991 also in ferrets (Mustela furo). In 2004 tb was reported
(according to WAH 2004, page 251) also in wild pigs, wild cats, stoats,
hedgehogs and hares, i.e. the tb situation became worse than before, obviously
due to inadequate epizootiological control and quite ineffective anti-tb
programmes. The bovine tb instability was confirmed also in farmed cervidae: “At
The OIE Code, as a bad example, is naturally strongly influencing import sanitary conditions for animal commodity trade at bilateral as well as multilateral levels. Instead of specifying the import quality conditions to be guaranteed and understandable to all users, there are used “cleverly” general formulations (often referring to currently not available documents) having minimal information value for importing countries and their farmers/consumers. How can importing countries assess the risk of infections/pathogens introduction, as required by the OIE Code, having no any data on specific infections in exporting countries? This type of camouflage represents other form facilitating easy and highly profiting export regardless of sanitary quality, i.e. guaranteeing nothing ! This type of very vague formulations is only a non-documented information not representing at all any sanitary guarantee. The farmers/consumers have not any chance to study the incredibly overcomplicated international documents, being almost not available and under permanent changes.
Example: New Zealand is exporting meat to
the European Union with “Animal and Public Health Certificate” (TZ-2006/12-PRO2 New Zealand) having following
text: “The animal products herein described, comply with the relevant New
Zealand animal health/public health standards and requirements which have been
recognized as equivalent to the European Community standards and requirements
as prescribed in Council Decision 97/132/EC, specifically, in accordance with
the Food Act 1981, Biosecurity Act 1993 and Animal Products Act 1999.” This is all !? No one word what is
guaranteed, i.e. no any sanitary guaranty ! How can the importing country and the users
understand if the commodity is free or not of infection pathogens, namely of
foodborne disease ones (e.g. is the commodity free of Salmonella or not ?) ? To what kind of etiological investigations the
commodity was subjected? What about their size (incl. the grade of representativeness) and results ? Is the
commodity free of all infections, or only of all internationally reportable
infections or only of some selected infections (which ones) ? In the above
mentioned “certificate” there is not any answer expected by the importers and
consumers. How can importing EU-member country government decides freely
about the import from opposite part of
the globe having not any information
for infection introduction risk assessment?
The “agreement” is “cleverly” formulated, in a form of deliberate camouflage, to avoid any doubt about
commodity sanitary status (no chance for the complaints) or the refusal due to
sanitary reasons or due to missing necessary infections occurrence information.
look in the newest OIE global animal health information system (WAHID) for the
comparison of sanitary situation between any importing country and the New
Zealand as exporting one, then we can find for the year 2005: “There
is no report for New Zealand” (WAHID website dated 3 February
2007). The same system reported on animal health situation: “
4.15 The OIE Code is not admitting the price of lower sanitary quality commodity to be lower than of the higher quality commodity one due to avoiding sanitary quality grading, i.e. conducing to the equalization of prices and thus making impossible competitive motivation for sanitary quality improvement. Regardless of missing sanitary quality guarantee, many major rich exporting countries even strongly financially subsidise the export of non-healthy animals and non-pathogen-free animal products discriminating (seriously damaging) the producers of importing countries. This practice supports the pressure on importing country authorities to admit artificially cheaper products to be imported, i.e. infection/pathogens’ introduction. This dirty practice of the major exporting countries contributes also in this way to minimize national animal production of importing countries to maximize import without any sanitary guarantee, i.e. contributing to infections/pathogens long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading and globalization. This criminal practice is contrary to the principles of fair international trade. See also 6.4.
Example: European Union admits many West European
countries to support financially the export of animals and animal products
without sanitary innocuousness guarantee (maximizing profit). One of the main
export channels goes into Central European countries where the EU has dictated
criminal production quota to minimize national animal production, consciously
destroying previous full self-sufficiency in meat, milk, eggs and other animal
products and the previous well developed livestock industry as a whole. The
farmers of these countries are not able to compete with the subsidized prices
of imported animal commodities. Significant reduction of local production
(including liquidation of hundreds of thousands of animal farms and ranches), replaced
by the initially artificially cheap import, brought gradually much higher
prices than before. Similar situation in on American continent where strongly
4.16 a) The OIE Code is avoiding the veterinary certificate to be issued by the officers being materially (financially) responsible for guaranteeing sanitary status and for eventual sanitary deficiency = making impossible successful reclaim procedure. According to the OIE Code the export document issuing “accredited” veterinarian is not responsible for real sanitary status and has to sign only what he knows (no investigation – no knowledge about existing infection = “health”?). He can sign what he wants ! The OIE is not considering any objective inspection of these “accredited” veterinarians by government officers (who usually do not see exported animals and animal products) not to complicate relatively easy and profiting trade. According to OIE Code nobody is responsible for sanitary guarantee of exported animal commodities !
OIE Code 2007, Article 220.127.116.11:” It is essential not to include in the requirements additional specific matters which cannot be accurately and honestly signed by a veterinarian. For example, these requirements should not include certification of an area as being free from non-notifiable diseases the occurrence of which the signing veterinarian is not necessary inform about. Equally, to ask certification for events which will take place after the document is signed is unacceptable when these events are not under direct control and supervision of the signing veterinarian.”
OIE Code 2007, Article 18.104.22.168, paragraph 5: “They should not require a veterinarian to certify matters that are outside his-her knowledge or which he-she cannot ascertain and verify.”
OIE Code 2007, Chapter 22.214.171.124: “Certifying veterinarians should only certify matters that are within their own knowledge at the time of signing the certificate, or that have been separately attested by another competent party; have no conflict of interest in the commercial aspects of the animals or animal products being certified and be independent from the commercial parties.”
b) The above quoted OIE Code statements demonstrate once more that so called “certificates” have nothing to do with sanitary guarantee and even cannot be in conflict of interest in the commercial aspects !? Therefore, the OIE is preferring private veterinarians and not government veterinarians to investigate animal commodities and to issue export sanitary documents themselves. It is logical that export business and demanding sanitary aspects are normally in conflict of interest what is for the OIE an unknown phenomenon. The OIE, in spite of being intergovernmentall organization paid by member country governments, has been degrading (even “killing”) government veterinary services defending animal and human population health while private veterinarians have opposite interest and motivation. The OIE Code reflects serious weakness of major exporting country government veterinary services with very limited staff able to work mainly in their offices and spending a lot of time by administrative work.
OIE Code 2007, Chapter 1.1.1, term Veterinary Services : “Private sector organisations are normally accredited or approved to deliver functions by the Veterinary Authority” (“normally ?”).
OIE Code 2007, Article 126.96.36.199 describing the “responsibilities” of the exporting country, instead of asking them for full sanitary quality guarantee of exported animal commodities as of primary importance, is requiring only information and measures that are for importing country only of secondary importance such as: “ country ability to apply measures to control and prevent the relevant listed (?) diseases, structure of veterinary service, procedure for authorization of certifying veterinarians, monitoring their activities to verify their integrity and impartiality, etc.” All these uncontrollable information cannot replace at all the sanitary quality guarantee with full legal financial responsibility for eventual export of pathogens.
c) Very interesting is the provision in the paragraph 3. of the same Article: “The Head of the Veterinary Service of the exporting country is ultimately accountable for veterinary certification used in international trade.” How ? This is only a poor theory when the certifications are carried out mostly or exclusively by private veterinarians who, without necessary effective supervision on the spot by the government service, can certify what they wish due to not having any legal responsibility for the sanitary quality guarantee as deliberately avoided by the OIE Code. The OIE Code is full of other theoretical provisions giving tasks to the Heads of the Veterinary Service not respecting the facts that weakened government services of exporting countries are lacking necessary staff, facilities, material, funds, etc. needed for adequate control of international export. Using private “accredited” veterinarians is only imperfect emergency substitute which cannot replace independent government service. They usually avoid the conflict of interest with private exporters at the expense of the health in importing countries = export of infections.
4.17 The OIE Code is avoiding the trade contract to include the procedure for the complain in case when the imported animal commodity doesn’t meet import sanitary conditions or has introduced infections/pathogens (e.g. for covering losses caused by this commodity). In practice, according to the OIE Code not admitting sanitary guarantee and not requiring financial responsibility, the importing country must pay these losses and cost of control/eradication measures itself !
4.18 The OIE Code is avoiding decision making authority to respect the opinion of the imported animal commodity users on sanitary quality. The OIE doesn’t respect at all the opinion of imported commodity users (farmers, consumers, etc.) on sanitary quality !! In the OIE documents there are even provisions about acceptability of some food-borne-disease-pathogens in imported food ! Who has given the OIE the right to impose on the consumers the duty to accept non innocuous food ?
In the OIE Handbook on Import Risk Analysis for Animals and Animal
Products it can be found on page 2 in the part entitled “
How far the WTO and OIE anti-sanitary concept has reached is demonstrated by P.B. Jolly who writes “It is imperative to put an end to certain misconceptions, particularly the requirement of ‘zero risk’ ” and mentions the idea of “responsible consumers” i.e. to accept not innocuous food !? In: Veterinary Services: organization, quality assurance, evaluation. OIE Scientific and Technical Review, Volume 22 (2), August 2003, p. 384. .” Again, who decides who is “responsible consumer”, i.e. who accepts voluntarily pathogens in his food ?
This OIE document confirms
anti-sanitary policy also of the FAO/WHO
Example see in 7.11.
The number of ad hoc (non systematic) investigated samples of food of animal origin in exporting countries is absolutely minimum being very far from the lowest representativeness when considering the immense size of exporting commodities.
The OIE as well
as the FAO/WHO
4.19 The OIE Code is not requesting to declare the true sanitary quality of the exported animal commodities (e.g. legibly labelling, marking). Within the uncontrollable jungle of international export and re-export of animal commodities their origin is very often unknown, i.e. not traceable and their sanitary quality is almost always unknown to the users (farmers, consumers, etc.) = free long-distance spreading of infections/pathogens. The OIE Code makes consciously impossible to inform the users on the true sanitary quality of the imported commodities (animals, food of animal origin, etc.) avoiding deliberately, in the so called “OIE international certificates”, any information on true sanitary status. Thanks to this dirty policy, neither the farmers nor the consumers know the sanitary quality if the imported commodity is free of infection pathogens or not. Unfortunately, following this model, the same anti-sanitary policy is transferred into local national trade. Thanks to the OIE policy the imported animals and their products are the only commodities where the exporter must not inform about their quality and can export what he will without any quality guarantee! This is something incredible ! The OIE absolutely doesn’t care about the opinion of the farmers and of the consumers who would never agree to import non-healthy animals and non-pathogen-free animal products as it is dictated by this extremely dangerous organization.
4.20 The OIE Code is supporting the tendency of continuous deterioration of trade commodity sanitary quality instead of meeting increasing sanitary quality requirements of importing countries. The OIE is systematically making the OIE Code more benevolent (every year revisions of many chapters) to even more “facilitate” trade exporting more easily infections/pathogens. This consists, e.g. in minimizing or abolishing the sanitary requirements on exporting animals investigations, on epizootiological characteristics of other animals in the herd and territory of their origin. Other form of OIE organized long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading of infections/pathogens is simply to eliminate the infection from the Code provisions (e.g. paratuberculosis, leptospirosis). Other form of minimizing sanitary requirements and confusing importing countries are several uncontrollable tricky “novelties” such as the “zoning, compartmentalization, regionalization, judgement of equivalence of sanitary measures, risk boundary, etc.” based on theory, estimates and speculations only. The OIE Code doesn’t require effective field control and protection of the specific infection free zones, regions, etc. territory selected for the export. The result is that the protection is formal on paper *), if any and the infections continue spreading within and outside the country.
*) As a deterrent example can be mentioned the “paper
The OIE is in the hands of the most powerful countries trying to minimize the already minimal OIE Code sanitary requirements for their export. Instead of imposing on exporting countries to improve animal sanitary status in their territories to can guarantee export of animals and their products without pathogens (i.e. without exporting sanitary problems into importing countries) they are systematically introducing in the OIE Code theoretical “novelties” impossible for the importing country to control. They can use them “at home” as internal problem of any country. Why not ? Many ideas can be reasonable and acceptable for local trade only (if ideal conditions available and epizootiological situation well known) but not for international trade practice. The exporting country under existing minimal or zero controls/inspections can declare and “certify” what it wants. Because of regionalization and zoning have been for exporting countries too demanding (requiring even eradication of particular infections !?) and therefore “complicating” the export, the “scientists” in service of international business (= “professional prostitutes”) elaborated different papers to support this new camouflages for importing countries. Similarly as in many thousands of post-SPS OIE publications and documents as well as in all publications of “business servicing scientists”, there in no one word that the export must or should be without animal infection pathogens !
All these “novelties” only make easier the export of infections = their spreading and globalization ! They are deepening the OIE-caused-lost of economic motivation for animal infection effective control and eradication.
Example: “The concept of compartmentalisation” was published in Rev. sci. tech. Off. Int. Epiz., 2006, 25 (3), 873-879 by eleven (11 !) authors. The paper defends not proved “seven factors” theory (no risk assessment, no examples of practical results) which is not applicable in nation-wide practice even in the countries of the authors (e.g. lack of necessary government service staff and no control, insufficient knowledge of infection occurrence, not reliable accredited veterinarians usually depending on local producers, not guaranteeing infection-free export, multi-etiological problems, etc.). The majority of the authors are from the same countries which for decades have dominated the OIE: six from USA (3 from Centres for Epidemiology and Animal Health, Fort Collins, Colorado) – the major exporter of animal commodities (including not pathogen-free ones), two from Instituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Teramo, Italy (not able to eradicate African swine fever during three decades and to control effectively the sanitary situation; see also paragraph 2.10) and one from European Union (applying the same trade policy as the OIE conducing to pathogen spreading = animal infection Europeanization). In the Summary there is a demagogical statement “assess and manage animal disease risk so that the safety of trade can be ensure” when the practical impact is exactly opposite (= infection spread).The principle of internal isolation is an old one applied in large scale animal production units trying to separate animals according to their categories and to isolate selected affected herds from non-affected ones. The top isolation measures have been called “black-and-white system”. However, in spite of the internal isolation, the basic production unit (ranch, farm) represents for export purposes one basic epizootiological unit.
The importing countries are not interested in exporting country local uncontrollable measures easily to be abused. They are interest only in healthy animals and their sanitary innocuous products accompanied by official guarantee of full sanitary quality !
4.21 The OIE Code is not assuring the stability of international sanitary provisions for exported animal commodities to can adjust in time sanitary quality preparation. The OIE Code is being issuing every year with many changes not marked in the extremely wordy book. The OIE is calling the Code as the “international standard”. However, any professional quality international standard cannot be changed every year ! This documents very low scientific and practical quality of the OIE Code.
The Code as an international “standard” is unique in the world by its absolute instability - issuing every year (from 1998) a new version without any indications of the changes in these thick books and thus seriously confusing the users. Every new issue conduces to facilitate more and more the conditions for exporting countries at the even major detriment of the importing country animal and human health. In the other words, every new issue increasing infections/pathogens export risk facilitates more and more the globalization of animal communicable diseases through international trade. The instability due permanently replacing previous issues documents very serious lack of the OIE responsibility, scientific standard, objectivity, respect to international trade practice experience and logic as well as very low professional quality of the Code. Permanent changing the Code gives evidence that the OIE is not scientifically and even not logically justifying (not able to implement it or simply it is not justifiable at all) not only any Code “new” provisions (also “new” information systems) in spite of repeatedly requiring importing countries to scientifically justify their demand for healthy animals and pathogen-free animal products ! This can be understood as a top of the OIE demagogy and hypocrisy !
Example: Only in the OIE Code 2007 there are 24 revised chapters and appendices on the following subjects: general definition, zoning and compartmentalization, rabies, foot and mouth disease, rinderpest, bluetongue, bovine tuberculosis, BSE, equine influenza, equine infectious anaemia, equine piroplasmosis, equine rhinopneumonitis, glanders, equine viral arteritis, avian influenza, surveillance for rinderpest, surveillance for bluetongue, surveillance for avian influenza, etc. It means that the previous Code 2006 can be thrown into basket as not more valid. The same exercise has been repeated every year from 1997. One doesn’t know what is still valid and what not.
4.22 The OIE Code is making impossible financial (or material) responsibility for hidden sanitary flaws of exported animal commodity (e.g. for infection introduction, for false sanitary documents not corresponding with import conditions). According to the OIE Code the certifying officer guarantees nothing !
4.23 The OIE Code is not requiring any post-import sanitary guarantee period for imported animal commodities as it is normal in all other trade commodities. Therefore, the exporting country is without any risk of infection/pathogen export complaint = risk-free export !. The export of animal commodities is the only one where the negative consequences of non-full-quality export are without any “penalty”, not only due to difficult to detect invisible and non-measurable “phenomena” without particular laboratory investigations (their size is minimal or zero due to economic reasons) but mainly due to not guaranteeing exported commodity sanitary quality (veterinary certificate information is without legal value for the official complaint). All the negative post-import consequences, such as losses and cost of control/eradication measures, must be covered by the paying importing country what is something incredible in any other trade commodity! These are the criminal consequences of the OIE Code policy mainly due to not admitting infection-free trade, not requiring sanitary guarantee and due to requiring nonsense “risk assessment” based on speculation in favour of exporting countries! The exporting countries must be “grateful” to the OIE for so “clever” arrangement for easy and without-risk-export of non-infection-free commodities regardless of sanitary consequences in paying importing countries being internationally without any support (= defenceless).
b) The OIE anti-sanitary policy is
unfortunately “slavishly” copied by other international organizations
(influenced by the same major exporting countries) such as the the FAO/WHO
c) Animal infection Europeanization.
International trade within the European
Union is even easier due to not requiring at all any sanitary guarantee (only
information, if any). As far as the sanitary quality of the meat and other
products of animal origin are concerned, the “system” is only in the hands of
“self-controlling” (?) producers and exporters
without the “interference” of government
services (“out of play”). The only criterion for the importers is the price
and not any sanitary quality, e.g. international
movement and circulation of the meat is free conducing, thanks to the EU
organized absence of government sanitary inspections and infection controls, to
irreparable Europeanization of
foodborne-disease-pathogens such as
salmonelloses ! The conscious Europeanization is applied also on exported animals without sanitary guarantee crossing
uncontrolled the country borders not respecting entirely different animal
infection situation in different member countries. The EU HQs animal health
“armchair” staff dedicates mainly to the creation of ad absurdum enormous number of different legislation documents and
to the very formal (paper) control of their implementation. The staff doesn’t
dedicate its activities to practical solution of the main problems such as
effective protection of animal and human populations’ health and control,
elimination and eradication of major infections in the EU territory, i.e. to
the improvement of animal populations’ health. (As a deterrent example it can
be mentioned three decades of African swine fever in
Example of the Europeanization: The spread of bluetongue in 2007 from the most southern part of the European Union (Spain and Italy) for the first time in the history into the Nordic countries, following the benevolent OIE Code “conditions” facilitating trade at the expense of the importing country health.
d) The worse is that the OIE Code extraordinary benevolence is very often “transferred” in national animal commodities’ trade and thus supporting animal infection spreading inside of the country = disastrous multiplying effect of the OIE policy being at the top of the infection propagation “pyramid”!
4.24 The OIE Code is trickily avoiding international sanitary conditions according to animal commodity type. The OIE is obviously afraid that formulating sanitary import conditions according to different animal species and categories, according to different animal products such as meat, eggs, milk, etc. would require to use the terms “healthy animals” and/or “pathogen-free animal products”. These terms, unknown in the whole OIE Code, could create immense difficulty to exporting countries when pathogen-free status would be required and they should start with demanding mass investigations, infection control and eradication programmes to achieve the required sanitary status of exported commodities.
4.25 The OIE
Code is lacking clear cut definitions of many used terms conducing to
misunderstanding and speculations as far as sanitary quality of exported animal
commodity is concerned. For example, the OIE is deliberately avoiding to identify sanitary import
conditions for animal products, first of all for meat (the most important
and the most frequent vehicle for infection/pathogen export, long-distance spread
and globalization). In about 600 pages of the OIE Code there is for meat
sanitary quality only one sentence of four words *): “Fit for human consumption.”
without any definition, explanation, conditions, requirements for
investigations, for origin from healthy animals, etc.. While in the long list
of the OIE Code “definitions” there are many definitions generally known to
everybody such as “death”, “killing”, “slaughter”, etc. For the most important animal commodity for animal
infection globalization there is no
space in the Code, obviously not to complicate profitable international
trade spreading freely infection disease pathogens. The main effort of the OIE
is to take attention away from the most important sanitary phenomena, such as “healthy animal” ,”pathogen-free animal product” , etc., what is reflected also in the
fact that these terms are missing at all in the whole thick OIE Code books. The
OIE is applying the same policy as FAO/WHO
*) In the OIE Code 2007 of about 57 thousand words there are e.g. 878 words dedicated to General Obligations, 657 words to Certification, 2,383 words to Risk Assessment and 8720 words to Veterinary Services Evaluation.
**) Example see in the paragraph 7.11.
4.26 The OIE has been avoiding any critical analysis of international trade sanitary consequences to be presented to member country governments for information and as the basis for the further development of its policy. The OIE is the only intergovernmentall organization in the world history not informing at all its paying members on the impact of its activities and documents. Due to the fear to discover and admit catastrophic consequences of its policy, the OIE immediately abolished the indicators of pre-WTO/SPS information system for the evaluation of animal infection import cases. The OIE is not interested at all in the true about the impact of its policy conducing to communicable disease long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading and globalisation.
More information in: http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/globsurveillance.htm “Global crisis of communicable animal infections' monitoring and surveillance: less information on their occurrence than before computer era = facilitating infections/pathogens spreading through international trade !”
4.27 a) The OIE was strongly supporting the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund policy in incredible destruction of government veterinary services during the 1990’ and thus contributed to significant reduction (somewhere almost till to zero) of public service ability to control animal infections and trade. Very weak public veterinary services are not able to control effectively international trade and supervise non-governmental services involved in veterinary certification of exported animal commodities. It is logical that weak public services can usually control the trade and private service only formally and administratively, i.e. they can control the papers. The OIE Code is not requiring (on the contrary it is deliberately avoiding) any effective government veterinary control of international trade letting almost all this trade in the hands of private veterinarians (!!) having completely contrary interest (profit). There is generally known that where is not effective control/inspection and where is missing the fear of sanctions there is breeding ground for corruption and violation of relevant rules. In our case when the OIE is avoiding sanitary guarantee then the signing “accredited” veterinarian can confirm what he wants !
Instead to require strengthening of government veterinary services, Dr A. Thiermann (USA), President, OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission is stressing (2004), without any proof, how the implementation of this document is and will be „maximizing the benefit of globalization.“. This is the same trick as the WTO/SPS promising preamble "Desiring to improve the human health, animal health .. in all Members;" while in the whole document there is no one word of the health improvement measures. On the contrary, the WTO/SPS was written only to facilitate the export of non-healthy animals and non-pathogen-free animal products, i.e. to facilitate export of infections/pathogens = animal infection globalization. Defending the WTO/SPS he is admitting long-distance spreading of animal infections through „unrestricted trade“ (!?). The WTO/SPS is maximizing the benefit only of the exporting countries at the expense of the importing countries maximizing their losses.
b) The OIE has been consistently and deliberately mixing public and private veterinarians not respecting at all quite different contradictory characteristics, positions, duties and interests as well as quite different grades of responsibility for sanitary quality of exported animal commodities. The OIE has been degrading government services and their role in international trade. For the exporters the private “accredited” veterinarians are more acceptable that the government ones. The private veterinarians are usually not so strict in respecting local legislation and export sanitary conditions (according to the OIE Code having no any responsibility for sanitary status) in comparison with government veterinarians. One of the reasons is the fact that the home countries of the OIE dominating officers have very weak government services unable neither to control on the spot all internationally notifiable animal infections nor the animal commodities export. The OIE has never presented to the member country governments any recommendation to strengthen public animal health services and their sanitary control role in and their responsibility for animal commodity trade to avoid spreading of communicable diseases.
c) Today, the Chief Veterinary Officers represent more “the generals without army”. Due to lack of necessary number of full-time public service veterinarians the countries are unable to organize successful “battle” - animal infection surveillance, screening, control, elimination and eradication. Private veterinarians have naturally completely different interests and their ad hoc use as part-time professionals for some public actions cannot replace full-time specialists of government services. This fact belongs among the main reasons why the major exporting countries unscrupulously pushed through the WTO/SPS and the OIE the possibility of exporting animal commodities regardless of animal infection pathogen presence, i.e. animal infection long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading and globalization. In the majority of exporting countries the international trade is in the hand of practically uncontrollable private “accredited” veterinarians. In some countries almost all private veterinarians are “accredited”, usually not considering their special qualification, i.e. without necessary selection, if any, based on necessary training and examinations.
Example of private service not helping even in the
most catastrophic panzootics: From more than 12 thousand
government and private veterinarians in
the United Kingdom there were only 2,000 veterinary surgeons at 2001 FMD
outbreak high working to control it. One would expect all-nation mobilization
of all veterinarians fit for work to participate in the anti-FMD campaign under
one command. To replace missing professional staff there were “imported”
veterinarians from different European countries and overseas (e.g. from
d) This case demonstrates very important experience that the majority of private veterinarians are usually not available for infection diseases control, eradication and emergency actions. These veterinarians, including “accredited ones”, give naturally the priority to current curative practice providing them necessary personal income and defending their “territory” against the concurrence during their absence. The OIE doesn’t respect the significant difference and instead of supporting, as intergovernmentall organization, the government services, it supports private services benevolent to the export of animal commodities.
e) The OIE is co-responsible for admitting government veterinary services defending animal populations’ health to be too weak and almost defenceless against strong and powerful private sector defending its economic profit.
Examples of dismantling government animal health services:
Rweyemamu, Astudillo: “Since the mid-1980s structural adjustment programmes in developing countries have led to a demand for the privatization of veterinary services, thus aiming at drastically diminishing the role of the state in these activities. Surveillance, early warning, laboratory diagnostic services, planning, regulation and management of disease control programme, as well as ensuring the quality and safety of animal products were secondary considerations. The chain of veterinary command that required notification of disease outbreaks enabling a response to disease emergency and which also ensured the management of national disease control programme, was often dismantled.”
Ozawa et al.: “To cope with ever-increasing demand on Veterinary Services, both countries have made continued effort to expand the services, which currently only have a limited number of government personnel.” “There are increasing demand for the prevention and control of diseases…. Furthermore, consumers are becoming more and more interested and demanding in regard to the safety of livestock products. This means a heavier workload for the Veterinary Services. However, current veterinary manpower is inadequate to cope and the recruitment of additional workers is difficult in the light of the continued downsizing of the Government.”
f) The OIE has never recommended to member country governments to strengthen government animal health services and their competences. In order no to “complicate” the export, the OIE has never recommended to member country governments any criteria for the selection of veterinarians to be accredited for some work in the name of the government, any profile of these veterinarians as the conditions for obtaining the diploma of particular obligatory postgraduate training (undergraduate education usually is not preparing adequately the new veterinarians for this demanding and highly responsible work). In order no to “complicate” the export, the OIE has never recommended to member country governments: how to inspect – control the work of “accredited” veterinarians and “accredited” diagnostic laboratories, e.g. re-testing, placebo testing; revision of local investigations on the spot, field sampling and of laboratory testing; how to hedge against mistakes in sample collection, sending, results interpretation, against sample confusion (or substitution), mistakes and corruption in attest issuing, etc. The pre-export quarantine inspection should the must.
g) Without strong, well trained, equipped, organized and managed public veterinary service, supported by necessary funds and legislation, it cannot be implemented neither any nation-wide successful animal infection control and eradication programmes nor any effective sanitary inspection of animal commodity trade and export !
h) The OIE is organizing veterinary service evaluation missions to selected countries not including the most important ones for animal infection long-distance spreading and globalization – the major exporting countries (the evaluation and critics of the OIE dominating countries are not permissible !?).
The major meat exporting countries in
thousand tonnes – average 2002-2004:
The United Kingdom is not the subject of the OIE evaluation missions in spite of: being unable to detect and eradicate in time the FMD 2001 (about 10 million animals lost); exporting the FMD in France; having the major proportion of the BSE cases (1988-2000 :184,346 from global total of 189,858 cases); exporting BSE in: Ireland – 5 in 1989, 1 in 1990, 2 in 1991 and 1992, 1 in 1994 and 1995; in France 1 in 1999, in Portugal 1 in 2000, 2002 and 2003; in Italy 1 in 2002. ( Eurostat: Dec. 2005). A large rendering company in UK continued and expanded its export of meat and bone meal, which may have been contaminated with BSE, for 8 years after EU ban in 1988, to 70 countries in the Middle and Far East.”(Hodges, J. 2001: Editorial. Livestock Production Science 69, p. 59).
4.28 Summarizing the above facts it can be stated that the OIE is supporting unfair international commercial practices in animal commodities being in services of the major exporters. One of the key problems of international trade in animal commodities are unfair business-to-user commercial practices generating distortions of competition regarding sanitary quality.
The OIE is supporting misleading commercial practices such as: if the exporting country through the OIE “information system” is providing false information on animal infection occurrence (e.g. presenting ad hoc incomplete numeric data as real ones) and is therefore untruthful or in any way deceives or is like to deceive the importing country, and in either case causes or is likely to cause it to take a transactional decision that it would not have taken otherwise:
- nature of the commodity, its main sanitary characteristics such as its infection-free status, sanitary risks, fitness for purpose, results to be expected from its use, etc..
- attributes, rights and duties of the certificate issuing person, his qualification, status, approval, affiliation or connection of exporting agency, etc.
- compliance with the importing country requirements (the commitment capable of being verified), etc..
The OIE is supporting misleading omissions of important information that the importing country needs for transactional decisions (involving a right of withdrawal or cancellation) and thereby causes or is likely to cause it to take a transactional decision that it would not have taken otherwise: the OIE information system minimizing ad absurdum data on animal infection occurrence facilitates the exporting country to hide or provide in an unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely manner such information.
The OIE is not avoided aggressive commercial practices such as undue influence of the major exporting countries referring to the OIE Code.
The OIE is deliberately not requiring any penalty for unfair international trade practice conducing to animal infection export.
Example: The EU directives (2005/25/EC of
More information in:
- http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/vetmanpower.htm": Global crisis of public professional veterinary manpower unable to control effectively animal population health/diseases and animal trade !”
- http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/OIEcode.htm "Critical analysis of OIE Animal Health Code for international trade supporting infections/pathogens' export = the most dangerous document for global animal population health in the history !”
- http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/consumer.htm "Conscious insufficient protection of consumer against foodborne disease pathogens: international policy admitting them in food of animal origin = crime against humanity ! “
5. List of principles of international protection of animal population health not respected by the OIE
5.1 Primum non nocere (First, do not harm).
5.2 The priority of international animal health policy is to protect healthy animals and their herds/ populations against the introduction of infections/ pathogens from abroad.
5.3 The anti-epizootic measures must respect fully different biological character of infection etiological agents and their interaction with animals and environmental conditions.
5.4 To support local (national) animal production to maximize the self-sufficiency and thus to avoid or minimize the need for risky import of animals and their products.
5.5 Not to import risky animal commodities without the guarantee of full sanitary quality (= without sanitary innocuousness – avoiding all infectious diseases) or without acceptable sanitary guarantee.
5.6 Not to import animal commodities from countries known as the exporters of infections/pathogens.
5.7 Not to import animal commodities from countries having very weak government animal health service unable to control animal commodity export and to guarantee its sanitary innocuousness or other acceptable level of sanitary quality.
5.8 To prefer and support animal commodity import from the shortest possible distances to shorten spread of eventually imported infections/pathogens.
5.9 To prefer and support animal commodity import from one or minimal possible places of origin and thus reducing spread of eventually imported infections/pathogens.
5.10 To prefer and support one or minimal possible places of destination and distribution of introduced animal commodity to reduce spread size of eventually imported infections/pathogens.
5.11 To stabilize the animal commodity trade channels between exporting and importing organizations and thus to narrow the stream and dispersion of eventually imported infections/pathogens.
5.12 To prefer import from specific infectious disease free countries, territories and localities of epizootiologically sufficient size to avoid or minimize the risk of introducing specific infections/pathogens.
5.13 To require pre-import investigations and quarantine of sufficient duration and necessary multi-etiological investigations searching for pathogen carriers to avoid their export.
5.14 To require and support multi-infection surveillance, monitoring and screening covering maximal possible population and territory to discover all existing infection outbreaks in exporting countries, to isolate and eradicate them to can export sanitary innocuous animal commodities.
5.15 To require for infections’ screening the best and the most complex diagnostic methods to discover all specifically diseased animals and outbreaks in exporting countries, to isolate and eradicate them to can export sanitary innocuous animal commodities.
5.16 Not to accept animal commodity without official document on sanitary status guarantee issued by independent officer, preferably of government service.
5.17 To support in case of doubt about sanitary quality of animal commodity to be exported, before the decision on import permission, to visit exporting country to analyse sanitary situation on the spot assessing the reliability of public animal health service control and of sanitary guarantee for the export purpose.
5.18 To require for the export purpose sampling methods giving the most possible objective data on sanitary status when investigating a representative part of the animal commodity to be exported.
5.19 To respect that every case of export/import of animal commodities is different in place and time and therefore it must be solved flexibly respecting biological character of multi-infection agents and importing country need for sanitary innocuous goods.
5.20 To respect that every exporting country has different situation in individual and multi-etiological infection occurrence requiring different approach in identifying sanitary import conditions.
5.21 Importing countries to be informed truly and in full on animal infection occurrence in exporting countries.
5.22 To support all suitable motivations for effective animal population health protection, multi-infection investigations, control and eradication in exporting countries to be able to export only animal commodities of full sanitary quality.
5.23 International documents influencing the trade in animals and their products to be concise and fully transparent, including the used terms, to facilitate their uniform understanding.
5.24 Education, trainings, research and meetings in animal health to be dedicated primarily to the methods for animal population health protection against the infection/pathogen introduction through import and to the methods of animal population health recovery through effective control, elimination and eradication of specific infections, mainly in exporting countries.
5.25 To support infectious diseases control and eradication activities in exporting countries to avoid “delivery” of infectious disease pathogens in importing countries.
6. OIE “new policy” contrary to the principles of international protection of animal population health
6.1 Basic historical principle of the medicine “Primum non nocere” (“First, do not harm”) has become for the OIE almost an unknown rule not applied at all in the “new modern (?)” OIE Code policy! The OIE doesn’t prefer the protection of importing country animal population health (with exception of one or very few selected infections of major exporting countries’ interest) letting the overwhelming majority of animal infections to be exported. Instead of consistent preventive medicine the OIE applies fire-brigade approach, i.e. action only in case of infection outbreak or emergency.
Even the old Greeks and Romans applied the principle “Praevenire melius est quam praeveniri.” (“It is better to precede than to be preceded.”)
As one of many “symptoms” confirming the OIE policy in favour of exporting countries only it can be mentioned the OIE Code Glossary definition of “Sanitary measure”: “means any measure applied to protect animal or human health or life within the territory of the Member Country from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of a hazard. [Note: A detailed definition of sanitary measure may be found in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures of the World Trade Organization.]”
This definition clearly speaks about the sanitary measures to be applied only in importing countries after introducing infections/pathogens through international trade! The OIE Code calculates only with pathogen-non-free trade ! No one word that the main sanitary measures must be carried out in exporting countries to can export sanitary innocuous animal commodities. It is very strange that detailed definition of the most important term is to be found in the WTO/SPS and not in the OIE Code, specialized international organization for anti-epizootic policy. This confirms once again that the WTO/SPS was the tricky “work” of the OIE and its corrupt “experts”. The definition in the WTO/SPS represents a strange mixture of everything which has nothing to do with the importing country health protection against infection pathogen introduction.
6.2 a) The priority of today OIE is to safeguard international trade and not to protect animal and human health ! The OIE is repeatedly declaring that the requirements for exporting healthy animals and pathogen-free animal products are unjustified and contrary to safeguarding trade. The OIE documents state repeatedly (thousand times ?) and demagogically *) that “within its mandate under the WTO SPS Agreement, to safeguard world trade by publishing health standards for International trade in animals and animal products”. The only reference to the OIE Code in the WTO SPS (annex) doesn’t mean any new mandate contra the established one many years ago in the OIE basic text (constitution) by the founding member country governments and parliaments! No any government or parliament have approved explicitly the change of initial OIE anti-epizootic mandate of consistent protecting animal health in the world into an organization supporting animal infections/pathogens’ long-distance spreading and globalization through international trade! This self-made infection-spreading “mandate” legally doesn’t exist; it was “created” illegally by irresponsible OIE leadership in service of major exporting countries.
b) The OIE has not any “mandate” for animal infection/pathogen spreading even when referring to the WTO/SPS where in the preamble it can be read following text: “"Desiring to improve the human health, animal health .. in all Members;", i.e. not desiring to make animal health worse! The above mentioned OIE statement stresses that its mandate is “safeguarding world trade” while deliberately omits “safeguarding world animal and human health”! The former main priority “concerning spread of epizootic diseases and the means used to control them” disappeared being replaced by the main concern of major exporting countries – to safeguard international trade. No one word of safeguarding world animal health or concern about the long-distance spread of epizootic diseases. This change, not cleared officially by the Governments (only by Chief Veterinary Officers’ consensus), explains the “new” role favouring major exporting countries and supporting globalization of animals infections. The OIE has become an organization of different objectives than the original ones, that are still the most important for global animal population health.
Note: The deviation of the OIE objectives from the original ones is reflected also in OIE publication “75 years 1924-1999” where on 152 pages was not space to quote the OIE original main duty “avoiding spread of epizootic diseases” what is today declared by the WTO and the OIE as non-tariff barrier !?
c) The main concern is not to avoid infections’ long-distance spread but to safeguard trade: “adoption and enforcement of sanitary measures in order to minimize their negative effects on international trade” . The Code is not accepting at all the trade in healthy animals and their products: “in case where a government chooses to apply stricter measures, the importing country m u s t be able to show that its measure is based on a scientific assessment of the potential health risks.” (OIE CODE 2001, DG OIE Foreword, pages III and IV.) What is “scientific assessment of the potential health risks.” ?
*) The “new” objectives of the OIE published in 2004.
6.3 a) The OIE Code doesn’t respect biological characteristics and complexity of individual animal infections/pathogens. It doesn’t respect different types, subtypes of etiological agent strains, their resistance, ability to reproduce and spread, ability to increase their virulence through passages among susceptible animals (without specific resistance in specific infection free population). It doesn’t distinguish between virulent, avirulent and conditionally pathogen strains, it doesn’t consider the risk of agents’ mutation, it doesn’t consider that the trade sanitary problems and measures are multi-etiological, etc. It doesn’t consider that the majority of infections are very difficult to discover due to prevailing subclinical course and sneaking spread. It doesn’t respect that the imported infections usually are not detected in time and not eradicated, particularly when penetrated into wildlife. It doesn’t respect that not eradicated imported infections can spread horizontally and vertically (to following generations), changing gradually their characteristics (e.g. from acute manifest form to chronic and subclinical ones) and many times becoming enzootic lasting many years or even up to the end of the existence of the particular local susceptible subpopulations (“for ever”?). It doesn’t respect that the interactions agents-animals-environment represent a dynamic process of changes in place and time and that every case is different (there are not two identical cases !). It doesn’t respect that biological complex characteristics is impossible to measure quantitatively, i.e. objectively. It doesn’t respect eventual failure of human factor. It doesn’t respect that biological processes at population level cannot be modelled mathematically, particularly when the input data are not reliable. Therefore, the use of mathematical/statistical models cannot replace practical field investigations and infection control measures.
b) In spite of very bad experience with mathematical modelling of infection control measures, the OIE, dominated by the theoreticians – armchair bureaucrats, instead of organizing practical international preventive and infection eradication programmes is giving particular attention to “The Use of Epidemiological Models for the Management of Animal Diseases” – Final Report of the 75th General Session, Paris, 20-25 May 2007, pages 7-9. The OIE continues to present theoretical abstract fantasies having nothing to do with practical measures of the member country governments. Instead of supporting practical measures and training, the OIE is confusing action-oriented epizootiology with theoretical biostatistics and modelling (while sitting in offices) based on non real data and thus deviating veterinary services from demanding field surveillance, control and eradication activities.
Example: Kitching, Thrusfield and
Taylor (2006): “During
the 2001 epidemic of FMD in the
c) International trade cannot be based upon OIE speculations and not verified theory !
6.4 The OIE is not supporting at all local animal production to avoid or minimize the need for sanitary risky import of animals and their products. The self-sufficiency in animal production represents the best preventive measures against the introduction of different animal infections from abroad. For the OIE this concept is not acceptable because it s Code is supporting only risky international trade in animal commodities. The main “duty” of today OIE is the safeguard of international trade in non-pathogen-free commodities, i.e. without any sanitary guarantee and not to protect consistently animal and human health in importing countries. See also 4.15.
6.5 The OIE doesn’t care at all about warning member country governments not to import risky animal commodities without the guarantee of full sanitary quality (= without sanitary innocuousness – avoiding all infections) or without acceptable sanitary guarantee (e.g. freedom of all internationally notifiable infections). It cares only how to force importing countries to accept non-pathogen-free animals and their products, i.e. supporting infection long-distance spread and globalization. See also paragraph 4.18.
6.6 The OIE doesn’t analyse the cases of exporting infections/pathogens and therefore it has never informed and warned importing country governments about those countries exporting systematically animal infections/pathogens’. The OIE has not been interested in discovering the major infection/pathogen countries-exporters not to complicate relatively easy and profiting export without regard to worsening of infection occurrence in importing countries due to infections/pathogens introduction.
6.7 The OIE doesn’t analyse and identify the countries having very weak government animal health service unable to control animal commodity export and to guarantee its sanitary innocuousness or other acceptable level of sanitary quality. Therefore, the OIE has never informed and warned importing country governments about those countries having very weak public service unable to control effectively animal commodity export, i.e. to guarantee full or required sanitary quality and thus to avoid the export of animal infections/pathogens.
6.8 The OIE new policy has never preferred, supported or recommended to member country governments animal commodity trade of the shortest possible distances and thus to limit as much as possible eventual spread of imported infections/pathogens. The OIE doesn’t care about the introduction of animal infections through international trade, on the contrary it supports animal infection long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading without regard to the distances between localities of origin and of destination of traded commodity.
6.9 The OIE new policy has never preferred, supported or recommended to member country governments the principle to export of animal commodity from one or minimal possible places of origin and to stabilize this trade between exporting and importing organizations. The OIE doesn’t care about animal commodity multi-origin contributing to multi-infection pathogen export. On the contrary, the OIE supports animal infection long-distance spreading without regard to the mentioned logical principle.
6.10 The OIE new policy has never preferred, supported or recommended to member country governments the principle of one or minimal possible places of destination and distribution of imported animal commodity to minimize spreading of eventually imported infections/pathogens. On the contrary, the OIE supports animal infection long-distance (incl. intercontinental) spreading without regard to the mentioned logical principle.
6.11 The OIE has never preferred, supported or recommended to member country governments the principle of stabilizing the animal commodity trade channels between exporting and importing organizations and thus to narrow the stream and dispersion of eventually imported infections/pathogens. Stabilized trade channels facilitate better control of the commodity trade chain and etiological investigations to discover in time eventual infections/pathogens.
6.12 a) The OIE new policy has the tendency to minimize the size of specific infection free territories and populations to be required as import sanitary conditions. This is increasing the risk of introducing specific infections/pathogens from surrounding not properly controlled territories and populations. For this purpose the OIE has been introducing also some not objectively controllable “novelties” in form of not uniformly understood terms such as “unit, epidemiological unit, subpopulation, compartmentalisation, regionalization, zoning, infected zone, surveillance zone, categorization of a country/zone, equivalence of sanitary measures, low prevalence, hazard-based, risk-based etc.”confusing importing countries (as it was already mentioned above).
The region can be understood as a district, or country
and block of countries ? What about European Union region with African swine
OIE Code 2006, Chapter 2.2.8
b) The above mentioned example is reflecting general approach of the Code to reduce the import requirements as much as possible, i.e. to narrow them to individual animals = clinically affected to leave at home and the rest (suspect and subclinical carriers) to export regardless of being from affected herds and/or zones. The Code authors either have no any idea on the epizootiology of the diseases or are in service of export business lobby opening way for disease spreading. Where is the “famous” OIE scientific convincing risk assessment ? The above mentioned anti-sanitary approach reminds the words of Dr MacDiarmid that for the export the local disease situation is not important “when having risk reducing tools (tests, treatment, whatever)” !? (See also example in 2.9 paragraph). From the epizootiological point of view just the local (zone) sanitary situation is the key factor in selecting animals or their products for the export. The selection of individual clinically healthy diseases from affected herds and zone is extremely risky what the OIE Code doesn’t respect! The most dangerous are the animal-carriers of etiological agents being without disease clinical manifestation (i.e. originated from affected herds and zones !!).
c) It merits attention the OIE abuse of sampling methods for declaring a herd, flock, zone, territory or country as specific infection free in spite of particular disease occurrence ! The infection exists but according to the OIE Code “officially” doesn’t exist ! Where is the logic and professional approach ! For supporting export the OIE is even using the open lies !
Examples (OIE Code 2007):
Chapter 2.5.5 – equine influenza: “Equine influenza free country… requirements: a serological survey has been carried out on a representative sample … sufficient to provide at least a 99 % level of confidence of detecting the disease if it is present at a prevalence rate exceeding 5 %.”
Chapter 2.3.1 – bovine brucellosis: “free country = the entire cattle population of a country or zone is under official veterinary control and it has been ascertained that the rate of brucellosis infection does not exceed 0.2% of the cattle herds in the country or zone under consideration”;
6.13 a) In the OIE Code import conditions for specific infections, there is continuous tendency to minimize up to avoid pre-export etiological investigations (searching for pathogen carriers), due to their cost and mainly due to the risk to discover the reality - sanitary problem making the export impossible. E.g. in the OIE Code 2000, Chapter 188.8.131.52 “Animal Health Measures Applicable Before and At Departure” contains correct provisions regarding the pre-export quarantine, however, it is contradictory to the whole concept of the OIE Code not admitting export of neither healthy animals, i.e. free of infections/pathogens nor animals free of internationally notifiable infections/pathogens:
The OIE Code 2007, Chapter 2.2.6 Paratuberculosis – empty page = eliminating all import
conditions, including pre-export
"It is not longer
possible to apply the old system under which animals and animal products had to come from specific free
zones, and were subjected to isolation, quarantine,
inspection and diagnostic testing before and after export." (!?) -V. Caporale (
The OIE Code is asking not to spend a lot of time investigating animals before the departure at the border posts regardless of investigation time needs: “The time and place of the examination shall be arranged taking into account customs and other formalities and in such a way as not to impede or delay departure.” (Article 184.108.40.206)
b) The before-SPS OIE Code 1992, Chapter 220.127.116.11: “When they have been found to be clinically healthy and free from List A diseases or any other infectious disease.” (This before-SPS OIE Code was still representing useful recommendations without SPS “risk assessment” trickery.) Similar formulation can be found also in all following OIE Codes, e.g. in 2007, 1.4.1: “When they have been found to be clinically healthy and free from diseases listed by the OIE.” Only in these sentences the OIE recognizes the importance of all internationally reportable infectious diseases. It seems that this text of before-SPS OIE Code referring on all infectious diseases has been obviously by mistake forgotten to be eliminated. The OIE actual policy is supporting only unimpeded animal trade and not to complicate it by avoiding infection export.
6.14 The OIE has never required, supported or recommended to member country governments multi-infection surveillance and monitoring covering maximal possible population and territory to discover existing infection outbreaks in exporting countries, to isolate and eradicate them and to export sanitary innocuous animal commodities. On the contrary, the OIE “facilitate trade” tendency has been to limit as much as possible animal infections’ surveillance, monitoring and screening in exporting countries to minimize the risk of infection/pathogen discovery, to save money for demanding costly measures and thus to increase export profit at the expense of the health in importing countries. The OIE refused the author’s suggestions to include in regular reporting on animal health situation in individual countries also on the numbers of specific etiological investigations to show the size of the active surveys (screenings). Without this the ad hoc reported numbers of specific infection affected herds and animals are very far from the real occurrence and thus confusing importing countries when deciding on the sanitary conditions.
6.15 The OIE has never required, supported or recommended to member country governments for infections’ screening to use the best and the most complex diagnostic methods to discover all specifically diseased animals and outbreaks in exporting countries or zones, to isolate and eradicate them and thus to can export sanitary innocuous animal commodities. On the other hand, the OIE publishes a useful “Manual of Standards for Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines”. Unfortunately, some countries do not use the most sensitive OIE recommended diagnostic methods and therefore they are not able to discover specific infection real occurrence in their territories what represents an increased risk to export infection pathogens’ carriers.
Example: Among very few
countries reporting also the numbers of specific investigations belongs
6.16 The OIE has never required, supported or recommended to member country governments the principle not to accept animal commodity without official document on sanitary status guarantee. On the contrary, the OIE Code doesn’t respect at all that any exported commodity must have a quality guarantee, in our case sanitary guarantee, i.e. to guarantee infection/pathogen free status. To achieve sanitary innocuous status requires a lot of work and resources. Therefore, the OIE is replacing this kind of document by non-binding “international veterinary certificate” informing only on negative results of clinical and eventually special etiological investigations. The exporting countries, following the OIE Code provisions as far as sanitary status is concerned, guarantee nothing. There is not great difference when comparing it with illegal export of animal commodities being also without any sanitary status guarantee and thus contributing similarly to infection/pathogen international spreading and globalization.
6.17 The OIE Code is recommending in case of any doubt about sanitary quality of exporting commodity, before the decision on import permission, to visit exporting country and analyse its veterinary service situation following a very long list of the criteria (for writing a book?). However, the most important aspect for importing country is deliberately missing, i.e. to investigate sanitary situation on the spot – at the origin of animal commodity to be exported, to assess the ability of public animal health service to control local sanitary situation and to meet required import conditions as well as to evaluate the reliability of sanitary guarantee/attests for avoiding the export of sanitary problems (infection/pathogen).
The OIE has been repeatedly calling for veterinary service evaluation in the member countries, in developing and transition ones, i.e. mainly importing ones (being as usually discriminated by this organization). The OIE has never considered to send veterinary service evaluation missions to the countries the most important for long-distance animal infection spreading and globalization, i.e. the major animal commodity exporting countries (according to the OIE Code without any guarantee for full sanitary innocuousness). This fact reflects the OIE domination by these countries not permitting any outside mission to look into their veterinary “kitchen” what could discover the sanitary reality and complicate the easy export.
Examples: The countries with major meat export in
6.18 a) The OIE has never required for export purposes to use sampling methods giving the most objective data on sanitary status when investigating only a representative part of the animal commodity quantity to be exported and its surrounding sanitary threatening conditions. The OIE requires only sampling methods being not able to discover the infection in population or subpopulation for the export due to insufficient number of representative samples. It permits infection/pathogen prevalence in some animal commodities to be exported up to 5% value what represents open support of exporting “legally according to OIE” animal-carriers or infected animal products ! The “armchair epidemiologists” have managed to get into the OIE Code the sampling methods sufficient only for rough orientation on infection occurrence and not for animal commodity export where there is a need for much precise and demanding procedure. This anti-sanitary professional nonsense has become normal OIE statistical procedure regardless of obvious export of infections/pathogens.
Example: "”Total number of samples … is based on the random statistic sample required to give a probability of 95 % to detect one positive sample given that infection is present in the population at a level of 5 % or greater". (Code 2001, Art. 18.104.22.168 – “Hygiene and disease security procedures in poultry breeding flocks and hatcheries”) referring to regularly monitoring of the poultry establishments what is openly admitting Salmonella (Salmonella enteritidis and Salmonella typhimurium) occurrence, i.e. even their export !
b) In the OIE Code there are missing import conditions against zoonotic Salmonella in poultry meat as well as in mammal meat opening wide path for their free long-distance spread through international trade !
One of the reasons why the OIE Code avoids the import conditions for the salmonellae letting them to be exported freely could be based on Acha, Szyfres (1985) statement that “ it is impossible to obtain salmonella-free foods of animal origin.”(!?). The resistance to include mammal salmonelloses could be also linked with the opinion of Dr Stuart C. MacDiarmid (1992), that time National Adviser (Animal Health), MAF Policy and actual Secretary General, OIE Commission for the Terrestrial Animal Health Code who wrote: “Salmonellae are already widespread and common in New Zealand. … between 1 and 5 % of sheep and cattle are unapparent carriers.”
most common vehicles for human infection are poultry, pork, beef, eggs, milk
and their products. In the
c) These statements help to understand the fact that the OIE Code and FAO/WHO Code Alimentarius do not require the food of animal origin to be free of zoonotic salmonellae and that these infections/pathogens are not included in the OIE international information system and in any international control programme ! Ergo, the policy against this zoonosis in exporting countries is “doing nothing”. Where are widely declared OIE, WHO, FAO and EU programmes to protect consumer health against foodborne infections when letting them to be freely exported? Where is the “famous” risk assessment ?
d) This is one of the reasons why the WTO/SPS and the OIE Code are not admitting importing countries to require pathogen-free animal products !
e) If we consider the above mentioned information and the consciously holey OIE Code, then it can be supposed that every day is introduced, without any ante-export and post-import specific controls and investigations, into importing countries enormous quantity of zoonotic salmonellae (including exotic strains) spreading freely in extensive territories infecting incalculable numbers of human beings ! This infection is the first one reaching its globalization thanks to “doing nothing” at international level.
f) The OIE instead of trying to avoid global mass spreading of this extremely important foodborne disease pathogens has opened the way for their free long-distance spreading through international trade when applying the policy of “doing nothing” !
What are the thousands of papers and hundreds of international meetings on animal salmonellosis as foodborne disease for, when the situation in the world is rapidly deteriorating as never before thanks to internationally organized “doing nothing” at the field level?
6.19 The OIE doesn’t respect at all that every case of export/import of animal commodities is different in place and time and therefore it must be solved flexibly respecting biological character of multi-infection agents and importing country conditions and needs for sanitary innocuous goods. The OIE Code provisions are very rigid not admitting any adjustment to actual sanitary conditions in exporting countries as well as in importing ones. The whole Code reflects administrative bureaucratic approach strongly influenced by the “paper veterinary epidemiologist-theoreticians”.
6.20 Other theoretical non-sense provisions are represented by the “Code guidelines for reaching a judgement of equivalence of sanitary measures” not respecting the absolute lack of reliable data on true animal population health situation and on anti-epizootic measures in the countries. The OIE Code doesn’t respect at all that there are not two countries with the same animal health situation, with the same multi-infection structure, occurrence, immunity and stage of development under the same conditions, that there are not two infection strains with the same characteristics, that the infections represent a dynamic phenomenon in permanent change in time and place, etc. requiring different sanitary measures. Every exporting country has different situation in individual and multi-etiological infection occurrence requiring different approach in identifying sanitary import conditions. These facts are not considered in the OIE Code based on pure bureaucratic approach not respecting at all scientific principles, biology, ecology and normal logic.
The sanitary measures are internal problems of any country. The non-quantifiable comparison (“artificial exercise”) of these measures is without any importance for fair trade requiring full sanitary quality of exporting commodities ! In no any other standard for international trade is included similar non-sense of “measures equivalence” as it is in the OIE Code.
6.21 The importing countries should be informed truly and in full on animal infection occurrence in exporting countries. Unfortunately, the OIE “usurped” in 1996 global information system on animal infection occurrence (till that year the system was common to FAO, WHO and OIE) and immediately reduced significantly information for importing countries making them unable to objectively assess epizootiological situation in exporting countries and infection introduction risks. The OIE abolished regular reporting on infection introduction through international trade making impossible to analyse globally infections/pathogens’ long-distance spreading and globalization. The OIE abolished regular reporting on infections’ occurrence grading, on first reporting infection cases in the country, etc. The OIE replaced all these information by a cross “+” not distinguishing infection in one animal or million animals = absolute confusion of importing countries! Also the new OIE information system WAHID is based on deliberate misleading omissions and on maximal ad absurdum theoretical (even non-sense) combinations of reported very incomplete data on animal infection occurrence (for “paper epidemiologist” publications ?), not respecting at all practical needs of member country governments (what should be the objectives of the OIE information system).
More information in:
http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/globsurveillance.htm “Global crisis of communicable animal infections' monitoring and surveillance: less information on their occurrence than before computer era = facilitating infections/pathogens spreading through international trade !”
6.22 a) The OIE has abolished, thanks to its Code extremely benevolent for the trade, all suitable motivations for effective animal population health protection, multi-infection investigations, control and eradication in exporting countries. These countries, knowing that they must not export healthy animals and pathogen-free animal products, stopped after WTO/SPS and “new” OIE policy previous intensive and demanding surveillance and monitoring based on active preventive investigations to discover all specific infections’ affected herds and territories, control and eradication programmes. Former motivation for highest possible sanitary quality of animal commodities disappeared saving money and work at the expense of importing country animal and human health. Stopping intensive anti-infection programmes represents one of the consequences that almost all known animal infections continues spreading and their occurrence become irreparable. Animal population specific infections’ free status due to successful eradication programmes is being converted into previous infection occurrence status (all work and resources have been lost). Minimizing active investigations is conducing to the lost of the knowledge of specific infection occurrence and eventual sanitary “measures” are becoming semi-blind up to blind at all. Without the knowledge of specific infection situation at the level of herds and territories, the export document issuing veterinarian can “confirm” anything (no investigation = no knowledge = health !?) when the OIE Code is prohibiting to sign anything what is him unknown = not to issue any sanitary guarantee !
b) Even importing country governments stopped intensive preventive investigations, infection control and eradication programmes due to the OIE policy supporting infections/pathogens introduction through international trade in animal commodities. The continuation of animal infections’ control and eradication programmes, when combined with new introductions of specific pathogens, has lost practical sense.
It would remind the work of mythical Sisyphus who was condemned in Hades eternally to push a rock to the top of a hill from which it rolled down again.
c) The OIE doesn’t care at all about the consequences of its policy of conscious continuous mass long-distance spreading of infections in the world in spite of its demagogical promising “global animal health improvement” as a new (?) priority of this organization.
6.23 a) The OIE doesn’t care that international documents influencing the trade to be concise and fully transparent, including the used terms, to facilitate their uniform understanding. The OIE Code for international trade in animals and animal products is incredibly over-complicated (not considering its extraordinary size), not transparent and full of terms without clear cut definitions obviously to cloud the countries when making decision on the import. The problem is not artificial of not quantifiable subjective risk assessment but how to assure that the exporting animal commodity is sanitary innocuous, i.e. free of pathogens of communicable diseases of animals, incl. transmissible to man. About this, there is not one word in the whole OIE Code provisions’ “jungle” neither in all other OIE official documents. The purpose is to pulverize the problem and thus to confuse importing country to accept the animal commodity under very benevolent (minimized) sanitary conditions, i.e. including infection pathogens.
b) In the OIE Code there are speculative theoretical terms which can be understood differently such as: acceptable risk, unacceptable risk, appropriate level of protection, compartment, establishment, biosecurity plan, biosecurity measures, infected zone, unimpeded trade, containment zone, etc. Who decides in concrete cases what is acceptable, appropriate, unacceptable, unimpeded trade, containment zone, etc. ? The OIE or exporting countries dictating importing countries the “level” of their sanitary protection ?
c) Post-SPS OIE Code tricky novelties to facilitate export of animal infection pathogens: Risk analysis section: absurd guidelines for import risk analysis, formal evaluation of veterinary services (only questionnaire called it falsely by the OIE as “international standard”), zoning, compartmentalisation, regionalization, guidelines for reaching a judgement of equivalence of sanitary measures, etc.. From practical point of view all of them represent only nonsense unreal methods having nothing to do with importing country animal health protection. The deliberate purpose is, unfortunately, exactly on the contrary.
Examples: OIE Code 2007, Chapter 1.1.1 General Definitions: “
Quantitative risk assessment - means an assessment where the outputs of the risk assessment are expressed numerically.
Qualitative risk assessment - means an assessment where the outputs on the likelihood of the outcome or the magnitude of the consequences are expressed in qualitative terms such as ‘high’, ‘medium’, ‘low’ or ‘negligible’.
Who decides what is ‘high’, ‘medium’, ‘low’ or ‘negligible’ risk? Where is the “zero” what must be the baseline ? The OIE doesn’t know it at all ! Everybody knows that the infection introduction risk evaluation is so complex that it cannot be assessed exactly using numerical expressions = professional nonsense! All these theoretical speculations have nothing to do with fair transparent trade and serve only to confuse member country government when deciding about the sanitary conditions for importing animals and/or animal products.
d) In the same OIE Code 2007 Article there are terms useful perhaps for research works but not at all for practical international trade and for member country governments. They serve for confusing importing country governments when evaluating infection introduction risk, to can declare their arguments for import refusal or more demanding sanitary conditions as not sufficiently “scientifically justified”.
“ Transparency - means the comprehensive documentation of all data, information, assumptions, methods, results, discussion and conclusions used in the risk analysis. Conclusions should be supported by an objective and logical discussion and the document should be fully referenced. Uncertainty - means the lack of precise knowledge of the input values which is due to measurement error or to lack of knowledge of the steps required, and the pathways from hazard to risk, when building the scenario being assessed. Variability - means a real-word complexity in which the value of an input is not the same for each case due to natural diversity in a given population.“
e) Some OIE Code terms and statements are illogical and absolutely contradictory, e.g. “unimpeded trade without incurring unacceptable risks to human and animal health”. This means in actual practice, according to the OIE trade policy, that the animal commodities being not free of infections/pathogens cannot impede their export !
Example: OIE Code 2007, Article 22.214.171.124. “International trade in animals and animal products depends on a combination of factors which should be taken into account to ensure unimpeded trade, without incurring unacceptable risks to human and animal health.””
6.24 The OIE, often together with the WTO, during the last decade has organized incalculable number of meetings, trainings and produced innumerable number of different publications and documents supporting infection long-distance spreading through international trade, always referring to anti-sanitary WTO/SPS. The topic is always the same. How to facilitate export at the expense of importing country health, i.e. export of infections/pathogens. No one of these activities has been dedicated to how to avoid the export of infections/pathogens, i.e. how to improve animal health situation in exporting countries. No one of these action has been dedicated primarily neither to the methods for animal population health protection against the infection/pathogen introduction through import nor to the methods of animal population health recovery through effective control, elimination and eradication specific infections, mainly in exporting countries. The same programmes have different OIE commissions for international trade as well as WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Committee). This Committee has carried out several “Reviews of the Operation of the SPS”, always how it is beneficial to infection/pathogen exporting countries, i.e. how to make the export of non-pathogen-free animal commodities even more facile and not how to protect the animal and human health in importing countries !
According the Final Report on 75th General Session, 2007, paragraphs 86-89 “The Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Committee) held four regular meeting in 2006.” “The SPS Committee has been discussing regionalization since 2003. During these discussions, the OIE representative regularly described OIE work on zoning and compartmentalisation.”
The OIE doesn’t admit any critics or doubts or anti-SPS suggestions to be presented in its training courses, meetings, documents and websites.
Example: WTO text “Understanding the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures”: Questions and answers: Problem: How do you ensure that your country’s consumers are being supplied with food that is safe to eat – “safe” by the standard you consider appropriate ? And at the same time, how can you ensure that strict and safety regulations are not being used as an excuse for protecting domestic producers?” Exactly the same text has been repeated in many other WTO documents such as “Sanitary and phytosanitary measures” or “Standard and Safety – Food, animal and plant products - How safe is safe ?” These two sentences demonstrate clearly the intention of the WTO/SPS the consumers not to ask for sanitary fully safe food not to complicate trade in non-pathogen-free products. However, the consumers are not interested in any WTO/SPS speculation regarding sanitary innocuousness of imported food. It is obvious that the food originated from local known conditions is for them preferable to the food from countries of unknown animal health/disease situation and even without any sanitary guarantee of the innocuousness. The same problem is with the international trade in animals. The WTO and the OIE have been organizing hundreds of courses to convince the trainees to accept export of non-pathogen-free commodities (“safe is not safe”!?).
6.25 All OIE “apparat” (HQs staff, commissions, editorial boards, etc.) is in the hand of the major exporting countries maximally benefiting from the OIE trade policy at the expense of importing country health. This is the same as “to set the fox to keep the geese”. If the OIE was founded to protect animal health in the world, mainly to avoid infection long-distance spreading through trade, then for applying logical basic principle of “zero risk approach” decisive influence should be in the hands of the most threatened countries, i.e. the major importing ones and not on the contrary. The major exporting countries are abusing the fact that weak government services of importing countries are unable to detect in time or at all the introduced infections/pathogens and thus the export is without any risk of penalty. The major pathogen-exporting countries, through the WTO/SPS and the OIE Code, dictate importing countries to accept animal commodities of non-full-sanitary quality (innocuousness) and even prohibit to refuse them. They dictate de facto the level of health protection in importing countries. The OIE, instead of logically requiring exporting countries to apply necessary control and eradication measures to can export the “health”, is organizing missions for veterinary service evaluation in importing countries and requiring them to apply the measures against imported diseases (= OIE is consciously expecting diseases/pathogens imports organized by itself).
Example of the major exporters see in the paragraph 4.27 h.
6.26 The OIE has trampled all principles of international animal and human population health protection.
7. Undesirable consequences of the OIE policy condusing to animal infection globalization
7.1 Good health of animals is the main prerequisite for their effective production, reproduction and optimal use as well as for human health protection against diseases transmissible from animals. These infections have opposite impact conducing to animal suffering and premature death. Similarly, good health of human beings is the main prerequisite for any adequate human activity and for leading a contended long life. Zoonoses have opposite impact conducing to human suffering and premature deaths. Imported animal infections are damaging livestock husbandry and agriculture development and thus general economic and social development in the world. The number of affected animals and human beings by imported animal infections is rapidly increasing reaching uncountable size. Due to missing global statistics on this problem, it could be use only rough estimates. Therefore, this chapter is dedicated to consequence forms only.
7.2 In the world during last decade incalculable number (billions ?) of animals and persons (hundreds of millions ?) have been affected by “legally” imported animal infections/pathogens, thanks mainly to the benevolent OIE Code. The numbers of affected animals and humans in importing countries are rapidly increasing (multiplying effect) due to missing both effective international measures against the infection/pathogen export and successful post-introduction actions to detect and eradicate them.
7.3 Everybody knows (with exception of the OIE ?), that any animal infection introduced from abroad is contributing to the deterioration of animal health situation locally and often to further spreading territorially, nationally and sometime up to continentally and finally to globally affecting incalculable number of animals and humans (in case of zoonoses). In one or very few days any animal infection, thanks mainly to the OIE policy, can be exported through infected animal commodity to any part of our planet. Everybody knows that not eradicated imported infections can remain and spread for a long time.
7.4 The deterioration of animal infection situation consists in the introduction of new infection in specific infection free country (historically or after successful eradication) or increasing actual specific infection focality, morbidity and mortality values. When the introduced infections are not eradicated, what is the usual case, then they are getting chance for further spread and eventually to enroot locally – territorially in form of enzootics that could last sometimes almost “for ever” (mainly when penetrating among wildlife) and become the source of further spreading. The OIE is consciously supporting international long-distance spread and globalization of animal infections due to doing nothing (or almost nothing) to avoid the export of communicable diseases.
7.5 Thank to immense size of international trade in non-healthy animals and non-pathogen-free animal products (the OIE doesn’t know and doesn’t admit trade in healthy animals and pathogen- free animal products) the health situation of our planet human and animal populations is becoming every day worse and worse without any action to stop this irreparable disaster. The national and international control and eradication programmes, not considering very few exceptions, are practically the past (before dismantling government veterinary services and minimizing public services role) and today almost unknown for the OIE and other relevant international organizations.
7.6 Classification of consequence characteristics of animal infections has many criteria such as according to: animal species and categories, causality, environmental impacts, disease forms (peracute, acute, subacute, subchronic, chronic, unapparent carries), quantitative aspects (e.g. losses in milk yields, meat production weight), qualitative aspects (e.g. lower animal product quality - non-free of infections/pathogens, lower prices and restrictions in distribution and consumption), direct/indirect impact (e.g. direct negative impact of infections on natality, indirect negative impact on body weight growing), space – losses (local, territorial, continental), time – losses (instantaneous, prolonged, continuous, permanent), visibility (e.g. visible or observed losses due to dead animals, non-visible losses due to sanitary restriction of animal movement and trade), measurability - ability to be quantified (e.g. measurable losses in litres of milk, un-quantifiable human sufferings), other criteria such as evaluation of total or of a part of losses, direct losses suffered by owners, losses suffered by the community, etc.
7.7 Worsening global animal infection situation, thanks mainly to the OIE Code policy, has different sanitary consequence forms of ecological, biological, economic, public health and social characters, separately or in combination. The consequences have different grades from mild up to catastrophic impacts. The problems is, that nobody in the world is, neither individual professionals or institutes nor international organizations analysing the global consequences of actual international trade policy in animals and their products. The OIE policy is trying to hide the incredible truth eliminating in the international animal health information system the data on the export/import of animal infections through international trade, following the OIE infection globalization policy. Therefore, the concrete data on the catastrophic consequences as a whole are missing at all. However, every literate person knows that export of infections means their distant, up to global mass spreading damaging our planet life.
7.8 Ecological consequences. Imported animal infections negatively influence fauna component of global biosphere in different forms: cause a disequilibrium of animal populations’ territorial distribution, of animal species structure and of category structure inside of individual species, reduce the size of animal populations (in some localities and in animal species up to zero), reduce to zero of some species being close to their disappearance (be threatened with extinction), reduce animal population territorial density, increase proportions of the etiological agents' vectors and reservoirs increasing risk for susceptible animal species including man. Other form of the consequences is represented by the reintroduction of specific animal infections in territories recovered in the past thank to effective eradication programmes (usually very demanding, costly and time-consuming, even many years up decades). An important indicator of imported infection spreading is the ratio primary/secondary outbreaks documenting late discovery and blockade of the primary outbreaks mainly due to weak or not existing effective anti-epizootic surveillance at field level and due to lack of necessary number of well trained veterinary professionals.
- Myxomatosis of rabbits introduced into
- Foot and mouth disease ratio primary/secondary outbreaks: Taiwan in 1977 = 1 : 6,147, UK in 1967/68 = 1 : 2,364 (430,000 lost animals); UK in 2001 = 1 : 2,030, Greece in 1994 = 1 : 94, Netherlands in 2001 = 1 : 26; European Union in 1977-1987 average = 1 : 54; Europe in 1991-2000 average = 1 : 10,5. (OIE, FAO, Davies).
7.9 Biological consequences of imported animal infections are multiform being reflected in changing characteristics and complexity of specific animal infections/pathogens as the components of the biosphere. Being under new foreign environmental conditions the introduced pathogen strains are often changing their pathogenicity, resistance, ability to reproduce and spread and increasing their virulence through passages in susceptible population. Under the new conditions, the pathogens can mutate and convert into new strains (complicating identification and effective measures), avirulent and conditionally pathogen strains can become virulent, the spectrum of vectors/reservoirs and/or of susceptible animal species can be enlarged (particularly when pathogens affecting domestic animals penetrate into multi-species wildlife). Under the new conditions, the pathogens can change the infection course from subclinical one into manifest one, from subchronic or chronic into acute or peracute one. Mixing imported with local herds having different internal and external microflora, namely of conditionally pathogen strains, can cause outburst of “sleeping” infection. A particular problem represents the import of new emerging infections, i.e. unknown infections about which the world is not yet informed and properly prepared due to missing research, suitable diagnostic methods as well as preventive and control/eradication measures = free spreading and globalization.
7.10 Economic consequences of imported animal infections are multiform being reflected in: affected animals, their herds/flocks and populations as the deterioration of all production and reproduction parameters (in terms of reduced quantity and quality) seriously complicating livestock husbandry due to interrupted animal performances of animals and of trade:
a) Reduced number of animals in total, per surface unit, per space volume unit; undesirably deformed species and category structure (proportions) due to increased mortality and premature culling and slaughter.
b) Reduced genetic value due to lower proportion of genetically valuable animals and lower rate of high yielding animals.
c) Retarded development due to: reduced natality rate, survival-to-weaning rate, survival rate; retarded age at weaning, age for feedlot, age of sexual maturity, age at first parturition, age for slaughter; reduced weight of new born, at weaning, at feedlot beginning, at a given age, at sexual maturity, at slaughter; reduce weight gain per time unit; reduced duration of active/productive life; prolonged period for achieving a given weight, etc..
d) Deteriorated reproduction performance: reduced fertility, increased number of services per conception, prolonged duration of service period and reproduction interval, reduced number of new born animals per female during one reproduction cycle and during the whole life, undesirable replacement/restocking rate, etc.).
e) Deteriorated production (e.g. milk, meat, eggs, wool, etc.) performance: reduced total production during a given period, during a production cycle, per day, per year; reduced average production per animal during a given period, during a production cycle, per time unit, per day, per year, per the whole life; reduced production per space unit and per input unit such as feed unit, monetary unit, manpower unit, etc.); increased feed per kg growth (inefficiency of conversion of nutrients from feed).
f) Deteriorated quality and price of animal products: reduced the yield of slaughter animals; carcasses not fit for consumption; reduced grade of biological quality, grade of sanitary innocuousness, grade of epizootiological innocuousness, grade of utility - ability to be processed and used without restriction; reduced price, etc.).
g) Increased cost of sanitary measures: total, per year, per production unit, per animal, proportion from total cost of animal production, of animal health preventive and control programmes, quarantine buildings, facilities (laboratories), expendable (vaccines, drugs, disinfectants, etc.) and non-expendable material, transport and logistic means, manpower, etc.; compensation for sanitary slaughter, training programme, extension material; animal health services cost, etc.
h) Negative impact of anti-infection restrictive measures on local, national and international life, economy and trade.
i) Increased value of cost/benefit of reduced animal production and of reduced food processing (increased input to decrease output in monetary terms). Cost of resources that are wasted on animals that die or being sanitary slaughtered. Excessive expenditure on feed as a result of poor feed conversion efficiency. Cost/ineffective livestock husbandry development. Losses due to inefficient production reduced price of animals and their products
j) Complications for animal production management, modern technology introduction, concentration/size and housing of animals on farms and ranches; requirement for more staff and resources than without imported infections.
k) Difficulties of national and international trade in animals and their products.
- Complete depopulation due to imported African
swine fever mortality and sanitary slaughter in
- According to FAO in 1980 following number of animals died in the whole world: 64 millions of cattle (12,7 millions MT), 128 millions of pigs (9 millions MT), 100 millions of sheep (1.5 millions MT) and 43 millions of goats (500 thousands MT).
Successful programme of eradication of
During last three decades in the 20th century Southern American
countries were prohibited to export beef to
- FAO estimated in 1962 that average total losses caused by animal diseases in developed countries were about 15 percent and in developing about 35 percent.
- Kitching, Thrusfield and Taylor
(2006): “The official
figure for the number of animals slaughtered was approximately 6.5 million, but
when the total number of still-sucking lambs, calves and pigs that were slaughtered
is included, the total could be as high as ten million.
Approximately three million healthy animals were slaughtered to control
the epidemic.! The financial cost of the FMD epidemic in the
7.11 Public health consequences. Imported animal infections transmissible to man cause sufferings, working incapacity, invalidity, and deaths in human populations, mainly in rural and sub-rural areas of cities. The incidence and prevalence of these infections have grave negative impact on the health and well-being of people. The consequences are reflected: in reducing human life duration, grades of human health quality, grades of human welfare, productive life duration and working ability; in increasing risks for human health, cost of preventive and treatment drugs, vaccines, sanitation, etc.. While the effect of imported zoonoses on human productivity or output in terms of lost income and the cost of treatment can be quantified, the value of premature mortality and human suffering are completely different categories which cannot be evaluated in monetary terms. The negative consequences that can be quantified in monetary value of: preventive investigations, diseased persons' investigations, specific vaccinations, preventive treatments, curative treatments, sanitation actions, hospitalization, specific control measures, compensations and subsidies, public health services, public health extension work, specific research and training; losses due to epidemiological limitations and prohibitions and other costs related to zoonotic infection measures.
OIE risk assessment method, the relevant international organizations such as
author of this paper, unable to find in available international documents and
websites any declaration on sanitary innocuousness of the food of animal
origin, several times sent e-mails to the Secretariat of the FAO/WHO
- About fifty zoonoses can cause death in
humans. The zoonoses in
- In some “new” European Union countries the limits for
pathogens in food originally fixed at
zero value must be changed and accept food-borne-disease pathogens in food up to certain limit, admitted following the FAO/WHO
7.12 Social consequences. Undesirable negative social consequences of imported animal infections are multiform being reflected mainly in reducing standard of living of affected people projected mainly in lower income and reduced animal product consumption. Reduced animal production contributes to the poverty of livestock output depended population. Reduced animal production contributes to the hunger of human population depending on livestock product consumption. Poverty and hunger contributes to the interruption up to making impossible normal social, cultural, sportif and political activities. Deterioration of psychological well-being accompanying imported zoonotic infection. Similar consequences are related with the measures against imported infections.
Kitching, Thrusfield and Taylor (2006): “The consequences .. were severe: economically, in terms of cost to the country; socially, in terms of misery and even suicides among those involved in the slaughter programme. The amount of slaughter that took place is not longer likely to be tolerated by the public. The public memory of the mounds of dead animals, funeral pyres and burial pits cannot be erased. “
7.13 The OIE has been continually avoiding to analyse catastrophic consequences of its policy and to inform member country governments about this horrifying reality. Instead, the OIE deals with annual changes in its overcomplicated Code and with frequent changes in global animal health information system loosing more and more its information value for import condition decisions. Other “tactics” to avoid dealing with rapidly worsening global animal health situation is represented by the incredible amount of topics to be dealt during the OIE general sessions having nothing to do with the protection of health in importing countries during international trade such as animal welfare (local problem), animal health modelling (speculations), etc. The problem of individual animal suffering is nationally important but the mass suffering of incalculable millions of animals affected by imported infections/pathogens due to OIE policy is not the subject for this anti-sanitary organization.
Note: The OIE has produced enormous number of papers and organized enormous number of international meetings, seminars, conferences, missions, agreements, etc. as never before while the global animal infection situation has been worsening as never before, thanks mainly to criminal support of animal infection export.
In 2006 there were 160 OIE Reference Laboratories and 20 OIE Collaborating Centres in 30 countries covering 101 diseases and topics. In the particular OIE Annual Report of 728 pages, they reported on enormous number of activities and publications but no one was dedicated to the main problem - global analysis of critical situation, its causes and consequences as well as the suggestions for the improvement in the given disease or topic. They do not feel any responsibility for increasing morbidity and mortality in the world and prefer to dedicate their activities to secondary local problems following the OIE instructions not including global problem analyses avoiding the discovery of the truth which could seriously “complicate” the export.
7.14 Animal infection globalization and worldwide circulation of specific pathogens, invisible enemies for all species of animal kingdom, including human, are not the OIE problem ? The protection of global animal population health is not the OIE responsibility ? Is the OIE an organization responsible for its policy, activities and results to nobody ?
8.1 The “Discussion” usually compares already published data and texts dealing with the same or similar subjects. Unfortunately, the author has not been able to find for the comparison relevant publications on animal infections’ globalization through international trade. His publications on this subject are available on the website http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz. Many components of author’s publications are included in this paper. It is a pity that neither any relevant international organization nor any institution have produced scientific analysis of animal infections’ globalization through international trade. The OIE, as only global organization responsible for the collection and dissemination of data on animal infections, abolished deliberately this kind of reporting. The author has tried to collect and analyse official data available up to 1996 and then only ad hoc data on imported animal infections. See References.
8.2. Actual increase of global warming, the hunger of hundreds of millions of inhabitants, mainly in developing countries, and excessive urbanization (isolation from natural conditions) make international infection spreading much more serious due to reduced natural resistance of the world populations. Even the World Health Organization (WHO) warns *) that actual changes in global climate create conditions for much rapid spreading of infections diseases than up today. This is fully valid also for the spreading of infections/pathogens through the export/import of animals and animal products.
*) Warnings of Marget Chan, Director General, WHO, August 2007 about steadily increasing number of newly discovered and re-emerged infections, about the speed of communicable disease spreading and about the threat of by global pandemics (“transmission in the whole world could last only few hours”).
Mr. Al Gore,
8.3 The OIE
absolutely doesn’t care that the most important human right is the right to
life (United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and
proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A III) of
8.4 Mass long-distance spread of animal infections (including those transmissible to man) through trade in the whole world, thanks mainly to the OIE policy, has already lost the chance for significant reduction and eradication of almost all known animal infections (up today no one has been eradicated globally). The man-made created very critical situation will be getting worse due to further horizontal and vertical (to next generations) spread, mostly sneaky, of imported uncontrolled diseases. Some of these “invisible enemies”, mainly those penetrated into wildlife, could last up to the end of terrestrial life on our planet contributing to its man-made destruction. We are witnesses of real global bioterrorism organized by an organization financed even by the country governments.
8.5 More than one decade “improving animal health worldwide” has not been the OIE priority (?). Thanks to the OIE policy the imported infections/pathogens have caused incalculable millions of deaths and sufferings of animals and human beings in the entire world, much higher than due to recent wars and terrorism acts.
There is a difference – the war and local terrorist action consequences can be mended during relatively a short period while the introduced infection spreading consequences can last much longer, if not up to end of life on our planet. The OIE policy could be understood as historically the first consciously organized global crime against our planet life damaging its biosphere due to dangerous disruption of biological/ecological balance and increasing global occurrence of animal infections conducing to animal populations’ reduction and to human populations’ hunger. Actual planet warming is creating easier conditions for animal infection spreading, due to imposing stress upon infected animals and humans, than before !
- The OIE policy avoiding export of healthy animals and pathogen-free animal products is exactly opposite to its absolutely false and demagogic proclamation about animal welfare ! The OIE policy admitting zoonoses export is also entirely opposite to human welfare !
- The above mentioned documents have been not produced anonymously – the names are known and the history of our planet life will never forget them !
8.6 The OIE has trampled all principles of international fair trade and of animal and human health protection !
Perhaps, the OIE could be converted into a self-financed discussion club (saving money of the governments), e.g. within the World Veterinary Association, without having direct impact on the global animal commodity trade not to cause more damages. It could continue to organize meetings and to produce wordy theoretical papers of armchair pseudo-epidemiologists for publication, discussions and conferences. Then the trade could be again free and follow fair international trade principles.
8.7 The absurdity of the OIE Code can be demonstrated by the theoretical application of its provisions on international trade in inanimate commodities (which do not contain dangerous components able to reproduce and spread themselves as in the case of animate commodity pathogens) “to facilitate trade” applying the dogma that “Import risk analysis is preferable to a zero risk approach.”).
- could not refuse offered commodity without providing exporting country written well documented convincing scientific justification (i.e. not respecting the right to select freely the most suitable country);
- could not require at all full quality, e.g. fully usable/functioning product, without any post-import troubles;
- could not require better quality without written convincing scientifically justified risk assessment;
- could not require quality guarantee document;
- could not require the commodity to be free of defects;
-could not refuse the commodity not free of defects;
- should pay imported commodity as for 100 % quality regardless of real quality grade;
- should pay the commodity not free of defects as for defect-free one, i.e. full price;
- should pay all repairs of imported defected commodities and other post-import losses itself ;
- could not reclaim defected commodity (due to non existence of legally binding quality guarantee documents);
- should discard defected irreparable imported commodities and pay for it itself;
- should accept exporting country representatives to evaluate reasons for demanding import conditions;
- should accept exporting country statistical methods admitting major proportion of defected goods;
- should be totally excluded of all imports if requiring zero risk importation policy !?
According to the OIE Code provisions the requirements for full quality commodities or to insist on guarantees as the absence of defects would be irresponsible and contrary to the principles of encouraging international trade !!!
These theoretical examples reconfirm the OIE Code concept unscrupulously favoring exporting countries at the expense of the importing ones. According to OIE concept the exporting countries could not be responsible for the commodity quality !
8.8 The criminal perversity of the WTO/SPS and the OIE Code illustrates the simple example:
the purchaser cannot require full quality good; he must take any, even damaging ones (it cannot be simply refused), as the seller decides (without any quality guarantee thanks to the WTO and OIE export supporting dictate), but he must pay as for full quality and face negative consequences himself ! The producer/seller/exporter decides, not the paying end-user !
8.9 The OIE is doing everything to suppress any information for world public and institutions on its infection globalization policy causing disastrous consequences for human and animal health.
8.10 The OIE does not concentrate its activities on the main and only task for which it is responsible, which was given at its own creation: to prevent the transmission of animal diseases between states based on thorough analysis of their spread, mainly due to international trade.
Instead, the OIE without official approval of the member-country governments renamed itself “World Organization for Animal Health” and has expanded its activities to almost all problems of veterinary medicine (such as animal welfare, zoo-hygiene, drugs, etc.) at the local (national) levels not conducing to international spreading of animal infections. These problems do not require international actions and therefore the OIE has not any responsibility for their solutions. This organization, facilitating export of animal infections (as mentioned above) has become a bureaucratic institution producing mountains of papers and organizing a lot of meetings with relatively minimal positive impact (if any) on practical solution of anti-epizootic problems to protect consistently importing countries against the infection introduction from abroad. As an example of an incredible paperwork, it can be mentioned enormous number of OIE bilateral agreements – about 50 ! (“playing” on international importance ?) consuming time and resources to the detriment of the principal obligation that it does not comply. The OIE avoids responsibility for its main obligation and deals with relatively easy agenda without being officially responsible.
Note: Cooperation Agreements between the OIE and Intergovernmental Organizations and other Nongovernmental Organizations (2010):
FAO, WHO, PAHO/WHO, WTO, WB, EC, IICA, GS-AC, OIRSA, SAARC, SPC, CABI, OAU-IBAR, SADC, CEBEVIRHA, WVA, IFAH, FEI, IDF, IMS, ILRI, ABs, PVC, SEAFDEC, SSAF, IFAP, AOAD, ECOWAS, WAVLD, ICMM, IEC, WSPA, ICLAS, ICES, IPC, ASEAN, IDB, IATA, WCO, WAEMU, WMO, WIPO, WSAVA, ISO, CIC, UMA, GF-TADs, GLEWS, GFSI.
9.1 The OIE policy conducing to man-made globalization of animal infections has catastrophic consequences for our planet life. The WTO/SPS through the OIE Code has caused incalculable numbers of newly affected animals and persons by “legally” imported pathogens conducing to infection globalization = man-made irreparable global ecological disaster. The OIE policy is conducing to serious irreparable changes of the planet microflora structure in favour of infection disease pathogens. The OIE policy is conducing to gradual irreparable colonization of the planet by the damaging dangerous microbes and parasites devastating our earth fauna due to postimport horizontal and vertical spreading (multiplying impact) during the future.
9.2 The OIE, thank its animal infection globalization policy, has become a very dangerous organization for global animal kingdom health and surviving. Global spreading of pathogens (with multiplying effect, sometimes even up to exponential curve tendency) through international trade can contribute to the disappearance of many animal species and in the far future even to vanishing of “homo sapiens”, i.e. to humankind disappearance !
The irresponsible OIE doesn’t care at all about the consequences of its policy for the future development of our planet life and humankind fate ! The OIE obviously follows the proverb “Why bother about the future when we are dead and gone !”.
9.3 OIE Code “risk assessment” being required from importing countries (however, not being used for the OIE Code itself !!!) is a big criminal trickery not to guarantee the infection-free-status of exported animals and their products but guaranteeing for sure the long-distance spread and future globalization of animal infections !
Perverse situation: animal commodity importing countries are paying membership fees of an organization damaging seriously their human and animal health, livestock development and production, economics, people living standard, biosphere, etc. ! The importing countries are paying an organization which has been converted from useful institution into their “enemy”.
9.4 The tragedy is that the animal infections spread as never and no any international organization carries out any effective programme to block and reduced them, i.e. to improve global animal population health applying the principle of globalization of animal health. Simple passive monitoring of some selected infection diseases, without any follow-up actions, is absolutely not any solution. Instead of practical international control and eradication programmes, these organizations linked with animal health, entirely isolated from the field realities and needs, are producing only incredible amount of papers and theoretical meetings and discussions, following the very bad example of the OIE.
9.5 The OIE criminal policy organizing animal infection globalization conducing, due to imported infections, to mass sufferings and deaths of increasing incalculable number of animals and humans (x-times higher than due to recent wars and international terrorism), has also several other very negative consequences additionally to those mentioned above in the chapter 7. The OIE not only contributed to the dismantlement of government services minimizing their staff and resources making it unable to control effectively trade and animal infections but also to minimizing up to zero animal population health/disease: field activities (prevention, surveillance, investigations, infection elimination/eradication, etc.), research, science, undergraduate education and postgraduate training avoiding practical problem solutions. Shortly, the OIE has caused a global destruction of previously well developing animal population medicine theory and practice (epizootiology, veterinary epidemiology, food hygiene, zoohygiene, etc.) giving the priority to the trade profit of the richest exporting countries and not to the protection of health and life in importing countries. The OIE has betrayed its mission and basic medical principle (Primum non nocere).
9.6 If we want to maintain our planet in habitable conditions also for future generations, we must minimize the risk of its biosphere destruction. Improving animal health worldwide cannot be implemented by the actual export business servile OIE which has lost its original anti-epizootic position and professional animal health authority and is guilty for historical record in worsening global animal health. It is not doubt that thanks to actual staff “constellation” at the OIE and its domination by the major exporting countries, the OIE will continue in its actual support of infection long-distance (incl. intercontinental) mass spreading through international trade. To start the programme of global animal health improving will not be possible without immediate abolishment of the WTO/SPS and of all actual OIE Code anti-sanitary provisions or of the OIE as an intergovernmental organization (supporting consciously animal infection globalization) and letting this task to United Nations Organization respecting normal principles of fair international trade also in animals and animal products and normal principles of international animal and human health protection.
9.7 Last warning letters, sent to the most influential organizations and persons asking for actions to stop without any delay the WTO and the OIE organizing animal infection globalization through international trade, represent further arguments testifying dangerous risk for the life on our planet:
a) Internationally organized spread of
infectious diseases damaging global health, biosphere and UN programmes
– document for United Nations Secretary-General sent on
b) Invisible threat to our planet biosphere – warning against infectious
disease globalization – document for Executive Director, United Nations
Environmental Programme sent on
of infectious diseases – underestimated dangerous threat to our planet
biosphere – document for Dr Al Gore, Former US Vice-President sent on
d) Information letters on infection globalization through international trade were also sent to Barack Obama, USA President-elect on 21 November 2008 and 18 January 2009.
Post-WTO/SPS OIE Animal Health Codes for International Trade:
Special Issue 1997
Seventh Edition, 1998
Eighth Edition, 1999
Ninth Edition, 2000
Tenth Edition, 2001
Eleventh Edition, 2002
Twelfth Edition, 2003
Thirteenth Edition, 2004
Fourteenth Edition, 2005
Fifteenth Edition, 2006
Sixteenth Edition, 2007
Seventeenth Edition, 2008
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- Kouba V. (2004): Abuse of disease import risk assessment method facilitating infection export. http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/riskassessement.htm
- Kouba V. (2004): Book Review - Handbook on Import Risk Analysis for Animals and Animal Products, OIE. Acta Veterinaria Brno, 73: 549-551-
- Kouba V. (2005): Book Review - Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2004. Acta Veterinaria Brno, 2005, 74 (1):161-1963. http://www.vfu.cz/acta-vet/vol74/74-161.pdf
- Kouba V. (2006): Critical analysis of OIE Animal Health Code for international trade supporting infections/pathogens' export = the most dangerous document damaging global animal population health in the history ! http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/OIEcode.htm
- Kouba V. (2006): Global tables of epizootiological importance reflecting the deterioration of world animal population health: Reported cases of specific infection/pathogen introduction in individual countries according to specific infections (1,319 reports). http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/disintrod.htm.
- Kouba V. (2007): Book Review - Terrestrial Animal Health Code 2005. Acta Veterinaria Brno, 2006, 75: 481-483. http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/OIEcode2005.htm
- MacDiarmid S.C. (1992): The Importation into
- Murray N. et col. (2004): Handbook on Import Risk Analysis for Animals and Animal products. OIE, Paris, 183 pp.
- Morley R.S. (Editor) (1993): Risk Analysis, animal health and trade. OIE Revue scientific and technique, vol. 12, No 4, 390 pp.
- Ozawa, Y., Chang, K,
Yoshida, K. and Michino, H. (2003): The present and future organization of
Veterinary Services in
- Rweyemamu M.M. and Astudillo V.M. (2002): Global perspectives for foot and mouth disease control. Rev.sci.tech.Off.int.Epiz. 21(3)
- Thiermann A. (2004): Emerging diseases and implications for global trade. Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. Int. Epiz., Vol. 23 (2).
- Thiermann A. (2004): Adapting veterinary infrastructure to meet the challenges of globalization and the requirements of the World Trade Organization Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (WTO/SPS). OIE Review scientific and technique, Vol. 23 (1).
- Zepeda C., Salman M., and Ruppaner R. (2001): International trade, animal health and veterinary epidemiology: challenges and opportunities. Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 48: 261-271.
11. Annex I
Book Review – Agricultura Tropica et Subtropica, Universitas Agriculturae Praga, Vol. 45 (3) 2012: 80-81 :
Models in the management of animal diseases, OIE Review scientific and technique, Vol. 30 (2), 2011
The Office International of
Epizootics (OIE) publication of 261 pages contains 22 papers edited by P.
Willeberg from the Center for Animal Disease Modelling and Surveillance,
P. Willeberg et al. describe a limited model applied
in practical solving surveillance of trichinellosis and BSE in
three papers deal also with FMD management modelling. These “works” belong,
similarly as the majority of the papers, among unbelievable fantasies having
nothing to do with practical life and missing any proof of their feasibility,
efficiency and usefulness. Their authors have not good idea about practical
management of animal infections and belong among “armchair epidemiologist” playing with
computers and inventing absurd mathematical models. A deterrent example is
represented by so called “standard” of K. Owen et al. from
The OIE on one side is publishing a paper of S.S. Nielsen et al. on a model simulating paratuberculosis control while on the other side has eliminated specific protection measures from its Terrestrial Animal Health Code admitting global spread of this infection through international trade.
In the publication it cannot be found a single example where mathematical model has helped practically to solve control and eradication of any animal infection. There is no one model that has proven effective in animal disease management practice to can serve as an useful example for the others. Mathematical modelling represents today a “mania” propagated mainly by those having no any responsibility for animal population health protection and communicable disease management. Many authors are undergraduate and postgraduate educators of “modern veterinary epidemiologists” (including from developing countries) able to process statistical data and elaborate disease management models but not to solve practical problems in the field. It is much easier and more comfortable to sit in office and work with a computer than to solve animal infections under difficult field conditions and being responsible for the results.
The utility of mathematical models as tactical decision support tools is very limited by the innate unpredictability of disease spread. A model constitutes a theory, and a predictive model is therefore only theoretical projection. No model will produce the right output when fed by the wrong input. The UK experience provides a very serious warning of how mathematical models can have unforeseeable catastrophic consequences.
I wonder why the OIE, responsible for animal population health protection, is wasting its resources for almost useless “products“ instead of concentrating the efforts on its original basic duty to assist in avoiding animal infection spreading through international trade, what has become today’s reality. The countries, first of all the developing ones, need guidance on effective measures based on practical experience and not theoretical fantasies. Václav Kouba
Note: From Wikipedia: Re UK 2001 FMD “The extreme overkill of many disease-free animals (80 % of culled livestock were clear) was a result of inappropriate poor mathematical modelling that did not reflect the epidemiology of the epidemic.”
12. Annex II
Book Review – Agricultura Tropica et Subtropica, Universitas Agriculturae Praga, Vol. 46 (4), 2013: 136:
Good governance and financing of efficient Veterinary Services. OIE Scientific and Technical Review 31 (2), 2012
This publication of the Office International of Epizootics (OIE) of 321 pages containing 21 papers was edited by Dr Laurent Msellati, Senior Manager of the Agriculture and Rural Development Team for the Latin America and Caribbean Region, World Bank, Washington.
The contributions deal with different aspects of the
governance and financing of public veterinary services such as: good veterinary
governance definition, measurement and challenges, veterinary service missions,
animal health legislation, governance and management of veterinary
laboratories, coordination between veterinary services, good governance in “one
health” approaches, global public good concept, economic analysis of animal
health, strategic plans for improving the performance, veterinary services in
developing countries, financing public veterinary services, organization of
veterinary services, public-private partnerships; etc.. At the end there is an
interesting annex called “Good governance
and the financing of efficient Veterinary Services guidance note”
representing a form of a summary.
The majority of the papers deal with selected subjects only theoretically without concrete examples proving practical application of the authors’ ideas. There are very few practical examples useful for the paying governments - members of the OIE as independent intergovernmental organization. Almost all papers call for strengthening veterinary services and refer to so called “OIE international standard” which is de facto only a form of a questionnaire. On the other hand among 352 literature references the most important documents on governance of public veterinary services such as “Standard of Veterinary Services” FAO, 1974 and “Guidelines for strengthening animal health services in developing countries“, FAO, 1991 are not mentioned at all. The editor and the contributors underestimated the fact that the main criterion of a good governance are practical results, i.e. how far the services had contributed to the protection and betterment of animal population health. It is a pity that not a single paper describes veterinary service efficiency using cost/benefit analysis, comparison of centralized with decentralized services governance, methods for identification of service priorities and a governance analysis from a country with excellent nationwide practical results..
As usually, also this OIE publication is dominated by a small group of major exporting developed countries. From 46 authors (only one is Chief Veterinary Officer having experience with national veterinary service governance), 17 indicate France as their country origin. This country, leading the OIE from its very beginning in 1924 (including the post of Director General) is “giving lessons” to all the countries and therefore one would expect its governance system as a good model for the others. Unfortunately, according to OIE documents, France has had problems with the efficiency of its veterinary services. For example: more than a half of present internationally reportable animal diseases are not officially notifiable (i.e. their occurrence cannot be known); 2001 export of foot and mouth disease into Netherlands (causing more than 200 000 dead animals); inability to eradicate bovine brucellosis, bovine tuberculosis and enzootic bovine leukosis (eradicated years ago in many European countries) etc..
The OIE selected as the Editor, instead of an experienced Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO), an officer from the World Bank. In the 1990s, this organization, together with International Monetary Fund (both dominated by the same countries as the OIE) forced the governments to minimize their role through significantly reducing their budget. As the consequence public veterinary services in the majority of the countries have been drastically reduced and almost dismantled. CVOs of these countries, due to critical shortage of money and staff, became “generals without solders” not able to deal with national animal health problems as before. Their public veterinary services have lost previous capacity to control animal health situation, to eradicate infectious diseases, to inspect trade in animal commodities, to protect inhabitants against disease transmissible from animals, etc. Private “accredited veterinarians”, depending existentially on local breeders and producers, sometimes unreliable and easily to be corrupt, cannot replace at all the role of independent public services. No one paper deals with this fact when calling for strengthening public veterinary services. Due to actual critical lack of resources, in spite of availability of effective methods, rich experience and all the efforts of public veterinary services, animal health situation in the world is getting worse as never before.
More information in: http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz.
France is also dominating EU veterinary policy conducing to mass spreading (Europeanization) of infectious diseases through international trade due to: very benevolent OIE-EU sanitary conditions, abolished border controls, unreliable certificates (without infection-free guarantee) and minimum (if any) inspections on the spot by public veterinary service. For example: during 1990-1996 in 181 from 326 cattle shipments imported from Western Europe into Czech Republic with “official veterinary certificates” there were discovered different infectious diseases (tuberculosis in 3, paratuberculosis in 24, IBR in 39, trichophytosis in 86, leptospirosis in 11 and hypodermosis in 18 shipments)! The EU, following the bad example of the OIE, instead of consistent practical protection against infectious disease spread through international trade, instead of practical Europe-wide control and eradication programmes against all important transmissible diseases of animals, is applying the easiest policy - “doing nothing” (with the exception of paperwork. meetings, publications, legislation not respecting the individual country situation, conditions, priorities needs and resources). E.g. The EU has been unable to eradicate African swine fever imported in 1978 in Sardinia, Italy. To import an infection is the question of a moment, however eradicate it is extremely difficult up to impossible. The animal population health in Europe is rapidly deteriorating even in the countries self-declared as with “good governance of veterinary services”.
One of the basic principles of good governance and financing is to focus available resources on the main duties to achieve the key objectives. The OIE, instead of consistently implementing its only duty as “international office of epizootics for the control of infectious animal diseases”, self-decided in May 2003, without any official clearances by all member country governments, to expand its activities arguing that “the scope of the OIE’s missions has evolved beyond the prevention and control of epizootic diseases to include all animal health issues”. The OIE ignores that the “new issues” of infinitive numbers are the responsibility of individual country governments while the OIE is responsible for international control of epizootics. Distracting activities from the epizootic control is irresponsible wasting resources of member country governments, instead of concentrating them on its main duty under new world-wide emergency – rapidly increasing infection spread through global trade. Enormous new bureaucracy requiring additional paperwork (e.g. the OIE has signed more than 50 “Cooperation Agreements” with different organizations) and meetings are burdening also member countries. The OIE, instead of alarming the world, doesn’t care at all about the causes and consequences of animal diseases spreading through international trade. Extremely benevolent “OIE Code” facilitates export of animal commodities at the expense of health in importing countries. It supports WTO (World Trade Organization) policy: first business/profit and not sanitary innocuousness. The question arises as to justify the existence of this organization not fulfilling its duty, ignoring catastrophic consequences of its policy and contributing to irreparable globalization of animal infections.
The OIE produces some useful documents such as manuals for diagnostic standards. As far as the “OIE Scientific and Technical Review” the member country governments expect information helping them to solve their problems mainly through publishing good examples from countries with concrete results in protection and recovery of national animal populations health (e.g. infection eradications) and protection of human health. Unfortunately, this OIE publication contains almost exclusively papers dealing with topics which can be published in hundreds of other publications issued by the universities and different veterinary institutions, associations and societies. The member country governments need information on veterinary services management conducing to successful national anti-epizootic programmes. OIE dominating countries (richest in the world) are obviously not interested in informing on more successful services in other countries. Some example can be found in http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/cmea.htm). Author’s paper “A method of accelerated eradication of bovine brucellosis in the Czech Republic” was published in the above mentioned OIE publication in 2003 after 3 years of the OIE trying not to accept it (obviously due to not believing that the country-wide eradication was achieved during only 5 years). Many contributors from Central European countries with successful anti-epizootic programmes have a similar experience.